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ABSTRACT 
It is generally assumed that the EU law regime excludes arbitration from its scope, since 
issues of EU law must be resolved within the EU legal order, according to the wording of 
the Treaties and the case law of the CJEU. It is also assumed that courts offer adequate 
and effective protection to litigants, thus arbitration does not make any further 
contribution to parties. This thesis challenges these ontological assumptions, using the 
case of bank depositors, and aims to investigate whether courts within the EU protect 
bank depositors effectively or whether arbitration would offer further protection. For this 
purpose, the nature of bank deposits is considered, and the approach of courts and 
arbitrators towards depositors are comparatively analysed, based on effectiveness of 
protection, as the appropriate tool of assessment. The findings of this examination lead to 
the final research question regarding the role, if any, of arbitration within the EU legal 
order and the relationship between arbitration and litigation, in particular within the 
context of the global financial crisis. Thus, the central argument of this thesis is that, if it 
is accepted that arbitration does have a place in the EU legal order, and based on the 
argument that bank deposits qualify as investment, bank depositors can enjoy the 
protection offered by international investment arbitration, which can protect them more 
effectively than litigation 
The originality of this work centers around three points. Firstly, this thesis aims to use the 
principle of effectiveness in a substantial sense rather than its procedural meaning, 
considering whether individuals do not only access the justice, but also being remedied 
effectively. Secondly, this thesis argues that bank deposits can be treated as investment, 
thus depositors could enjoy further protection offered by investment law. Finally, the 
thesis supports that the EU law regime does have some place available for arbitration, 
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albeit its traditional exclusion, especially during the particular period of the financial 
crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis has caused pivotal changes in the EMU’s structure1 and 
its constitutional foundations, leading to the completion of European integration being 
put at risk. Post-crisis austerity measures2 implemented by those Member States that were 
heavily hit by the crisis, which were deemed necessary to fulfil the criteria in order to 
receive financial assistance by international lenders, have raised a lot of questions with 
respect to the level of protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. 3 Although each 
Member State’s programme for financial assistance varied, the common purpose of all 
programmes was ‘to return Member States to sound macroeconomic or financial health 
and restore their capacity to meet their public-sector obligations’,4 and this purpose can 
reflect the public interest involved and which may counter-balance the effects on 
individuals’ fundamental rights. 
The aim of this thesis is to identify whether courts within the EU effectively protect bank 
depositors, as a category of individuals affected by the post-crisis austerity measures, and 
whether arbitration would offer additional protection, especially in the light of the 
ongoing global financial crisis. The selection of bank depositors as the subject matter was 
                                                                
1 Although the crisis started in the financial/banking sector, it pushed the EU economy into severe 
recession and affected simultaneously the two central policies of the Union, namely the EMU and the 
internal market, and underlined the need for public intervention in the financial/banking sector, in the 
form of state aid, state guarantee or liquidity measures and recapitalisation, and the need for permanent 
and integrated crisis systems. Remarkably, the European Banking Union has been developed after the 
crisis arose.  
2 Either affecting the banking sector of the State (for example, banks restructuring and bail-in) or the 
social and employment rights of the citizens (for example, increase in taxation, reductions in public sector 
workers’ salaries and pay cuts in the pensions of retired citizens) 
3 See N. Alkiviadou, ‘Sustainable Enjoyment of Economic and Social Rights in Times of Crisis: 
Obstacles to Overcome and Bridges to Cross’’ (JMMWP 1/2017, School of Law, UCLan Cyprus, August 
2017), available at: 
http://www.uclancyprus.ac.cy/files/5115/0407/8235/JMMWP_Dr.Natalie_Alkiviadou.pdf  (accessed 5 
September 2017) 
4 European Parliament, Committee on Budgetary Control, ‘Working document on the European Court of 
Auditors' Special Report N°18/2015 (2015 Discharge): Financial assistance provided to Member States in 
difficulties’ (2016) 2 
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made because, recently, during the financial crisis, their rights were heavily affected and 
they initiated proceedings in national, EU and international courts and arbitral tribunals. 
In other words, this thesis challenges the effectiveness of the protection offered by the 
courts to those depositors affected by the measures taken in response to the financial 
crisis. It is upon this assumption that this thesis will focus. Thus, the central argument is 
that arbitration could offer an alternative option for bank depositors that can protect them 
more effectively than litigation.  
The aim of this thesis will be achieved by examining those measures that have been 
adopted at the EU level and those implemented by Member States, under EU influence. 
The restoration of Member States’ capacity to meet their public-sector obligations and 
the survival of the Eurozone required numerous measures with broad effects on that 
country’s financial system, its economy, the labour market and its institutions. It is 
noteworthy that, so far, most challenges against those measures found recourse before the 
national courts of Member States, albeit with mixed results.5 In addition to the severe 
consequences of the crisis on the economic and social areas, there are also important legal 
aftermaths that have emanated from the actions taken by the EU institutions, international 
institutions and the Member States when countering the crisis. From the procedural scope 
of view, the financial assistance programmes and the resultant MoUs, which have been 
implemented in the Member States most heavily hit by the financial crisis, consist of a 
combination of EU and intergovernmental frameworks, a fact that prevented any social 
partners and other national or Union bodies6 from being involved. From the substantial 
scope of view, those programmes provided for fundamental changes and interferences in 
                                                                
5 See C. Kilpatrick and B. De Witte, ‘Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of 
Fundamental Rights’ Challenges’ (2014) LAW Working Papers 2014/05  
6 Such as the EU Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States 
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a wide range of subject areas that do not fall within the competences of the Union though 
they are in conflict with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
This thesis is regularly using the term ‘austerity measures’. Repasi described austerity 
measures as ‘measures whose substance is determined by a different actor than the one 
that is competent to adopt them’, and their compliance at the Member States level 
constitutes ‘a precondition for the payment of financial assistance, so non-compliance 
embodies the risk of a sovereign default of the debtor country’.7 Generally, this thesis 
recognises as austerity measures those that were implemented for the purpose of 
diminishing public deficit or, at least, restraining its increase. Such measures are 
contrasted to those that were implemented as a part of some other policy considerations 
that would exist even in the absence of a financial crisis. In other words, there is a 
distinction between the measures adopted for austerity purposes and the measures 
adopted as part of ‘a business as usual agenda’. In addition to their purpose, austerity 
measures may relate either to the public sector, by having the character of measures on 
public expenditure and structural or fiscal reforms, or to the private sector, nationalised 
or not, by having the character of measures affecting particular financial institutions that 
are considered at risk. Furthermore, austerity measures can be taken at the national level 
or at a supranational level; in other words, either by the national Parliaments, Central 
Banks and Departments of the Government or by supranational bodies, such as the IMF 
and the ESM Treaty. The involvement of Union institutions is evident, but it is rather 
indirect, in the sense that they do not adopt the measures themselves, but they are involved 
in the composition of supranational bodies, such as the international lenders, which 
consist of the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. The most common austerity 
                                                                
7 R. Repasi, ‘Judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra and Mallis’ (2017) 54 
Common Market Law Review, 1123, at 1124 
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measures include reductions in benefits and public pensions, increase in direct and 
indirect taxes, reductions in public expenditure and cuts in public sector employment and 
remuneration. Furthermore, ‘financial measures’ can be described as encompassing any 
measure or policy which relates to the banking system of a State or its sovereign debt and 
affects the citizens. Though austerity measures and financial measures can be arguably 
distinguished, this thesis treats them as one category of measures, since financial 
measures can fit in the definition given by Repasi and which is adopted in this thesis.  
The principal research problem of this thesis is whether courts within the EU protect bank 
depositors effectively and/or whether arbitration would offer more effective protection, 
especially in the light of the recent global financial crisis. The research questions guiding 
the study can be derived from the central research problem.  Initially, the rights of bank 
depositors and the restriction of those rights by the financial measures adopted by the EU 
in response to the crisis, such as the bail-in measures, the establishment and operation of 
DGSs and the agreements on exchange of national debt instruments held by the ECB and 
national central banks for new securities, shall be identified. Thus, the first research 
question evolves around the nature of bank deposits and the rights of depositors, 
identifying which of those rights have been affected by the financial measures adopted 
by the EU and/or the Member States and how. 
The importance of clarifying the nature of bank deposits lies on the necessity to identify 
those areas of law that include provisions which protect bank depositors. In addition to 
banking law, which clearly considers depositors, areas such as consumer law, contract 
law and company law may also be of relevance. Furthermore, deposits constitute property 
of their owner, thus property law provides for depositors’ rights. Finally, if it can be 
established that bank deposits qualify as investment as well, international investment law 
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should also be examined. Moreover, at a higher level, EU law and Public International 
law provide rights for depositors, in the form of fundamental rights, and are protected as 
such under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
For the purpose of this research, the term ‘depositors’ will be used and will exclude States. 
Thus, ‘depositors’ will include any individuals or businesses, either local or foreign, 
which hold deposit in a bank (financial institution). Depositors have rights arising from 
their relationship with the bank and, consequently, from the relationship between the bank 
and the State, since States themselves and, recently, the EU are responsible for the 
regulation, supervision and sometimes capitalisation of banks. The financial measures at 
the EU level and those at the Member States’ level influenced by such EU measures 
affected some of the rights of depositors, since they interfered in the banking system of 
the States in need. Thus, the depositors’ rights that have been influenced, as well as the 
extent to which this influence has taken place, are assessed.  
As it will be observed in the literature review, different legal orders treat the same rights 
in a different way. Thus, the comparative method will form the core of the analysis. 
Comparative law, as a research method, focuses on identifying mutual features among 
different legal orders. Though it mostly compares national legal orders, it is also useful 
for the analysis of aspects of EU and international law. Such comparisons contribute to 
the revision and unification of law across national frontiers. Comparative research can be 
pursued by macrocomparison, namely by comparing statutory interpretation, the role of 
precedent and the powers of judges in various legal systems, or by microcomparison, 
which compares the means through which the different legal orders resolve the same legal 
problems.  
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After analysing the rights of bank depositors affected by the EU financial measures, the 
approach of the courts shall be examined, in order to consider whether they have offered 
effective judicial protection to depositors. Arbitration, as a dispute resolution method, 
could also offer effective protection to depositors, and there are numerous cases pending 
before international arbitral tribunals challenging the measures adopted by Member States 
in order to deal with the financial crisis. In other words, the second research question 
evolves around the approach of the courts, which are dealing with the case of bank 
depositors, and the corresponding approach of arbitration, assessing in particular to what 
extent they offer effective protection to bank depositors. 
It cannot be denied that, in spite of the financial and economic primary considerations 
behind the methods employed in response to the crisis, the legal values enshrined in the 
EU Treaties and the ECHR have also been affected. Such effect constitutes the basis of 
litigation at the national level and, further, it initiates judicial dialogue between domestic 
courts and supranational courts based on the legal principles provided by EU law and 
international conventions, mostly the ECHR.   
Depositors have brought cases before national courts, but also before the CJEU, the EFTA 
Court and the ECtHR, seeking protection of their legal rights which have been affected 
by the EU financial policies. The approach of these courts must be examined so as to 
determine the extent of the effectiveness of the protection they offer and the extent to 
which judges follow a more neutral approach, away from political pressure and discourse. 
Measuring the effectiveness of the protection given to depositors could be drawn from an 
assessment established on the basis of the right of effective judicial protection, as it is 
preserved in the Charter, the ECHR and the EU Treaties and the relevant case law.  
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In particular, under EU law, effective judicial protection is preserved in Article 47 of the 
Charter which encompasses, inter alia, the right to an effective remedy of every 
individual in case of violation of EU law. The principle of effective judicial protection 
was initially treated as a ‘mere’ general principle of law evolving from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and Article 6 ECHR, until it was granted a Treaty basis 
of its own under the Lisbon Treaty and Article 19(1) TEU.8 A main argument of this 
thesis is that EU law adopts only a procedural approach towards effective judicial 
protection, while this chapter will try to involve effectiveness on the substance of a case. 
Litigation does not constitute the only available dispute resolution method for those 
affected by the austerity measures; in fact, arbitration has also been employed by 
numerous natural and legal persons. Arbitration and litigation have become the two sides 
of the coin, in cases parties are seeking a binding determination of their disputes. 
Remarkably, in history, arbitration predated litigation as a dispute resolution method. 
According to Professor Derek Roebuck: ‘Litigation is comparatively modern in the 
history of human society. It cannot predate the state, which must set up the courts which 
litigation by definition requires. Litigation and arbitration have been alternatives since at 
least the 18th century BC, when Assyrian merchants employed them in ancient 
Mesopotamia. But arbitration and mediation must be even older than that. Pre-state 
societies must have had some way other than violence to resolve their disputes.’9 
Being described as the private version of litigation, arbitration is defined as ‘an 
adjudicative dispute resolution process based on an agreement between the parties to refer 
                                                                
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/30 (‘TEU’) Article 19(1) TEU 
only creates the obligation of Member States to provide sufficient remedies to ensure effective judicial 
protection in areas protected by EU law. 
9 N. Kaplan, ‘The Role of the State in Protecting the System of Arbitration’ (2015) 81 Arbitration 452 
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a dispute or difference between them to impartial arbitrators for a decision.’10 Similarly 
and in more details, Halsbury’s Laws of England describes arbitration as ‘[t]he process 
by which a dispute or difference between two or more parties as to their mutual legal 
rights and liabilities is referred to and determined judicially and with binding effect by 
the application of law by one or more persons (the arbitral tribunal) instead of by a court 
of law.’11 Though arbitration was traditionally characterized as an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) method, its distinct characteristics rendered it an autonomous method. 
These characteristics are mainly the enforceability of awards at an international level and 
the fact that the arbitrator has the power to give a decision on the dispute that is binding 
on both parties. The fact that litigation process is public and, in most cases, it permanently 
harms the relationships between the parties due to its adversarial nature, rendered 
arbitration a more attractive option. 
As mentioned above, arbitration has also been employed by numerous natural and legal 
persons. An indicative example of the way arbitrators approach disputes on financial 
instruments and measures in response to the financial crisis is offered by the ICSID 
decision in the case of Abaclat v Argentina12  when the country defaulted on its sovereign 
debt and a class action emerged on an alleged violation of rights under a BIT after 
investors suffered a haircut of their investment. Although national citizens only had the 
option of litigation before domestic courts, foreign investors had also the alternative of 
international investment arbitration that was offered under the regime of BITs that 
Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the measures imposed 
by the government of Argentina, either legislative or regulatory, were challenged in 
numerous cases before ICSID arbitration brought by foreign investors. 
                                                                
10 S. Sime, ‘Res Judicata and ADR’ (2015) 34 Civil Justice Quarterly 35, at 42 
11 Halsbury & Halsbury, Halsbury’s Law of England (4th edn, Butterworths, 1991) 332 
12 Abaclat and others v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/07/5) 
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The process of choosing a particular legal issue and then comparing how various legal 
systems examine and resolve this issue develops functionalism. This process was mainly 
supported by Rabel and the initial aim of this theory was to achieve the unification of 
commercial law. According to Rabel, functionalism does not analyse differences in 
doctrinal construction but rather in the practical effects of the norms, such as the remedy 
provided for each issue.13 Functionalism, as a comparative method, can contribute to the 
examination of the depositors’ protection during the financial crisis. The avenues of 
national courts, EU courts, the ECtHR and arbitration, can be compared on the basis of 
the way they approach the legal consequences of the financial crisis on bank depositors 
and the effectiveness of each approach. The position of national courts is quite different 
when implementing EU law or ECHR law, since the former is supreme and directly 
effective, while the latter follows general international law norms on its primacy and 
effect in national legal orders. Furthermore, the elements of direct effect and supremacy 
do not bind arbitrators, even when they are asked to implement EU law or ECHR law. 
Therefore, the consistent application of EU law and ECHR law cannot be controlled or 
guaranteed, when a case is brought before an investment arbitration tribunal. 
The protection of bank depositors in the light of the financial crisis should be examined 
on the basis of the transnational legal process, on which legal redress is sought in cases 
where public and private actors are involved, including international organisations, such 
as the IMF and the ESM. Transnational legal process could be considered as constituting 
an aspect of liberalism. Liberalism is an ideology, constituting the basis of a legal method, 
which focuses on the rights of individuals as they are given effect and are protected in 
societies with less government, also named as ‘liberal States’. In an attempt to define 
                                                                
13 E. Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs: Eine rechtsvergleichende Darstellung (The Law of the Sale of 
Goods: a comparative survey) (Berlin and Leipsig: Walter de Gruyter & Co, volume 1, 1964) 67 
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liberalism, Slaughter states that ‘liberal States are States with some form of representative 
democracy, a market economy based on private property rights, and constitutional 
protections of civil and political rights’.14 In such liberal world, the institutions of liberal 
States engage in transnational transactions with institutions of other liberal States. In other 
words, liberalism offers the theoretical framework of ‘transnational law’, by rendering 
States as transparent bodies providing procedures and practices for the protection and 
representation of the interests of individuals and private groups. Transnational law has 
been described as encompassing ‘all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers’,15 thus including national law, EU law, international human rights law, 
as enshrined in the ECHR and international investment law. It also provides that private 
parties can trigger international legal proceedings against the States. Arbitration, as a 
dispute resolution method, reflects transnational law, in the sense that it links private law 
to the enforcement guarantees of State law and the cases dealing with ‘interplay between 
State and non-State institutions’ beyond the boundaries of a single State.  
The main characteristics of the transnational legal process are argued to fit perfectly in 
this area of research. Transnational legal process destroys the traditional dichotomies 
between domestic and international, public and private; which is reflected in the claims 
of private depositors against State measures both at the domestic level, before national 
courts, and at the international level, before international courts and arbitral tribunals. 
Furthermore, the process is normative, which means that new rules of law constantly 
appear and are enforced. The way banking depositors are treated by various legal orders 
and arbitration during this financial crisis, can establish new ways of protection of 
                                                                
14 A.-M. Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law, 509  
15  P. C. Jessup, ‘Transnational Law’ in C. Tietje et al. (eds), Philip C. Jessup’s Transnational Law 
Revisited – On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of its Publication, (Heft, 2006), 45 
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depositors’ financial interests, which, in turn, will be challenged. Thus the focus is both 
on the way international interaction creates law and the way law creates international 
interactions.  
The last research question proposes to look at the alternative dispute resolution method 
of arbitration, and, in particular, whether arbitration could constitute an available option 
for bank depositors, as well as the extent to which it could actually offer more protection 
to their rights. Therefore, the third research question evolves around the relationship 
between arbitration and litigation in the EU legal order and, generally, in the context of 
the global financial crisis. It is established that any disputes concerning matters of EU law 
should be resolved within the EU legal order,16 while arbitration is excluded prima facie 
from EU law.17 As a consequence, the use of arbitration pre-supposes the absence of any 
legal basis to claim under EU law. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the financial 
crisis, the lines between arbitration and litigation have become even more blurred, thus 
the relationship between them should be redefined.   
This thesis does not aim at limiting its analysis and its conclusions regarding the role of 
arbitration in the EU legal regime to the context of the financial crisis and the protection 
of bank depositors. Instead, the case of the financial crisis is used as an example and as a 
tool to prove that arbitration can indeed have a place in the EU legal order. In other words, 
it is tried to prove that bank depositors can enjoy effective protection through arbitration 
and this protection can be recognised within the Union, since arbitration and particularly 
investment arbitration, is argued not to be wholly incompatible with EU law.  
                                                                
16Article 19(1) TEU; Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union [2012] OJ 1 326/1 (‘TFEU’), Article 344  
17 Article 267 TFEU; Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2000] OJ 2 012/01, Article 2(1)(a) 
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Traditionally, EU law and international arbitration law constituted two separate worlds. 
Moreover, the common commercial policy of the EU did not cover investment law, 
therefore Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) belonged to the exclusive external 
competence of Member State. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) was inserted on 
the exclusive competences of the EU, when the Lisbon Treaty included it in the scope of 
the CCP.18  Furthermore, there is the principle that any external judicial body with the 
authority to hear disputes by individuals within the Union cannot be compatible with EU 
law.19 In contrast with the traditional approach of EU law towards arbitration, some recent 
trends indicate that investment arbitration can have some place within the EU legal order, 
those being CETA20 and TTIP,21 which provide for an investment court system (ICS) that 
reflects many of the features of arbitration. 
The choice between dispute resolution methods indicates that there is a rationale to guide 
bank depositors. Generally, liberalism, and, particularly, transnational legal process, are 
based on the idea that the main actors in the international scene are rational individuals 
who promote and defend their interest. Rationalism is a theory founded on Aristotle’s 
philosophy which supported that the human being has a rational principle. If it is assumed 
that people have always reasons and motives for making particular choices, then the 
                                                                
18 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 1 326/1, 
Article 206 
19 Opinion of 26 April 1977, re Inland Waterways, Opinion 1/76, EU:C:1977:63; Opinion of 14 
December 1991, on the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91, EU:C:1991:490; Opinion 
of 28 March 1996, Accession to the ECHR, Opinion 2/94 , EU:C:1996:140; Opinion of 8 March 2011, 
European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123; Opinion of 18 December 2014,  
Accession to the ECHR, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454  
20 EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, 29 February 2016, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
21 EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership EU’s proposal for Investment Protection and 
Resolution of Investment Disputes of 12 November 2015 (TTIP), available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
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decision to resort to litigation or arbitration is also based on some reasons and motives 
that should be identified.  
The above research questions should be consolidated and eventually lead to more general 
findings being made with respect to the effective legal protection of bank depositors, 
either by litigation or arbitration. 
I. ORIGINALITY – CONTRIBUTION 
The originality of this work lies in three key points. First, the current thesis focuses on 
the protection of bank depositors, based on the idea of effectiveness, which is already 
developed in EU law in its procedural sense, focusing on access to justice. However, this 
thesis aims to use the principle of effectiveness in a rather substantial sense, considering 
whether individuals do not only access the justice, but also being remedied effectively. 
The assessment of this kind of effectiveness will consider inter alia the principle of 
proportionality, in relation to the context of the global financial crisis. This assessment 
focuses on substantially effective protection has not been applied by any court or tribunal 
yet. 
Second, this thesis supports that bank deposits can be treated as investment, thus 
depositors could enjoy further protection offered by investment law. This subject is 
relatively new and is evolving. As the use of arbitration is a rather novel question in 
disputes concerning stakeholders of banks and other financial institutions, there are 
limited primary sources such as case law and arbitration awards to discuss and use in this 
research. There is lack of extensive literature and case law covering the use of 
international arbitration regarding measures imposed by States in response to a financial 
crisis, nor is there a significant body of research that discusses the effectiveness of this 
resolution method in this area regarding the particular period of the financial crisis. 
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Finally, the EU law regime excludes arbitration from its scope, as issues of EU law must 
be resolved within the EU legal order. This assumption of the exclusion of arbitration 
could be challenged, especially regarding the particular period of the financial crisis, 
based on two lines of arguments. Firstly, since the notions of litigation and arbitration 
have become interrelated to some extent, what is actually excluded from the scope of EU 
law should be reconsidered. For example, the EU has negotiated with other countries on 
areas of trade and investment and, among others, the agreements they suggest provide for 
an ICS that resonates with many of the features of arbitration, without labelling it as such. 
Secondly, the relevant EU legislation and case law leave some room for arbitration, even 
in matters concerning EU law. The main legal arguments that are discussed in support of 
a future role of arbitration on the EU legal regime, relates to Article 344 TFEU, Article 
19(1) TEU, the mandate of courts and arbitral tribunals and Article 267 TFEU. 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND TECHNIQUES 
This thesis aims to be based on secondary research, by using information already 
published but with the purpose of re-examining it from a particular point of view, or, in 
the case of new case law and arbitral awards, examining them for the first time. This is 
achieved through the content analysis of primary sources of information from the EU, 
national legal systems, and international legal orders, including sources of primary and 
secondary legislation. Some key pieces of legislation that will be used are the EU 
Treaties;22 the ECHR;23 the EU Charter24 and some EU directives and regulations.25 
                                                                
22 For example, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ 1 115/13 
23 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950 
24 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ 1 364/01 
25 For example the Directive 2014/59/EU for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms [2014] OJ 2 173/190 and the Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation) [2000] 
OJ 2 012 
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Furthermore, various Bilateral Investment Treaties will be reviewed, as well as the ESM 
Treaty26 and the TSCG.27 Data from secondary sources of information are also collected, 
indicative being those referred to in the literature review. The study is a qualitative one, 
through comparative and argumentation analysis, by focusing only on the courts’ 
approach towards the financial measures adopted by the EU, and the way that arbitration 
could become available for bank depositors in order to seek effective protection of their 
rights. 
Generally, the research’s two foundations are EU and international law. The relationship 
between these two legal regimes should be clarified in an early stage of the research, so 
as to have the abovementioned relationship between the various courts and the pieces of 
legislation, to be clarified as well. The EU legal order could be argued to be ‘monist’ in 
its relation to public international law,28 based on the ontological assumption that the EU 
institutions and the Member States are bound by the international agreements concluded 
by the Union.29 It is reiterated that while EU law is an autonomous legal order, supreme 
and directly effective, these international agreements, and also ECHR law, follow general 
international law norms on their primacy, validity and effect in national systems.  
Regarding case law, this thesis studies disputes which deal with the effects of EU financial 
measures on bank depositors, but also bondholders, shareholders and investors. Analysis 
is performed, of cases of courts at the national level of EU Member States, at the EU 
level, and at the Public International law level, only from the scope of the ECHR. 
Moreover, decisions and awards of arbitral tribunals, for example ICSID and the ICC, are 
                                                                
26Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism [2012] 
27Treaty of Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union [2012] 
28R. A. Wessel, 'Reconsidering the Relationship between International and EU Law: Towards a Content-
Based Approach?' in E. Cannizzaro et al. (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union 
(MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2011) 
29 Article 216(2) TFEU 
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examined, not only within Europe, but also regarding the Argentinian financial crisis. In 
addition to the judgments themselves, case reports and comments on different cases are 
referred to. It should be noted that the legal value of the cases studied in this thesis varies. 
In particular, while court decisions are binding and constitute legal precedent, particularly 
those of EU courts and the supreme national courts, arbitral awards lack the binding effect 
and only affect the parties involved on the dispute.  
 
III. STRUCTURE  
This thesis comprises of seven chapters including the Introduction and the Conclusion. 
Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 constitutes the Literature Review and consists of 
three legal orders, these being EU law, Public International law and International 
Investment law, being reviewed from a comparative perspective, focusing only on three 
specific dimensions. Firstly, access to justice is considered, as a central idea of the thesis 
is the comparative effective protection of bank depositors by litigation and arbitration. 
Secondly, the protection of bank depositors in the light of the measures for the 
management of the current global financial crisis should be measured on the basis of the 
principle of proportionality since public and private interests are involved and, mostly, in 
conflict. Finally, since bank deposits constitute property of the depositor, the protection 
of property and the right to possession in each legal order is examined.  
Having reviewed the existing literature on the area in Chapter 2, the third chapter of this 
thesis identifies the nature of bank deposits, so as to extract the rights of depositors. 
Chapter 3 also examines whether bank deposits can qualify as investments, either under 
international and EU law. The purpose of this examination is to prove that bank depositors 
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could be entitled to the protection offered by investment law, in case they are regarded 
investors. 
Chapter 4 proceeds to examine the various approaches that the CJEU, selected national 
courts and the ECtHR have followed when asked to review the legality of the post-crisis 
measures adopted at the EU and national level. Thus, analysis is made of some of the 
most prominent litigation arising out of the measures adopted in Ireland, Iceland, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus. In addition, selective case law of the ECtHR 
dealing either with the financial crisis or the protection of depositors and shareholders of 
failing banks. All the cases selected are studied from the perspective of the protection of 
individuals, either as depositors, shareholders or investors in banks. This chapter critically 
analyses the position of the CJEU, national courts and the ECtHR so far, from the scope 
of effectiveness of protection offered to applicants when confronting with the challenging 
task of ruling during the crisis.  
Having outlined, in Chapter 4, the approach of national, supranational and international 
courts, the fifth chapter of this thesis proceeds to examine the approach that international 
arbitration has followed when arbitrators were asked to review the conformity of the post-
crisis measures adopted at the EU and national level with the standards afforded to the 
protection of foreign investors. This chapter critically analyses the position of 
international arbitration so far, from the scope of effectiveness of protection offered to 
applicants, similarly to the measure assessing effectiveness developed in Chapter 4. 
Finally, Chapter 6 deals with the position of arbitration in the EU legal order and 
considers the traditional relationship between EU law and arbitration and between EU 
law and International Investment law and some recent trends on arbitration in the EU, 
namely the CETA and the TTIP. The focus on the position of arbitration in the EU legal 
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order at this stage is inevitable, since it would be insufficient just to demonstrate that 
arbitral tribunals can offer more effective protection to bank depositors, if the awards 
rendered cannot have a standing in the EU legal order.  Moreover, four arguments are 
developed to support that arbitration can be used by bank depositors in disputes regarding 
the financial crisis without being in contrast with EU law, with the final one suggesting 
that investment tribunals could be allowed to make direct references to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.  
Chapter 7 forms the Conclusion of this thesis where the research questions of this thesis 
will be re-addressed collectively using the findings and relevant comparative analysis of 
Chapters 2- 6. This chapter also addresses further research and relevant recent 
developments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As described in the Introduction, the principal consideration of the thesis could be 
summarised by asking whether courts within the EU protect bank depositors effectively 
and/or whether arbitration would offer more protection, especially in the light of the 
current global financial crisis. Such research question requires the examination of the 
bank depositors’ rights both at EU level and international level. The three legal orders 
that will be analysed in this section are EU law, Public International law and International 
Investment law.  
The relationship between EU law and Public International law could be the subject of an 
entire chapter, but, for the purposes of this thesis, the discussion will only be limited to 
the reason the two legal orders are examined separately.  It is expected that some of the 
arguments might be common between the two legal regimes. However, they are 
distinguished in the literature review, since they constitute different options for bank 
depositors regarding litigation. In other words, EU courts and Public International courts, 
particularly the ECtHR, constitute different options for bank depositors who wish to bring 
proceedings in the context of the financial crisis according to different, or, at least, not 
identical, legal standards. 
The choice of International Investment law is based on the assumption that bank deposits 
constitute investments in a foreign country and should enjoy the protection offered by 
International Investment law.30 For the purposes of this thesis, it is treated as a separate 
                                                                
30 It should be underlined that International Investment law is not applicable in the case of depositors in 
the home country, but only in the host country. 
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legal order, in the sense that though it constitutes a public law discipline, it was granted a 
private method of dispute resolution. In essence, the nature of disputes resolved by 
investment arbitration tribunals mainly constitutes issues of public concern because they 
mostly deal with measures adopted by the host State that affect inter alia foreign 
investors, therefore the typical bilateral relationship of private disputes is rather 
surpassed. For this reason, International Investment law is examined as a separate, 
probably ‘hybrid’ legal order, which is settled between public and private legal orders.31  
The three legal orders are reviewed from a comparative perspective, focusing only on 
three specific dimensions. It should be mentioned here, as a limitation, or rather as an 
indication, that each dimension have also been developed by national legal orders, and 
sometimes their national perspective is the one applicable.  
Firstly, access to justice is considered, as a central idea of the thesis is the comparative 
effective protection of bank depositors by litigation and arbitration. ‘Access to justice’, 
as a term, is not found easily in legal instruments. For example, the European Convention 
of Human Rights32 provides for the protection of access to justice without making any 
express reference to the term.33 In the same line, the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights34 protects the right to access to justice through the declaration of the right to an 
effective remedy.35 The term was specifically used by the Aarhus Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
                                                                
31 See S. W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
2010),  J. A. Maupin, ‘Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems 
Approach’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 
32 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950 
33 The ECHR protects access to justice under Article 6 (‘right to fair trial’) and Article 13 (‘right to 
remedy’) 
34 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) 
35 UN General Assembly, Universal declaration of human rights, Resolution 217 A(III), UN Document 
A/810 at 71 (1948), Article 8: ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’ 
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Environmental Matters, which describes access to justice as ‘access to a review procedure 
before a court of law or another independent or impartial body established my law’.36 
Secondly, the protection of bank depositors in the light of the measures for the 
management of the current global financial crisis should be measured on the basis of the 
principle of proportionality since public and private interests are involved and, mostly, in 
conflict. The principle of proportionality is founded on the axiom that the freedom of 
human beings is not absolute, thus the fundamental rights guaranteed by international, 
transnational and national legal orders controvert with the protection of the public 
interests and the society’s rights. However, fundamental rights are usually restricted due 
to arbitrary measures adopted by public authorities. Therefore, a balance is crucial to be 
established between the rights of individuals and the objectives of the State.     
Finally, since bank deposits constitute property of the depositor, the protection of property 
and the right to possession in each legal order are examined. Property law defines objects 
of property for the purpose of the law, whether tangible or conceptual, and confers 
exclusive rights in these objects or ‘things’ that are enforceable against the whole world. 
These property rights, are socially recognised and legally protected or created exclusive 
powers over these objects, asserted against the world at large. Thus property law creates 
‘things’ as normative concepts and assigns these things to natural or legal persons by way 
of conferring interests in them. The type of property right determines the extent of the 
granted exclusive power or interest.  
Generally, the purpose of this literature review is to critically assess the legal framework 
and the existing literature on these three dimensions of the three abovementioned legal 
                                                                
36 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’) 1998, 2161 UNTS 447, Article 9(1) 
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orders, in order to analyse the relationship of this thesis with the existing scholarly work 
and to demonstrate the research questions leading this thesis.  
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I. EU LAW 
1. Access to justice  
Under EU law, an explicit reference to access of justice is found in Article 67(4) TFEU, 
which reads as follows: ‘the Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular through 
the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil 
matters’.37 Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Article 47, on the ‘right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial’, contains the term ‘access to justice’ in its third 
paragraph.38‘Access to justice’ encompasses the right to an effective remedy before an 
independent and impartial tribunal which is established by law, the right to a fair and 
public hearing without undue delay, the right to legal aid when it is considered necessary 
and the right to effective remedies.  
It constitutes the foundation of a Union based on the rule of law, as it is clearly stated in 
Article 2 TEU,39 and this is evident by the numerous provisions that set out a system of 
legal remedies and procedures that authorise the CJEU to review the legality of measures 
adopted by the EU institutions. According to the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer in Roda Golf case, ‘[a]ccess to justice is a fundamental pillar of western 
legal culture [...]. Therefore the right to effective legal protection is one of the general 
principles of Community law, in accordance with which access to justice is organised 
[...]. Access to justice entails not only the commencement of legal proceedings but also 
the requirement that the competent court must be seized of those proceedings.’40 
 
                                                                
37 Article 67(4) TFEU 
38Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ 1 326/02 
39 Article 2 TEU 
40Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of 5 March 2009, Roda Golf, C-14/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:134, paragraph 29 
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Within the EU legal order, access to justice includes access to the EU courts and access 
to national courts and tribunals. These two aspects were clearly illustrated in the case of 
Les Verts v Parliament, where it was stated that: ‘Where the Community institutions are 
responsible for the administrative implementation of such measures, natural or legal 
persons may bring a direct action before the Court against implementing measures which 
are addressed to them or which are of direct and individual concern to them and, in 
support of such an action, plead the illegality of the general measure on which they are 
based. Where implementation is a matter for the national authorities, such persons may 
plead the invalidity of general measures before the national courts and cause the latter to 
request the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.’41As the quote indicates, the EU 
envisages access to courts at two levels: firstly, at EU level to enable citizens to challenge 
Union institutions’ decisions (Article 263 TFEU) and, secondly, at domestic level to 
challenge the decisions of the national authorities that interfere with EU law rights or to 
challenge the decisions of the EU institutions indirectly (Article 267 TFEU). 
With regards to direct action, the legality of a decision of an EU institution could be 
challenged either by ‘privileged applicants’42  or by natural or legal persons that are 
‘directly and individually concerned’ with the decision in question. This condition for 
locus standi is quite restrictive.  The traditional approach of the CJEU towards these two 
requirements was rather rigorous.43 
 
                                                                
41Judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts, Case 294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23 
42Member States, the Council, the Commission and the EU Parliament, as the guardians of the public 
interest, which can challenge any measure they believe that infringes Union law 
43Judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann, Case 25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17 
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Advocate General Jacobs supported the necessity of altering the interpretation of 
‘individual concern’ and adopting a more flexible approach.44 While the CJEU supported 
that Article 267 TFEU provides private applicants with unimpeded access to justice via 
the procedure of preliminary reference by national courts, Advocate General Jacobs 
argued that this avenue does not offer effective judicial protection and sometimes 
individuals remain without a remedy. As he explained: ‘Access to the Court of Justice via 
[Article 267 TFEU] is however not a remedy available to individual applicants as a matter 
of right. National courts may refuse to refer questions, and although courts of last instance 
are obliged to refer under the third paragraph of [Article 267 TFEU], appeals within the 
national judicial systems are liable to entail long delays which may themselves be 
incompatible with the principle of effective judicial protection and with the need for legal 
certainty’.45 What he proposed is to recognise that an applicant is individually concerned 
‘where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a 
substantial adverse effect on his interests.’46 Two years later, the same conclusion was 
reached by the General Court in the case of Jego-Queré.47 However, this judgment was 
indirectly overruled by the CJEU in UPA case,48 where it had to be considered whether a 
person not being individually concerned, could have standing to bring an action for 
annulment of a regulation, based only on the lack of any national legal remedy which 
contradicted to the principle of effective judicial protection. As it was established, the 
wording of Article 230(4) EC Treaty49 should be followed and cannot be affected by the 
system of legal remedies of the Union.50 At the same time, the CJEU also indicated that 
                                                                
44Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, C-50/00 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:197  
45Ibid. paragraph 42 
46Ibid. paragraph 60 
47 Judgment of 3 May 2002, Jégo-Quéré, T-177/01, ECLI:EU:T:2002:112, paragraphs 41-51 
48 Judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462 
49Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version) [2002] OJ 1 340/173, Article 
230(4) 
50Ibid. paragraph 37 
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‘the European Community is, however, a community based on the rule of law in which 
its institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts with the 
Treaty and with the general principles of law which include fundamental rights’.51 This 
statement could be argued to have let an application of Article 230(4) EC Treaty, even in 
the absence of individual concern, if no effective legal remedy existed under EU law.52 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, private litigants had locus standi only if the EU measure in 
question directly affected their legal position and they were ‘sufficient in themselves and 
require no implementing provisions’.53 Consequently, private applicants could challenge 
EU Regulations, even if not very easily, but not EU Directives.54 Such an argument was 
partly addressed by the CJEU in the Salamander case, where it was demonstrated that 
directives could be challenged directly, but it was admitted that the requirement of direct 
concern was difficult to be met, because ‘a directive cannot of itself impose obligations 
on an individual and may therefore not be relied on as such against him’.55 Thus, private 
litigants were used to be directed to their national courts to challenge the legality of 
directives when reviewing their transposition into their national legal systems.56 
The Lisbon Treaty tried to promote effective judicial protection of private litigants who 
challenge the legality of EU acts, by ‘relaxing’ the conditions of locus standi under Article 
263 TFEU.57 Currently, natural or legal persons are allowed to challenge ‘regulatory 
                                                                
51Ibid. paragraph 38 
52 E. Biernat, ‘The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of 
Judicial Protection in the European Community’ (JMMWP 12/03, New York University School of Law, 
2003) 38 
53Judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts, Case 294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166 
54By their very nature, EU Regulations require national implementing measures, while the 
implementation of EU Directives depends on the discretion of the Member States. 
55 Judgment of 27 June 2000, Salamander, J T-172/98 and T-175/98 to T-177/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:168, 
paragraph 54 
56S. Peers and M.Costa, ‘Judicial Review of EU Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2012)8 European 
Constitutional Law Review, 84 
57 Judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonpunt, C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, paragraph 43 
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acts’ 58  that do not ‘entail implementing measures’ 59  without having to demonstrate 
‘individual concern’. 60  The CJEU clarified that a restrictive interpretation of the 
admissibility conditions of Article 263(4) TFEU, does not impede the right to an effective 
judicial remedy.61 In addition, it was supported that the EU Treaties provide a complete 
system of remedies, by offering the option of preliminary reference, in cases where locus 
standi cannot be established for the purpose of Article 263 TFEU and, effective judicial 
protection for individuals is therefore guaranteed.62 In other words, preliminary reference 
counterbalances individuals’ limited access to direct actions, thus ensuring their effective 
protection against illegal acts adopted by the EU institutions. Despite this argument, the 
practice indicates that in some cases, for example in the case of the financial crisis, none 
of the two mechanisms offered effective access to justice to private litigants, since they 
could not meet the requirements of Article 263 TFEU and their respective national courts 
were reluctant to active the preliminary reference mechanism under Article 267 TFEU. 
This will be further analysed in Chapter 4.  
Consequently, on the assumption that access to the Court for individuals is still rather 
limited,63 despite the Lisbon Treaty amendment to Article 263, it is challenged whether 
such a gap can be filled by recourse to the preliminary ruling procedure. Though generally 
it is more possible for an individual to challenge a Community act through Article 267, 
due to the absence of specific requirements for locus standi, there are also some limits on 
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its application. Firstly, the decision to make a reference to the CJEU and the parameters 
of the question depend on the national court itself, thus it is out of the individuals’ control. 
As the CJEU stated ‘[Article 267 TFEU] does not constitute a means of redress available 
to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal. Therefore, the mere 
fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the 
interpretation of Community law does not mean that the court or tribunal concerned is 
compelled to consider that a question has been raised within the meaning of [Article 
267]’.64 In essence, the preliminary ruling procedure is, in principle, not a judicial remedy 
for individuals, but rather a means of cooperation between national courts and the ECJ 
when an action is brought before national courts.65 Moreover, Article 277 TFEU provides 
that preliminary reference can only be made for a Union act which is at issue in an actual 
legal dispute before a national court. 
Though in practice both Articles may have the same final effect, namely the annulment 
of the act in question, a ruling of invalidity by the CJEU, under Article 267 TFEU, 
requires national courts and the EU institutions to take all the appropriate measures to 
give effect to that ruling. It is argued that preliminary rulings do not create enforceable 
obligations, since only very limited remedies are available to unsatisfied private parties.66 
In fact, a failure to comply with the obligation to make a preliminary reference can have 
the effect of an infringement procedure against the particular Member State, a measure 
that rests on the discretion of the EU Commission.67 However, such effect could still leave 
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the applicants without an effective remedy, since the infringement procedure has no 
consequences on the national judicial decision that was taken without preliminary 
reference. Since the decision of the national court has reached its final stage, it cannot be 
challenged for a breach of the obligation to refer to the ECJ,68 even if doing so would 
enable the Member State to remedy that breach.  
Regarding remedies against national authorities before national courts, the ECJ has 
guaranteed Union rights by developing the principles of direct effect and supremacy of 
EU law. According to the principle established in the Van Genden Loos case, EU law 
confers rights on individuals, which must be directly enforced and protected by national 
courts.69 Furthermore, the CJEU in Costa v ENEL stated that the EU Treaties have created 
their ‘own legal system which [...] became an internal part of the legal systems of the 
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply’. 70  Thus, under EU law, 
individuals are entitled to access to EU courts and national courts in order to ensure the 
protection of their rights, through the effective enforcement of Union law. As the case 
law of the CJEU demonstrated, a Member State can be responsible for the harm caused 
to the effectiveness of EU law rules and the infringement of individuals’ rights if it cannot 
repair the breach of EU law it previously committed.71 
In addition to Articles 263 and 267 TFEU and the relevant case law, there are other Treaty 
provisions and EU Directives dealing with access to justice. As already stated, Article 
67(4) TFEU provides for access to justice in cross-border disputes, based on ‘the principle 
of mutual recognition of judicial and extra-judicial decisions in civil matters’, in an effort 
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to achieve ‘a Europe of justice’, through an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
In its AFSJ Communication, the Commission underlined that priority should be given to 
mechanisms that expedite access to the courts for private applicants, so that they can 
enforce their rights throughout the Union.72 Access to justice is also considered in various 
EU Directives. The Free Movement Directive provides for judicial redress procedures 
available to those EU citizens and their families that are refused to enter or reside in 
another Member State. 73  Similarly, the Racial Equality Directive provides that 
individuals who have been subject to discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds should 
be entitled to all the appropriate ‘judicial and/or administrative procedures’ so as to be 
adequately legally protected in any Member State.74 Access to justice is facilitated by the 
Legal Aid Directive which demonstrates that ‘all persons involved in civil or commercial 
[cross-border] disputes are able to assert their rights in the courts even if their personal 
financial situation makes it impossible for them to bear the costs of the proceedings’.75 
Finally, the Mediation Directive aims at facilitating and improving access to justice by 
promoting extrajudicial dispute resolution methods, such as mediation.76 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that access to justice is rather restricted in 
the EU law regime. Firstly, while Article 263 TFEU gives the right to private litigants to 
bring direct actions against Union institutions’ decisions, the conditions of admissibility 
are restrictively interpreted. Secondly, notwithstanding that citizens have the option of 
indirectly challenging the decisions of national or EU authorities that are against their EU 
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law rights through Article 267 TFEU, the whole process is exclusively depended on the 
discretion of the national court. Finally, as it is evident, though access to justice is 
enshrined for by EU Treaties, only instruments of secondary legislation facilitate access 
to justice for all EU citizens. Since EU Directives are characterised by indirect effect into 
Member States, this means that access to justice can be hindered or restricted, to some 
extent, based on the discretion of each Member State to implement the relevant Directives 
in a particular manner, thus the overall effectiveness of the operation of access to justice 
could be doubted. In the context of this thesis, all these findings signifies that bank 
depositors will face several hurdles when trying to bring cases against the measures 
affecting them, particularly in the sensitive framework of the financial crisis, where 
emergency conditions and political considerations are involved.  
2. Proportionality 
Among the general principles of EU law is the principle of proportionality, which is 
enshrined in Article 5 TEU, but was mostly developed by the CJEU. It applies to 
legislative and administrative measures adopted by EU institutions and to national 
measures which fall within the EU law scope and it is considered as ‘the preferred 
procedure for managing disputes involving an alleged conflict two rights claims’,77 those 
conflicts being of either constitutional78 or administrative nature.79 
It originates from different legal traditions of Member States with the most influencing 
being the German public law80 and the French administrative law81 and less directly 
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related, the English concept of reasonableness. The very notion of proportionality was 
supranationalised 82  by being recognised as a fundamental principle of the Union 
law.83‘This legal technique is intended to allow the Court not to invoke national laws but 
rather to build up an autonomous EU legal order so that the EU legal norms suffice to 
answer the legal issues presented before the Court.’ 84  Proportionality bears all the 
characteristics as a general principle of EU law. In particular, it is inherent in almost all 
the applications of the law,85 and, as noted by Advocate General Jacobs, ‘as for the 
principle of proportionality, there are few areas of Community law, if any at all, where 
that is not relevant.’86 Furthermore, it enjoys universal recognition, which means that it 
exists in various national and international legal orders. It is also differentiated by rules 
of law, in the sense that it forms the basis of the very institution of law and it represents 
an ideal of justice, while rules of law simply provide some rights or duties on parties.87 
For the court to decide that a measure is infringing, it has to examine three questions: 
firstly, whether the particular measure is appropriate to achieve the objective pursued; 
secondly, whether the measure is necessary to achieve that objective; and, thirdly, 
whether the burden imposed by the measures is disproportionate to the benefits secured 
(proportionality strict sensu). The appropriateness (or suitability) test deals with the 
relationship between the means and the end, the necessity test looks at any less restrictive 
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measures that could pursue the same purpose and the strict sensu test focuses on the 
burden imposed on individuals.88  
The principle of proportionality is applied by the CJEU when the legality of EU measures 
is challenged in direct proceedings and by national courts as well. Generally, as a ground 
of review of EU measures, proportionality focuses on the balance of private interests 
adversely affected by the measure against the public interests which the measure pursues 
to achieve. Additionally, as a ground of review of national measures, it focuses on the 
protection of fundamental freedoms, as they are enshrined in the EU Treaties, if a measure 
restricts them.89  
Legal theorists, most notably Robert Alexy, have presented the principle of 
proportionality as the gold standard of constitutional adjudication, since both rights and 
principles are taken into account to achieve the correct balance. ‘Constitutional judgments 
are only correct if they correspond to the outcome of an appropriate balancing of 
principles’.90 Such an approach implies that rights are not absolute and can be restricted 
for the protection or promotion of some public policies. As Alexy further supports: ‘[t]he 
Law of Balancing requires the increasing intensity of interference with liberty to be 
matched by an increasing weight of reasons justifying the interference’. 91  The legal 
theory on proportionality in the EU legal order is considered by Harbo, who challenges 
its applicability and states that ‘[t]he dissection of the principle reveals that the principle 
has no clear or fixed substantial meaning’92 and ‘[a]t some stage one could even question 
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whether the court, although claiming to do so, is really applying the principle of 
proportionality in the first place’. 93  As Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons argue, while 
evaluating the existence of balancing in the EU legal order, ‘given that no principle 
encapsulating an individual right in the general interest is absolute, the courts must engage 
in balancing to evaluate whether a legal norm is consistent with a general principle’.94 In 
other words, it is supported that a kind of balancing exercise exists, but not in the form 
which either Alexy or Harbo recommend.95 
Proportionality is an essential requirement of the justification of national measures, 
adopted in reliance upon provisions in the EU legislation, which are challenged on the 
basis that they limit to some extent fundamental freedoms. It is also a requirement of the 
justification of other national measures concerning EU law, which restrict other EU law 
rights. 96  Moreover, Member States should also act proportionately when they are 
applying EU measures, such as Directives. Even in areas were EU law offers some 
discretion to the Member States to choose what measure to implement and to what extent 
to protect the relevant public interest, they still have to act proportionately within the 
limits of their choices. As Advocate General Van Gerven stated ‘it is not sufficient for a 
national rule to be in pursuance of an imperative requirement of public interest which is 
justified under Community law, it must also not have any effects beyond that which is 
necessary. In other words, it must comply with the principle of proportionality. That 
principle has two aspects. First, in order for a national rule to be justified under 
Community law it must be objectively necessary in order to help achieve the aim sought 
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by the rule: that means that it must be useful (or relevant) and indispensable(…) Secondly, 
(...) the Member State must nevertheless drop the rule, or replace it by a less onerous one, 
if the restrictions caused to intra-Community trade by the rule are disproportionate, that 
is to say if the restrictions caused are out of proportion to the aim sought by or the result 
brought about by the national rule.’97 
A discussion regarding the role of the principle of proportionality in cases where the scope 
of EU law is blurred, such as in the context of the financial crisis, can arise. As far as 
most mechanisms employed by the Eurozone Member States in order to deal with the 
crisis were declared to fall outside the remits of the EU legal order, it is questioned 
whether the principle of proportionality, in the way it is envisaged by EU law, should be 
applicable or whether Member States have been given the absolute freedom to act the 
way they wish beyond any control of the proportionality of their actions. At the same 
time, it should not be ignored that the principle of proportionality also exist at the national 
legal orders, so each Member State’s courts have already interpreted and applies the 
proportionality principle in domestic disputes. The relevant case law is discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
It is argued that the interpretation of proportionality varies according to the areas in which 
is to be employed. 98  As Tridimas supports, this difference in interpretation is more 
evident if it is considered in the light of the distinction between the horizontal99 and the 
vertical100 dimensions of the application of the principle. On the one hand, Community 
measures are only quashed if they are held manifestly inappropriate to achieve the 
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intended purpose, even if they interfere with the four fundamental freedoms. On the other 
hand, national measures are quashed if a less restrictive alternative exists but it has not 
been adopted.101 Furthermore, De Búrca claims that ‘when action is brought against the 
Community in an area of discretionary policy-making power, a looser form of the 
proportionality inquiry is generally used’, because of the difference on the importance of 
the measure’s purpose and on the nature of the right affected.102 Again, these arguments 
lead to some considerations regarding the measures adopted by the Eurozone Member 
States aiming to handle the financial crisis. Since they have been characterised as an 
exercise of one of the Member States’ competences, it is inferred that the principle of 
proportionality, if applicable, would be applied in a more flexible sense. 
Thus, the objectiveness of proportionality could be challenged, based on the argument 
that it lacks neutrality in relation to value, and it is biased, for the achievement of EU 
integration. Sometimes, the court accepts interferences with fundamental freedoms, even 
if it is contrary to private interests, if such interferences contribute to the integration of 
the internal market of the Union. In such a case, the principle of proportionality operates 
as a conventional public law principle.103   
The following brief analysis of the case law of the CJEU leads to the conclusion that the 
principle of proportionality differs in application when used in relation to economic 
rights104 and fundamental freedoms, non-economic rights and Community measures.  
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Cases on economic rights and fundamental freedoms were the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, 105 concerning Community measures on the common market for 
agricultural products, and Hauer,106where the CJEU had to consider whether some EU 
administrative measures infringed the right to property, since they prohibited the 
landowner from planting certain types of vines, and the Court finally decided that the 
measures in question were proportionate in both cases. The horizontal dimension of these 
cases could be compared to the vertical dimension of the de Peijper case,107  which 
concerned national measures infringing fundamental freedoms. In that case, the 
regulatory measure was found disproportionate with public health protection, since, as it 
was held, only the least restrictive alternative would be accepted as proportionate. It 
should be noted that when applying the principle of proportionality, the CJEU treats both 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as fundamental rights. According to a CJEU’s 
judgment, ‘the principles of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, 
together with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of 
Community law of which the Court ensures observance’.108 
It is assumed that in cases of non-economic rights, the CJEU applies the principle of 
proportionality equally, irrespective of horizontal or vertical dimension. In the Hautala 
case 109  the protection of the right to information from public authorities had to be 
balanced with the protection of EU’s relations with third countries. The principle of 
proportionality required partial access to documents, up to the extent that it was 
appropriate and necessary without endangering the interests of the Union. The 
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Schmidberger case110 examined whether the fundamental freedom of movement of goods 
was restricted, not by a national administrative or legislative measure, but by a human 
right, namely the right to freedom of expression. The CJEU underlined that such a 
restriction could be justified if it promoted the general interest and did not operate as a 
disproportionate interference, impairing the very substance of the right.111 The freedom 
of expression was held to predominate of the free movement of goods.  This human rights-
friendly approach against fundamental freedoms was underlined by the CJEU in the Laval 
case.112 The right to take collective action had to be balanced with the freedom to provide 
services, with the reasoning emphasising that the right to take collective action for the 
protection of the workers of the host State, constitutes an overriding reason of public 
interest which justifies a restriction on the freedom of services.113 
Any Community administrative or legislative measures which do not infringe any 
individual right, can be quashed only if they are held manifestly inappropriate. In the 
Fedesa case, 114  concerning the agriculture policy of the Union, the CJEU based its 
decision solely on the manifestly inappropriate test. According to Advocate General 
Mischo, ‘[a]s regards proportionality in the narrow sense, that is to say the weighing of 
damage caused to individual rights against the benefits accruing to the general interest, it 
should be stated that the maintenance of public health must take precedence over any 
other consideration’.115 
This manifestly inappropriate test applied equally in cases that do not deal with public 
health, but, instead, deal with areas where EU institutions enjoy wide discretion, such as 
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social policy. ‘The Council must be allowed a wide discretion in an area which involves 
the legislature in making social policy choices and requires it to carry out complex 
assessments. Judicial review of the exercise of that discretion must therefore be limited, 
to examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers, or 
whether the institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.’116 
Any administrative regulation, which by its nature does not infringe any human right, 
causes economic consequences for private parties, sometimes to such an extent that their 
economic rights are infringed. It is thus necessary, to make a distinction between 
infringement of economic interests and infringement of economic rights, though the 
CJEU has not distinguished them yet. While the principle of proportionality clearly 
applies in an alleged infringement of economic rights, it is unclear whether an 
infringement of economic interests should also be proportionate to the purpose to be 
achieved. In the Skimmed milk cases,117 some Council measures of economic policy were 
challenged and the CJEU quashed them as they were held disproportionate, since the 
measures were not necessary to achieve the objective in question, though no less 
restrictive alternatives were proposed.  
In the recent Kadi cases, 118  a measure of common foreign and security policy was 
challenged on the basis that it infringed the fundamental human right to property. Even if 
the measure was finally held to constitute restriction of the right to property, the CJEU 
commented that ‘(…) the right to property is one of the general principles of Community 
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law. It is not, however, absolute, but must be viewed in relation to its function in society. 
Consequently, the exercise of the right to property may be restricted, provided that those 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the Community 
and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed.’119 As it could be 
reiterated, the principle of proportionality might be argued to lack objectiveness, since its 
value is not neutral in order to achieve EU integration and public policy purposes of each 
Member State separately. Therefore, it is expected that this lack of objectiveness will be 
apparent in the cases before national or EU courts challenging the measures adopted in 
response to the financial crisis, due to the high level of public policy, both of the Union 
as a whole and of each Member State apart, involved.  
3. Right to property  
Property law has always led a dormant existence within the ever-increasing body of EU 
law. The existence of Article 345 TFEU, which provides that nothing in the Treaties shall 
prejudice the system of property ownership in the Member States, has often created the 
impression to Member States, academics and sometimes the EU institutions themselves, 
that the Union is precluded from becoming involved in the area of property law.120 The 
wording of the Treaty Article could suggest that regulation of property law is under the 
exclusive competence of the Member States and, thus, EU institutions cannot legislate in 
this field of law. However, there are existing elements of EU property law in several 
Regulations and Directives,121 and there are various CJEU judgments concerning issues 
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of property law.122As Ramaekers argues, though there is not any specific EU piece 
legislation dealing exclusively with property law, ‘that does not mean that national 
property law is exempted from the influence of the internal market or from the scrutiny 
exercised by the CJEU’.123 The same scholar supports that Article 345 TFEU limits but 
does not prevent the application of EU law to the regulation of the right of ownership by 
Member States.124 Evidently, in the Fearon case, the CJEU established that Article 345 
TFEU does not exclude the application of the Treaty to questions of state or private 
ownership; it instead, underlines that these powers could belong to the Member States, 
but not as far as the exercise of those powers is concerned.125 
Property rights were recognised as fundamental rights by the CJEU in the Nold case, 
where it was demonstrated that the protection of property rights does not cover mere 
commercial interests or opportunities, such as shares of the market.126 In the Hauer case 
the CJEU considered that the public interest can limit the right to property.127In this case, 
it was held that the owner was not deprived of his property, since he remained free to 
dispose of it or to use it otherwise. 128 Apart from the public interest, the CJEU 
demonstrated that the right to property does not encompass the maintenance of an 
advantage that existed only for a limited period. In Biovilac, the CJEU clarified that ‘an 
undertaking cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of an advantage which it 
obtained from the establishment of the common organization of the market and which it 
                                                                
122 Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Portugal, C-367/98, ECLI:EU:C:2002:326, paragraph 48; 
Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v France, C-483/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:327, paragraph 44; 
Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Belgium, C-503/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:328, paragraph 44 
123E. Ramaekers, ‘Classification of objects by the European Court of Justice: movable immovables and 
tangible intangibles’ (2014) 39 European Law Review, 448 
124B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers, ‘Article 345 TFEU (ex. Article 295 EC),Its Meanings and 
Interpretations’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal, 292 
125 Judgment of 6 November 1984, Fearon, Case 182/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:335, paragraphs 6-8 
126 Judgment of 14 May 1974, Nold, Case 4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, p.491 
127 Judgment of 13 December 1979, Hauer, Case 44/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290 
128Ibid., paragraph 19 
57 
 
enjoyed at a given time’. 129  Similarly, in Bananas case, the CJEU stated that ‘no 
economic operator can claim a right to property in a market share which he held at a time 
before the establishment of a common organization of a market, since such market share 
constitutes only a momentary economic position exposed to the risks of changing 
circumstances’.130 
It could be argued that the right to property is not difficult to be violated by EU legislation 
because of the powerful authority of the Union in the area of economic regulation. The 
case law of the CJEU shows that a measure which interferes with private property is held 
reasonable, and thus legitimate, if it pursues a public interest such as the establishment of 
the internal market,131 the management of sector crises,132the enhancement of consumers’ 
confidence133  and the effectiveness of economic sanctions. 134  It is expected that the 
survival of the Eurozone and the completion of the European Banking Union will be soon 
included in this list after the case law on the recent financial crisis.  
It is important to note that EU law does not contain a general principle of compensation, 
and the CJEU case law illustrates that a reduction of owner’s benefit from the property 
does not constitute violation of the right to property and it is not compensable.135 
Since Member States are entitled to regulate their property law independently, there are 
many differences between them. In Roman law countries, such as Germany, ‘things’ (res) 
are considered only physical objects, thus rights are excluded as they are not corporeal.136 
On the other hand, under the law of Austria, the notion of ‘thing’ encompasses everything 
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distinct from the person and usable.137 The distinction between tangibles and intangibles 
is used by English law, as well as by Cyprus law, which calls things as ‘choses’.138 
According to The Sale of Goods Law of 1994, only actionable claims and money are 
excluded from ‘goods’. 139  While German law strictly separates possession from 
ownership, with the former being a mere fact and the latter being an absolute right, 
English law does not clearly distinguish the two concepts (‘an owner of a chattel is the 
person with the best possessory interest in it’). 140  In Cyprus, both ownership and 
possession are recognised as proprietary rights.141 
Moreover, ‘possession’ and ‘ownership’ are differently defined, though their definitions 
have some similarities amongst various Member States. It appears that the exercise of 
factual control and the intention to do so are the two common and essential characteristics 
of ‘possession’,142 and it is also commonly accepted that if factual control belongs to a 
person but the intention belongs to someone else, the latter is considered as a 
possessor.143A common rebuttable presumption also exists in relation to ‘ownership’, 
namely that the possessor is also the owner.144 The right of ownership is safeguarded by 
Article 23 of the Constitution of Cyprus,145 and according to the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Christou Orfanides v The Republic of Cyprus, ‘conceptually the term ownership 
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denotes proprietorship over an immovable or movable asset and indicates the possibility 
of that asset being transferred / sold / disposed of’.146 Finally, ownership in German law 
is protected by a proprietary remedy, while in the case of possession damages are 
available only under the general rules of tort. In contrast, under English law ownership 
does not confer a title to sue itself; only possession counts as title. Remedies for the 
protection of property are provided by Cypriot Contract law, and take the form of 
damages for breach of contract.147 
The particular countries were chosen to show the different approaches on the matter due 
to the different legal traditions, namely civil law and common law. The difference on this 
approach will be further examined in Chapter 3, where the nature of bank deposits under 
numerous national legal orders will show that civil law countries and common law 
countries treat bank deposits differently. Moreover, Chapter 4 will illustrate these 
differences between national legal orders by discussing their case law on the financial 
crisis.   
The remarkable discretion of Member States to regulate their property law independently 
results in a great variety of provisions on similar matters within the Union and impedes 
the effective protection of the rights to ownership and possession. An area in which this 
variety of provisions can be illustrated is the litigation at the national level regarding the 
financial crisis and the allegations of violation of the right to property.  
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II. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – ECHR 
1. Access to justice 
The right of access to a court is embodied in Article 6 ECHR and aims to guarantee that 
litigants have an effective judicial remedy, which protects their civil rights.148 The right 
of access to justice encompasses both the right to institute proceedings and the right to 
obtain a decision by a court.149 As it was established in Bellet v France, the right of access 
to justice must be ‘practical and effective’,150 in the sense that individuals should ‘have a 
clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with [their] 
rights’.151 Access to justice does not constitute an absolute right,152 though its limitations 
must not restrict access to such an extent that the very substance of the right is impaired.153 
Furthermore, a limitation is compatible with Article 6 only if it pursues a ‘legitimate aim’ 
and there is ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be achieved’.154 In a comparative perspective, access to justice is treated 
as the foundation of the EU, which is based on the rule of law. Thus, in theory, access to 
justice has a more prominent role in the EU law regime than under the ECHR regime.  
Individuals can apply themselves to the ECtHR, under Article 34 ECHR. It was stated 
that Article 34 constitutes one of the ‘key components of the machinery’ of human rights’ 
protection155 because it allows individuals to take legal action at international level to 
assert their rights. According to the wording of the Convention, ‘The High Contracting 
                                                                
148 See J. H. Gerards and L. R. Glas,’Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights 
system’ (2017) 35 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 11 
149Kutic v Croatia App no 48778/99 (2002) paragraph 25 
150Bellet v France (1995) Series A 333-B paragraph 38 
151Ibid., paragraph 36 
152Golder v  the United Kingdom, App no 4451/70, (1975) 1 EHRR 524, paragraph 38; Stanevv Bulgaria 
[GC] App no 36760/06 (2012) ECHR 46, paragraph 230 
153Philisv Greece (1991)13 EHRR 741 paragraph 59 
154Fayed v the United Kingdom, App no 7101/90 (1994) 18 EHRR 393 paragraph 65 
155Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections), App no 15318/89 (1995) paragraph 70 
61 
 
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right’; a phrase 
that ensures the absolute nature of the right. Individuals must be ‘directly affected’ by the 
alleged measure, thus only direct victims are allowed to lodge proceedings.156 Similarly, 
in the EU, private applicants should prove that are directly concerned by the measure at 
stake in order to meet the locus standi threshold.  
An individual can only lodge proceedings before the ECtHR if he has already exhausted 
all the domestic remedies. 157  As the text of Article 35 itself demonstrates, this 
requirement is founded on the generally recognised rules of international law, since it 
forms part of customary international law158 and it is contained in various international 
human-rights treaties.159 The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the ECtHR 
operates as a subsidiary to the national systems protecting human rights; it thus allows 
firstly national courts to decide questions concerning the compatibility of domestic law 
with the ECHR, before instituting proceedings to the international court.160 The purpose 
of this rule is to provide the national courts with the opportunity to prevent or correct the 
alleged violation, based on the assumption that domestic legal orders provide effective 
remedies in case a Convention right is violated. 161  This rule applies irrespective of 
whether the ECHR provisions have been incorporated into national legal order,162 and it 
is an essential element of the operation of the protection system under the Convention.163 
It is important to underline that Article 35 considers the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
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only, and not any other remedies provided for by international bodies. Though not 
explicitly provided, in practice, the exhaustion rule applies equally under EU law, since 
the exercise of the preliminary reference mechanism is compulsory only by the highest 
court of a Member State, which means that applicants have already exhausted the rest 
domestic remedies.  
The exhaustion rule has been characterised ‘as one that is golden rather than cast in 
stone’. 164  The rule has been applied with some flexibility and without excessive 
formalism, since the ultimate purpose is to protect human rights.165 The rule of exhaustion 
is not absolute and neither it applies automatically.166 For example, it was decided that it 
was not necessary for applicants to make use of a remedy which was not obligatory even 
from the highest national court. 167 Applicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic 
remedies, which are both theoretically and practically available at the relevant time and 
which they can directly institute themselves. In other words, they must exhaust those 
domestic remedies which are accessible, capable of providing redress regarding their 
complaints and offering reasonable expectations of success. Consequently, applicants are 
not obliged to avail themselves to discretionary or extraordinary remedies. One should 
note here that, using the comparative analysis method, in the context of the financial 
crisis, the exhaustion rule is rather an impediment to effective judicial protection. In most 
cases, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, litigants brought proceedings before their 
national courts, and once their cases reached the EU courts, they were reverted to their 
national courts. Thus, they were asked to go through the same procedure twice, and only 
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then they are allowed to file an application to the ECtHR, a fact that causes a remarkable 
delay to their effective judicial protection.  
Article 35(3)(b) provides that an individual application will be inadmissible if ‘the 
applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as 
defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the 
application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground, which 
has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’. This criterion consists of three 
elements: there must be a significant disadvantage; or respect for human rights 
necessitates the hearing of the application; or no domestic court has properly heard the 
case. Though Protocol 15 suggested the removal of the third element, the Convention has 
not been amended yet.168 It has been established that there is not any formal hierarchy 
between these three elements, though ‘significant disadvantage’ grounds Article 
35(3)(b).169 In practice, a hierarchical approach is followed, with judges examining each 
element in turn.   
‘Significant disadvantage’ reflects the idea that a violation of a right, even if legally 
recognised, is worth the attention of an international court only if it contains a minimum 
level of severity.170 Purely technical violations or without any significance, apart from 
their formal acknowledgement, do not merit European supervision.171 What constitutes 
the minimum level is a question of fact, determined according to the circumstances of the 
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particular case. Regarding the severity of the alleged violation, the applicant’s subjective 
perception is assessed,172 but only if it is objectively justified.173 
The existence of harm of a pecuniary interest is not necessary, as long as questions of 
principle may also cause a significant disadvantage.174 In Giuran v. Romania, a question 
of principle, which was the applicant’s right to respect for his possessions, led the Court 
to hold that a significant disadvantage was suffered, even if the national court focused 
only on the compensation of the applicant as a recovery of the stolen goods.175 The nature 
of the right allegedly violated, the seriousness and the consequences of the violation for 
the applicant, were introduced by the ECtHR as aspects to be considered in order to decide 
the ‘minimum level’ of severity.176 Moreover, the issues at stake before the national court 
or the decision already taken are now assessed.  Finally, if a pecuniary interest is affected 
by the alleged violation, the effect of the financial loss on the particular applicant is 
examined, considering also the specific conditions of the individual and the economic 
reality of the country.177 
Thus, access to public international courts, in particular the ECtHR, is protected by 
Article 6 ECHR, though its protection is not absolute. The right of individuals to apply to 
the ECtHR presupposes the exhaustion of national remedies and the existence of 
‘significant disadvantage’ suffered by the applicant. These requirements indicate that 
individuals cannot seek the protection afforded by the ECtHR effortlessly. However, in 
comparison with the threshold of Article 263 TFEU, ‘significant disadvantage’, which 
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seeks the minimum level of severity, is easier to be proved than the requirement of ‘direct 
and individual concern’, which is restrictively interpreted by EU courts.  
2. Proportionality 
While having the status of a general principle of EU law, the principle of proportionality 
has had a pervading impact throughout the case law of the ECHR, and it has been 
characterised as ‘the alter ego of the principle of effective protection’.178 The fact that 
State measures should be proportionate to the interference with ECHR rights has been 
expressed in several terms, including the phrases ‘relevant and sufficient’ grounds,179 
‘convincing established’ necessity to interfere,180 and ‘pressing social need’ must exist.181 
It has been supported that proportionality has a ‘thinly veiled form’ in the text of the 
ECHR.182 
The proportionality principle in the context of the ECHR has not been developed likewise 
in EU law. The Strasburg organs aim at achieving a balance between the individual’s 
rights and the general interests of the public and also between the measure adopted and 
the public objective to be pursued. Among the elements that constitute the principle of 
proportionality, there are four, generally accepted, essential elements.  
Firstly, a fundamental right can be limited only if a legitimate aim is to be pursued. In 
other words, illegal interests and social prejudices are not acceptable as reasons for 
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restricting individuals’ rights, and this is clearly stated in Article 18 ECHR.183  This 
element is described within the Convention as a purpose which is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’,184 and legitimate aims and public interests vary, according to the 
relevant human right.185  Despite the various names given, all the concepts could be 
summarised to the protection of the rights of others and the public interests. 
Secondly, the suitability of the mean in question is concerned, since the relationship 
between the mean and the aim should be reasonable. The requirement of suitability is 
contained in numerous provisions of the ECHR. For example, Article 5(3) provides for 
arrest or detention as suitable restriction of the right to liberty and security only within 
the reasonable terms of proceeding. Therefore, if the relationship between the purpose, 
namely the prevention of crime, and the mean, namely the interference with an 
individual’s liberty, is unreasonable, then the requirement of suitability is not fulfilled. 
However, this requirement should not interfere with the independence and the discretion 
of the judiciary of the State. Notably, ‘[a]lthough it is not normally the Court’s task to 
review the observance of domestic law by the national authorities, it is otherwise in 
relation to matters where, as here, the Convention refers directly back to that law; for, in 
such matters, disregard of the domestic law entails breach of the Convention, with the 
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consequence that the Court can and should exercise a certain power of review. However, 
the logic of the system of safeguard established by the Convention sets limits on the scope 
of this review. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to 
interpret and apply the domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention 
‘incorporates’ the rules of that law: the national authorities are, in the nature of things, 
particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection’.186 
Thirdly, a measure is held proportionate only if there is no any less restrictive alternative 
means of achieving the same purpose. In particular, ‘harm which is caused to the rights-
holders should be less, than the advantage received from limitation of their possible abuse 
of convention rights’,187 and the chosen measure should not be able to be replaced by any 
other less harmful measure.  
While the above elements focused on the relationship between the means, namely the 
restriction of a right, and the aim, namely the public interest, the final element focuses on 
the relationship between the fundamental right itself and the public interest. 
Proportionality in that stage applies stricto sensu and goes into the substance of the 
conflict between the right and the interest, in order to achieve a balance. According to the 
words of a ECtHR’s judge, the search for balance of ‘the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights 
… is inherent in the whole of the Convention’.188 
The principle of proportionality is characterised as the most demanding standard for 
deciding whether the limitation of a right was acceptable. A human right is not breached 
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if the measure in question is held to be proportionate or ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’.189 The examination of the operation of proportionality principle in the context 
of the ECHR, has led several scholars to link this principle with the margin of 
appreciation.  In particular, proportionality has been described as ‘the other side of the 
margin of appreciation’ 190  and as ‘corrective and restrictive of the margin of 
appreciation’.191 Other scholars support that the margin of appreciation is not an adequate 
and comprehensive mechanism for striking a balance between the rights of individuals 
and the public interests. ‘If the Court gives as its reason for not interfering simply that the 
decision is within the margin of appreciation of national authorities, it is really providing 
no reason at all but is merely expressing its conclusion not to intervene, leaving observers 
to guess the real reasons which it failed to articulate’.192 ‘The margin of appreciation is a 
conclusory label which only serves to obscure the true basis on which a reviewing court 
decides whether or not intervention in a particular case is justifiable. As such it tends to 
preclude courts from articulating the justification for and limits of their role as guardians 
of human rights in a democracy’.193 
Even if the term ‘proportionality’ is not included in the ECHR as such, the judges of the 
ECtHR apply the principle strictly, so as to ensure that fundamental rights are not 
unreasonably or heavily restricted. In comparison with the principle of proportionality 
under EU law, it could be noticed that EU law imposes a ‘softer’ obligation on EU 
Member States to ensure proportionality than the obligation imposed by the ECHR. Based 
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on this comparative result, it could be expected that the ECtHR is more likely to declare 
the measures adopted to deal with the Eurozone financial crisis as disproportional and 
thus in violation of human rights, than the EU courts.  
3. Right to property  
The right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession, i.e. the right to property, is protected 
by Article 1 of Protocol No.1 ECHR. The scope of Article 1 was first demonstrated in the 
Marckx judgment, which stated that ‘by recognising that everyone has the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, Article 1 is in substance guaranteeing the right of 
property’.194 
The notion of ‘possession’ encompasses both movables and immovables;195 even the 
benefit of a restrictive covenant was accepted as property right.196 Claims,197 shares198 
and legitimate expectations were also recognised as possessions.   
As the Court established in the Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, Article 1 of Protocol 
No.1 consists of three rules. ‘The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the 
principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule 
recognises that the States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary 
for the purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph.’199 Thus, for proving that a 
violation of the right to property took place, the applicant should firstly illustrate that 
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there is an existing property right, then that this possession has been interfered, and 
finally, that the particular interference was not one of those permitted. The three rules laid 
down in Sporrong and Lonnroth case are not independent from each other; in essence, 
the first rule constitutes the general principle and the latter two provide the instances 
where interferences are permissible.  
The first rule, namely the peaceful enjoyment of possession, covers any interference with 
property rights that is not deprivation of property or control of its use. It is common 
practice for the ECtHR to examine the second and the third rules at first, and then revert 
to the first rule, since they deal with specific types of interference, and if those types are 
not recognised, then the broader category included in the first rule is assessed. Sporrong 
and Lonnroth v Sweden,200 Solodyuk v Russia201 and Stran Greek Rafineries and Stratis 
Andreadis v Greece,202 are among the few cases that fail to be examined under the first 
rule. Notably, in the latter case the general rule was assessed regarding a national 
legislation rendering an arbitration award void and unenforceable.  
The second rule provides for the deprivation of property. Deprivation could be described 
as dispossession from the legal rights of the owner, in other words, transfer of property. 
While formal expropriation is clearly included in the second rule, 203  de facto 
expropriation was sometimes recognised by the ECtHR as deprivation as well, since the 
results are the same and what differs is that it is not based on legal procedures. ‘In the 
absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of ownership, the Court 
considers that it must look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the 
situation complained of […]. Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that 
                                                                
200Ibid. 
201Solodyuk v Russia App no. 67099/01 (2005) 
202Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece, App no.13427/87 (1994) 
203For example Andorfer Tonwerke v. Austria, App no.7987/77 (1979) p.31 
71 
 
are ‘practical and effective’ […], it has to be ascertained whether that situation amounted 
to a de facto expropriation, as was argued by the applicants.’ 204  For example, in 
Papamichalopoulos v Greece judgment, it was found that ‘the applicants were unable 
either to make use of their property or to sell, bequeath, or make a gift of it; Mr Petros 
Papamichalopoulos […] was even refused access to it’,205 and that amounted to a de facto 
expropriation.  
A national measure falls within the third rule if the purpose of the State is to control the 
use of property, while its ownership is not affected, for a public interest or in order to 
‘secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’. For instance, in Banèr 
v. Sweden, interference to exclusiveness only affected the enjoyment of the possession 
and thus, it was held that it constituted a control of use.206 Moreover, a temporary measure 
influencing the applicant’s property fell under the third rule, since it did not deprive the 
property.207 
The wording of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 itself declares that the right to property is not 
absolute. Interference is allowed if it is lawful, it pursues a public interest and it is 
proportionate. All these three conditions should be fulfilled; otherwise the ECHR will be 
decided to have been violated. The right can also be legally restricted at time of war or 
other public emergency, according to Article 15 ECHR.  
The requirement of lawfulness promotes legal certainty, which constitutes a fundamental 
principle of democratic societies and is inherent in the whole Convention. ‘Law’ is 
interpreted autonomously and encompasses sources that are formally legal and contain 
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some procedural safeguards, so as to exclude arbitrary acts. As it was noted by the 
ECtHR, ‘it has consistently held that the terms ‘law’ or ‘lawful’ in the Convention [do] 
not merely refer back to the domestic law but also [relate] to the quality of the law, 
requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law’.208 The second requirement is described 
both as ‘public interest’ regarding deprivation of property, and as ‘general interest’ 
regarding control of use of it. What constitutes a ‘public interest’ depends on the decision 
of national authorities in question, unless that decision is manifestly unreasonably 
founded. Finally, the measure must be proportionate, in the sense that it is ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ in order to pursue a legitimate aim.  
As it can be demonstrated, the ECHR provides a comprehensive legal framework for the 
protection of the right to property, which does not only entail the right to possession, but 
also the right to the peaceful enjoyment of that possession, with interference being 
allowed only in very specific circumstances. To put these findings in the context of this 
thesis, bank depositors may have more chances to prove that their rights have been 
infringed, based on the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession, rather than the right 
to possession as such, because they still constitute the owners of the bank accounts but 
their value have been significantly limited and their use was restricted due to capital 
controls.   
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III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
1. Access to justice 
The right to obtain legal protection and legal remedies has been considered controversial 
in the context of international investment law.209 The well-known right of access to justice 
is entailed in the principle of ‘minimum standard of justice’ that aliens and their economic 
interests are entitled to under customary international law.210 Traditionally, diplomatic 
protection was the only available avenue for foreign investors to protect their rights. A 
State exercising diplomatic protection espoused the claim of its national against another 
State and pursued it in its own name.211 ‘By taking up the case of one of its subjects and 
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a 
State is in reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, 
respect for the rules of international law.’212 Even then, the prior exhaustion of local 
remedies as a prerequisite implied the international obligation of States, to ensure access 
to courts to foreigners and to ensure that justice is delivered according to the standards of 
fairness and due process. However, such prerequisite includes only access to remedial 
process within the host State and under the national law of that State; it does not therefore 
cover the right of access to justice before international tribunals or the courts of a third 
State.  
The recognition and consolidation of the right of access to international justice and to the 
courts of third states by private investors, for the enforcement of international investment 
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awards, have strengthened the right of access to justice for foreign investors.213 The 
evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs), including NAFTA, which promote investment arbitration, has 
transformed, in the words of Francioni, ‘the inter-state claims to the private-to-state-
arbitration’,214 and relieved foreign investors from the burdensome diplomatic protection 
of their home State. That change had significant consequences, since it established that 
private investors are now able to protect themselves in law, without being necessary for 
their home states to intervene, and it introduced the human rights dimension in the sphere 
of international investment law, by recognising ‘the individual as the title holder of 
rights’215 which constitutes the foundation of the international human rights law.  
The right of access was central in the Loewen Group v the United States case,216 which 
was based on rights provided by NAFTA, and related both to litigation and arbitration. 
While the arbitral tribunal recognised the court’s maladministration of justice, it denied 
considering the merits of the case since claimants did not exhaust all the local remedies 
in the USA. The ICJ in the Diallo case,217 which concerned the diplomatic protection of 
foreign investors, commented on the exhaustion of local remedies: ‘It is for the 
respondent to convince the Court that there were effective remedies in its domestic legal 
system that were not exhausted’.218 In a comparative perspective, while under EU law 
and Public International law, the exhaustion of domestic remedies is treated as an 
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obligation of the applicant, in International Investment law it is considered as an 
obligation of the respondent. This remark reflects a general feature of International 
Investment law, namely that priority is given to the protection of investors.219   
The issue of State immunity may restrict access to justice for foreign investors, and this 
could be particularly evident during a financial crisis, when the necessary restructuring 
of a State’s public debt harms the foreign bondholders. In such a case, foreign investors 
need to resort to courts or arbitration to protect their private rights and their financial 
interests. However, effective remedies may not be available if the doctrine of State 
immunity applies, as in the cases of Nigeria, 220  Mexico 221  and Argentina. 222  Most 
recently, the doctrine was invoked in the case of Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring 
and the following bonds’ default during the economic crisis of 2001-2002. Foreigners, 
who invested in the defaulted bonds and sought remedies, had the choices of either 
diplomatic protection or arbitration. Diplomatic protection was not without obstacles, 
since investors had to exhaust all the available domestic remedies in Argentina, as a 
condition of admissibility, under customary international law. Moreover, as Francioni 
explains, even if the claim was admissible, the home state of the investors would have to 
prove that the bond default was a wrongful act by Argentina under the international rules 
on the treatment of aliens. 223  In such a case, Argentina would probably invoke the 
doctrine of necessity as a defence for excluding wrongfulness, according to Article 25 of 
the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.224 Instead of diplomatic protection, foreign 
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investors commenced proceedings before the ICSID arbitral tribunals,225 where necessity 
was not accepted as a defence,226 or, even if accepted, it did not preclude the Argentina’s 
responsibility to compensate foreign investors.227 
It is supported that the development and expansion of investment arbitration has enhanced 
access to justice, in the sense that foreign investors can have their disputes heard and 
decided according to the law, as a principle that now coexists in investment law and 
human rights law. This development has also released private parties from the chains of 
the State, ‘by allowing the former to bring claims directly against a state before an 
international dispute settlement mechanism’. 228  The interface between international 
investment law and human rights law has been challenged, on the basis that the latter 
provides for equal treatment when the former entitles only foreign investors to commence 
investor-state arbitration proceedings, which means that they enjoy further treatment than 
national investors, in the sense that an extra forum is available to resolve their disputes. 
Therefore, local investors as well as the host State itself do not enjoy the right to access 
to justice through arbitration.229 
The possibility of international investment arbitration for foreign investors has received 
various critiques. In particular, Ginsburg has argued that BITs create a distinct protection 
                                                                
225 See for example Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9), 28 July 
2008 
226 In CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award, 12 
May 2005, the Tribunal did not accept the defence of necessity since the measure adopted by Argentina 
affecting the investment did not constitute the only available response to the economic crisis and, also, the 
Government had significantly contributed to the materialization of the financial crisis. 
227 In LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic  
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision on Liability, 3 Oct. 2006, the Tribunal accepted the defence of 
necessity, but underlined that this defence does not exclude the obligation to compensate the affected 
investors, because of the temporary character of necessity, therefore the duty to compensate revives once 
necessity is concluded. 
228F. Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’ (2009) 20 The 
European Journal of International Law, 746 
229 J. Kurtz, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law: A Reply to Francesco 
Francioni’ (2010) 20 The European Journal of International Law, 1077 
77 
 
which is absolutely independent from domestic legal processes in the host State.230 ‘By 
allowing foreign investors to exit the domestic institutional regime (through arbitration), 
bilateral investment treaties are said to act as substitutes rather than complements to the 
domestic legal system.’231 As a consequence, the domestic legal system is sidelined and 
the motives of foreign investors to coordinate with domestic actors are decreased.232 
However, this does not necessarily mean that justice is not achieved or that foreign 
investors are not embedding in the host State.  
Summarily, access to justice in International Investment law is mainly provided through 
international arbitration, without excluding the option of domestic courts. Such a regime 
has both advantages and disadvantages, with the main advantage being that foreign 
investors are not dependent on the espousal of their claim by their home State anymore, 
and the main disadvantage being that national and foreign investors are not equally 
treated. 
2. Proportionality 
With the widespread application of IIAs and the resolution of investment disputes by 
arbitral tribunals, a crucial tension between two objectives in clash emerged. On the one 
hand, IIAs aim to protect foreign investors and their economic interests, and on the other 
hand, the host States aim to promote their legitimate public policies by taking all the 
necessary regulatory measures. Proportionality operates as an essential principle when 
such a tension arises.233  
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In the international investment law regime, the application of the principle of 
proportionality implies a method of legal interpretation that is particularly appropriate in 
cases of conflicts of foreign investors’ interests and of public policy objectives. 234 
Similarly, Stone Sweet supports that proportionality constitutes ‘the most appropriate 
analytical procedure currently available for adjudicating disputes’ that include conflicts 
of the aforementioned nature.235 
The principle of proportionality was firstly invoked by an investment arbitration tribunal 
in the Tecmed case. 236  The tribunal considered the impact of the measure on the 
investment and whether that impact was proportionate to the aim pursued,237 and reached 
the conclusion that the measure was disproportionate. The factors that were taken into 
account included the effects of the non-renewal of the licence, the legitimate expectations 
of the investor, the importance of the regulatory interest protected by the host state, the 
weight and the effect of the restriction. 238  After Tecmed introduced the principle of 
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proportionality in the area of investment arbitration, other cases followed its approach, 
such as the LG&E case.239 
The economic crisis of Argentina in 2001-2002 and the resulting arbitration proceedings 
of foreign investors against the State gave the chance to arbitrators to consider again the 
principle of proportionality in the context of investment protection. 240  In particular, 
Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT has been invoked several times, since it provides 
defence to the State for measures ‘necessary for the maintenance of public order’.241 In 
other words, in the case of the Argentinean economic crisis, the measures implemented 
could be considered as not breaching the US investors’ rights, if they could meet the 
requirements of Article XI. Arbitration panels were rather inconsistent in the application 
of Article XI, since some of them accepted that the measures taken were legitimate and 
preserved public order and security of Argentina, while others reached the opposite 
conclusion. According to Stone Sweet, proportionality would be the best-practice 
standard for dealing with conflicts that arise by clauses like Article XI,242 though most 
arbitral tribunals preferred to avoid applying it. Remarkably, the tribunal in Continental 
Casualty case employed the proportionality test when interpreting Article XI. As it was 
stated: ‘The necessity of a measure should be determined through ‘a process of weighing 
and balancing of factors’ which usually includes the assessment of the following three 
factors: the relative importance of interests or values furthered by the challenged 
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measures, the contribution of the measure to the realisation of the ends pursued by it and 
the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce’.243 Unsurprisingly, EU 
law and Public International law considerations when applying the principle of 
proportionality are not the same with the above. The effects of any measure on 
international commerce are not a priority either for EU law or for Public International 
law, without meaning that they are fully ignored. This difference is attributed to the 
different nature of interests protected by each legal order.   
It will not be surprising if, in the context of the financial crisis, the defence of necessity 
will be regularly invoked, for the protection of the State’s interests, and thus, 
proportionality might become a familiar tool for arbitrators. However, such development 
will definitely attract criticism, as it already does. For example, it has been argued that 
‘to adopt proportionality-style necessity analysis would place arbitrators in the position 
of the balancing judge as perhaps something quite different than arbitrators traditionally 
conceived’.244 On the other hand, supporters of the use of the proportionality principle in 
international investment arbitration believe that proportionality analysis is more rational 
and profound than the ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’ type of reasoning that most arbitrators 
use.245 As a result, arbitrators become more reliable and they do not ignore serious aspects 
of a dispute, like public interests that are not directly related to the investment but they 
are of high importance and can affect the decision.246 Particularly in the context of the 
financial crisis, the public interest element is pivotal and, irrespective of the conflict of 
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legal scholarship on this area, arbitrators may be found in a position that they cannot avoid 
the application of the principle of proportionality. However, it is assumed that the 
application of the proportionality principle will not lead exactly to the same results as in 
the case of EU law and Public International law, since, as have been mentioned above, 
different considerations are taken into account and more weight is expected to be put on 
the interests of private applicants under this legal order.   
3. Right to property  
International investment law provides for the protection of property without referring to 
the term; property is covered by the term ‘investment’ instead.247 Though there is no 
precise definition of ‘investment’, the arbitral tribunals have established some features of 
the notion, including a commitment of economic value, a certain duration, the assumption 
of risk, the expectation of making profit and contribution to the development of the host 
State.248 Contractual rights have always been considered ‘investment’ and, thus, they are 
protected against expropriation.249 As it was stated in SPP v Egypt: ‘Nor can the Tribunal 
accept the argument that the term “expropriation” applies only to jus in rem. The 
Respondent’s cancellation of the project had the effect of taking certain important rights 
and interests of the Claimants. …Clearly, those rights and interests were of a contractual 
rather than in rem nature. However, there is considerable authority for the proposition 
that contract rights are entitled to the protection of international law and that the taking 
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of such rights involves an obligation to make compensation therefor’.250 Moreover, in 
Bayindir v Pakistan the tribunal demonstrated that ‘With respect to expropriation, the 
Tribunal said in its decision on Jurisdiction: It is not disputed that expropriation is not 
limited to in rem rights and may extend to contractual rights’.251 Claims from loans and 
other financial instruments were also considered as constituting investments.252 
The most common interference with the investor’s property, i.e. investment, in the host 
State occurs in the form of expropriation,253 which is also known as ‘dispossession’ and 
‘deprivation’.254 Expropriation could be either direct, through the formal transfer of the 
title of the investment and its nationalisation, or indirect, through the interference by the 
host State in the use of the investment or the enjoyment of the benefits of the investment, 
without interfering to the legal title of the property. Expropriation is allowed, provided 
that some conditions are fulfilled, namely that a public purpose is pursued, which is 
provided by law, with the deprivation of investment being non-discriminatory and 
compensable.255 Numerous scholars have demonstrated that sometimes, the measures of 
a State may not constitute expropriation, even if they interfere with an investment. 
‘[F]oreign assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade restrictions involving 
licenses and quotas, or measures of devaluation. While special facts may alter cases, in 
principle such measures are not unlawful and do not constitute expropriation.’256 Dolzer 
and Stevens explained that: ‘To the investor, the line of demarcation between measures 
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for which no compensation is due and actions qualifying as indirect expropriations (that 
require compensation) may well make the difference between the burden to operate (or 
abandon) a non-profitable enterprise and the right to receive full compensation (either 
from the host State or from an insurance contract). For the host State, the definition 
determines the scope of the State’s power to enact legislation that regulates the rights and 
obligations of owners in instances where compensation may fall due. It may be argued 
that the State is prevented from taking any such measures where these cannot be covered 
by public financial resources’.257 
Most BITs provide for indirect expropriation by referring to the effects of the State’s 
action and at the same time, by avoiding distinguishing between compensable and non-
compensable regulatory acts. 258  Furthermore, the OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property259 laid down the four conditions to be fulfilled for allowing 
a State to take any expropriatory measure,260 and it notes that: ‘Article 3 acknowledges, 
by implication, the sovereign right of a State, under international law, to deprive owners, 
including aliens, of property which is within its territory in the pursuit of its political, 
social or economic ends. To deny such a right would be attempt to interfere with its 
powers to regulate – by virtue of its independence and autonomy, equally recognised by 
international law – its political and social existence. The right is reconciled with the 
obligation of the State to respect and protect the property of aliens by the existing 
requirements for its exercise – before all, the requirement to pay the alien compensation 
if his property is taken.’ 
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Regarding the degree of interference with the investment, what is important is the severity 
of the economic impact caused by the State’s act. In essence, an investor is not entitled to 
compensation if the foreign State’s action has not removed all or most of the investment’s 
economic value. In other words, the interference is compensable if it deprives the investor 
of fundamental rights of ownership, and it affects the investment for a significant 
duration.261 
It is noteworthy that in the Sea-Land case the arbitrators had to decide whether there was 
an expropriation of a bank account. Finally, they did not find any substantial deprivation 
of, or interference with the investor’s rights to his account, and stated that the ‘account 
remains in existence and available’ in the investor’s disposal.262 
The question has arisen whether the economic impact of the investor could be the sole 
criterion for establishing the extent to which the regulatory act constituted indirect 
expropriation. As the Tribunal demonstrated in the Tippetts case, ‘the intent of the 
government is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form 
of the measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their 
impact’.263 
Finally, the reasonable expectations of the investors are taken into consideration, since 
the affected investor proves that their investment was reasonably based on a state of 
affairs that could not predict the challenged regulatory act.264 
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It is expected that these elements will be examined by the arbitral tribunals which are 
called to decide on the compatibility of the measures adopted by countries during the 
financial crisis with the standards of the respective BITs. Undeniably, the economic 
impact of the investors will be proved harsh, while the consideration of reasonable 
expectations may be found more intricate. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As it can be concluded, all three legal orders tend to protect the same interests, but in a 
different way. While EU law and Public International law provide only for litigation, 
International Investment law provides arbitration as its main dispute resolution method. 
However, even within the sphere of litigation, EU law and Public International law ask 
parties to satisfy different requirements in order to have the necessary legal standing. The 
application of the principle of proportionality varies in each legal order, since it is 
perceived differently by the relevant actors and is pursuing a different purpose in each 
system. Finally, property is protected to a greater extent by Public International law and 
International Investment law, while EU law approaches the right to property by leaving 
it to the discretion of each Member State.  Notwithstanding the separate examination of 
the three legal orders for the purposes of the literature review, it is not implied that they 
cannot be mixed. On the contrary, there are areas where the three legal orders operate in 
conjunction, and a remarkable example is the one of the financial crisis. In essence, the 
reason why the literature review was structured is such a way as to distinguish between 
the three legal orders is to firstly appreciate the similarities and differences between them, 
by using the comparative method, so as to continue with studying the way the three of 
them interact in the field of this thesis. 
This examination of the literature review in the particular areas will now contribute to the 
identification of the rights of bank depositors in Chapter 3 and to the evaluation of how 
those rights have been affected by the financial measures adopted by the EU in Chapter 
4. Moreover, it will facilitate the analysis of the relevant courts’ approach and, in 
particular, of the effective judicial protection they might have offered to bank depositors, 
by taking into consideration the principle of proportionality in their decisions. Finally, the 
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role of arbitration, as the main instrument of access to justice provided by International 
Investment law, and the application of proportionality and the protection of property 
rights by arbitrators, found in Chapters 5 and 6, will be based on the literature review in 
that field.  
Numerous assumptions can be made from the literature review in relation to the topic of 
this thesis. Regarding the access to justice, it is assumed that the exhaustion rule provided 
for in Article 35 ECHR may operate as an impediment to effective judicial protection, in 
the sense that significant delays may occur. As was explained above, and will be further 
discussed in Chapter 4, when the applicants’ cases reached EU courts, they were reverted 
to their national courts. They are thus asked to go through the same procedure twice, and 
only then they are allowed to file an application to the ECtHR. Moreover, an impediment 
of effective, though not judicial, protection for foreign investors could be the principle of 
State immunity, which may be employed by the Respondent States, in order to avoid 
arbitration proceedings on the measures adopted.  
Concerning the right to property and its alleged violations during the financial crisis, 
effective protection of bank depositors and other stakeholders within the EU may be 
affected by the variety of provisions on ownership and possession, since its regulation 
belongs to the discretion of Member States.  
Finally, very important assumptions can be made in relation to the principle of 
proportionality. Firstly, since most mechanisms employed by the Eurozone Member 
States in order to deal with the crisis were declared to fall outside the remits of the EU 
legal order, it is questioned whether the proportionality principle is applicable or whether 
Member States have been given the absolute freedom to act the way they wish, beyond 
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any control of the proportionality of their actions.265 Furthermore, as it was noticed, EU 
law imposes a ‘softer’ obligation on EU Member States to ensure proportionality than the 
obligation imposed by ECHR. Based on this comparative result, it is assumed that the 
ECtHR is more likely to declare the measures adopted to deal with the Eurozone financial 
crisis, as disproportional and thus in violation of human rights, than the EU courts. Lastly, 
proportionality might become a familiar tool for arbitrators, because the defence of 
necessity is expected to be regularly invoked, for the protection of the State’s interests. 
Particularly, in the context of the financial crisis, the public interest element is crucial, 
thus the application of the principle of proportionality by arbitrators may be unavoidable.  
 
 
  
                                                                
265 The relevant case law is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SUBJECT MATTER: THE NATURE OF BANK DEPOSIT 
Apart from banking law that undeniably deals with some of the rights and obligations of 
depositors, it is assumed that local depositors and investors are entitled to any rights 
provided for by the national investment law and consumer law. Foreign investors are also 
entitled to any rights provided for by Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties 
between the country of their origin and the country of their investment. Moreover, EU 
law and Public International law provide rights for depositors, in the form of fundamental 
rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and European Convention 
of Human Rights). 
For the purpose of this research, the term ‘depositors’ is used and excludes States. Thus, 
‘depositors’ include any individuals or businesses, either local or foreign, which hold 
deposit in a bank (financial institution).  Bank depositors and bank shareholders have a 
radically different position in a bank. Shareholders own shares of the bank, and the 
amount of these shares determines the extent of influence that they can exercise over a 
bank’s corporate decisions. In contrast, bank depositors only save their money in the bank 
without having the power to influence any decision affecting the operation of the bank.  
The aim of this chapter is to identify the nature of bank deposit, so as to extract the rights 
of depositors. After distinguishing between bank depositors and bank shareholders (i), 
the chapter discusses the treatment of money as property in financial transactions (ii). 
What follows is an analysis of the notions of bank deposit and depositors under some 
national legal orders (iii), applying the comparative method, under EU law (iv), under 
Public International law (v), and, finally, under International Investment law (vi).  
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I. BANK DEPOSITORS AND BANK SHAREHOLDERS 
The rule established in Foley v Hill266 entails the risk that money deposited might be lost 
if the bank, as any other corporation, is not managed in good faith in pursuing its interests, 
as a whole. 267  Someone could argue that the interests of a bank refers only to the 
shareholders’ interests. However, there are States which tried to change the attitude that 
the purpose of a company is exclusively the maximization of shareholder value and 
introduce the protection and promotion of stakeholders’ interests too. For example the 
English Companies Act 2006 provides that ‘a director of a company must act in the way 
he considers in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole’.268 Though it is well established that directors 
must act in the best interests of the shareholders, and that is demonstrated by the fact that 
they should disclose to shareholders all the options available before making any decision, 
their obligation to take into consideration the depositors’ interests is controversial. For 
example, directors do not owe a duty to stakeholders if a corporation is solvent, though 
when facing the risk of insolvency, the stakeholders’ interests are of central importance 
in their decision-making. As it was demonstrated in Brady v Brady, while a company is 
solvent, the shareholders’ interests prevail and creditors’ interests ‘ought not to count for 
very much’. In contrast, during insolvency, ‘the interests of the company are in reality the 
interests of existing creditors alone’.269 
Since bank depositors have the right to be paid an amount equivalent to that they 
deposited, directors of banks should ensure, not only that the bank is solvent, but that it 
                                                                
266 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 H.L. Cas 28; 9 E.R. 1002; see below, section 3 
267See for example: Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petrol Ltd [1974] A.C. 821 PC (Australia), ‘in the 
interests of the company as whole is interpreted to mean in  the  interests  of  the  company  as  a  
commercial  entity’,  at  paragraph 82 
268Companies Act 2006, section 172 
269 Brady v Brady [1988] B.C.L.C. 20 at 40 
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has the necessary budget to be able to pay depositors on demand an amount equal to what 
has been deposited. Such obligation, in conjunction with the particular vulnerability of 
banks to bank run in general, impose a heavy burden on bank directors to ensure that any 
bank in difficulty is managed in a proper manner.270   
                                                                
270 See J. M. Sjovall, ‘What duty do company directors owe to banks and other creditors?’ (2004) 121 
Banking Law Journal 4; R. Westlake, ‘Guidance for the Directors of Banks’ (2013) IFC Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Focus 11 
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II. MONEY AS PROPERTY IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Before examining the notion of bank deposit, it seems prudent to start the analysis 
with a brief examination of the treatment of money as property in financial 
transactions. Money is usually described as tangible property in the literature. Goode 
supports that money are fungible in the sense that any amount of money can be 
exchanged for any other equal amount of money.271 This argument is based on the 
fact that one-Euro coin can stand for another one-Euro coin without having its value 
being affected, so that it does not matter which coin the holder has since all of them 
are the same. Though it constitutes a reasonable argument, it does not enlighten the 
discussion about the nature of money in relation to property law.  
In order to establish proprietary rights over money, either held as cash or deposited in 
a bank account, there must be a segregation of the particular fund of money, which 
should be made capable of distinct identification, before any claim brought against it. 
Segregation of money in bank accounts was discussed in numerous cases, including 
Re Goldcorp Exchange case, 272  Boscawen v Bajwa 273  and Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe).274 It can be noticed that while money is indeed fungible from 
Goode’s point of view, it is not fungible from the point of view of property law as 
these cases illustrated. Accordingly, the persistence of property law for certainty of 
the subject matter is reflected in the fact that for proprietary rights to arise, money 
should be separately identified from other money with which it has been mixed. As it 
was traditionally held in Roscoe v. Winder275and then illustrated in Boscawen v. 
                                                                
271R. Goode, Commercial Law (2nd edn, Penguin, 1995), 491 
272Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC) 
273Boscawen v. Bajwa [1996] 1 W.L.R. 328 
274Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6  
275Roscoe v. Winder [1915] 1 Ch. 62 
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Bajwa276, where a bank account is overdrawn, the money that was held in that bank 
account has disappeared, since the specific property which was to be the subject of 
the proprietary claim has ceased to exist. 
Such rulings are contrary to Goode’s argument that money is fungible and they can 
be replaced by other money of equal value without having their proprietary rights 
affected. The fungible nature of money was supported by the Court of Appeal in 
Hunter v. Moss,277 where it was argued that shares in a company were identical and 
indistinguishable, thus any part of shares could constitute the subject matter of the 
trust in question. While such approach satisfies the commonsense of parties, it entails 
the risk that claims to the property might be more than the property available to satisfy 
those claims. Such a problem did not arise in Hunter v. Moss,278 since all parties were 
solvent, but in Re Goldcorp Ltd the claimants were more than the money available to 
satisfy their claims.279  Thus, English authority still requires a segregation of the 
property in order for there to be proprietary rights imposed over it. 
What can be assumed from this section is that, according to the above authorities, 
bank depositors whose money was bailed in, should also satisfy the requirement of 
segregation of the property, so as to claim the protection of their proprietary rights.  
  
                                                                
276Boscawen v. Bajwa [1996] 1 W.L.R. 328 
277Hunter v. Moss [1994] 1 W.L.R. 452 
278Ibid. 
279Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC) 
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III. THE NOTION OF ‘BANK DEPOSIT’ IN NATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS 
Generally, money is considered a method of payment and a unit of account. As a 
method of payment, money allows saving. As a principle, money deposited in bank 
accounts should be repayable in money. As it was stated, ‘[a]s a rule, however, the 
economist’s view that everything is money that functions as money is unacceptable 
to lawyers. Bank accounts, for instance, are debts, not money, and deposit accounts 
are not even debts payable on demand […] In the absence of the creditor’s consent, 
express or implied, debts cannot be discharged otherwise than by payment of what 
the law considers as money, namely legal tender […] Nor does the fact that ‘bank 
money’ largely functions as money prove that in law it necessarily and invariably is 
money.’280 The quote illustrates, inter alia, that, from the perspective of methodology, 
Law and Economics appraise bank deposits differently, with the legal interpretation 
being more complicated, including the factor of consent of the depositor.  
There are two main types of transactions, through which banks collect capital; loans 
and deposits. The distinction between these two financial contracts can be understood 
based on the following considerations. On the one hand, when the bank pays an 
interest rate and uses the money from the customers’ accounts without their 
permission, then the contract is a loan to the bank. On the other hand, when the 
customer who owns a deposit is entitled to withdraw his money without any 
significant costs, then the contract is a deposit to the bank.  
                                                                
280F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 1992), 5-6, cited in K. 
Laurinavičius, ‘The Legal Nature of Bank Deposits’ (2006) 31 Review of Central and East European Law 
294  
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The fact that money deposited is then used by the depositary for its own purposes has 
been considered by all jurisdictions, in an attempt to define the nature of bank 
deposits.  
Under Roman law, the contract of depositum operated for the delivery of the money 
to the depositary to keep it in safe custody, with the depositor being able to claim his 
object at any time.281 Though usually individual objects were deposited, money was 
also accepted. If money was deposited either in a box or seared, then the contract was 
one of depositum. If an amount of money was deposited without being individualized, 
then the same amount was restored, but not the same coin in specie. In such case, the 
depositary obtains the right to use the money, as it acquires their ownership, as well 
as the risk of money getting lost.  
This kind of contract was described as depositum irregulare, since the depositary was 
only obliged to return equivalent things, instead of the same object stricto sensu.282 It 
was also considered whether depositum irregulare could be treated as mutuum, i.e. 
loan, due to the fact that both contracts transfer the ownership of money from the 
initial owner to the depositary – borrower. The counter argument was that each type 
of contract pursues different economic objectives, with mutuum promoting the 
interests of the borrower and depositum irregulare promoting the interests of the 
depositor. Since the depositary acquires the ownership of the money deposited, he can 
lend it or mix it with his own assets, thus the depositor’s restoration of money depends 
on the depositary’s (bank) solvency and on any applicable deposit insurance.  
                                                                
281K. Laurinavičius, ‘The Legal Nature of Bank Deposits’ (2006) 31 Review of Central and East 
European Law 297 
282 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 215 
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The notion of depositum irregulare has influenced the relevant legislation of many 
continental countries. Under German law, bank deposits are treated as loans, 
according to section 700 of the German Civil Code.283 French law is slightly different, 
with the ownership of the object deposited being transferred to the depositary, who 
can use and dispose it but is also obliged to restore the equivalent object, under the 
notion of ‘le depot irrégulier’.284 Swiss law refers only to money deposited and not 
to loans, though it is argued that in such case the depositary acquires the ownership 
of money, as well as the right to use it, similarly to the case of a loan.285 In Italy it is 
explicitly provided that by depositing a sum of money in a bank, the bank acquires 
ownership of it and is bound to repay in the same kind of money, though there is no 
any requirement to restore depositor’s money immediately on his demand.286 Dutch 
law does not contain the notion of depositum irregulare, but it only treats deposit as 
a contract under which the depositary is obliged to retain depositor’s money. 287 
Latvian Civil Code expressly recognises the conversion of deposit into a loan, for as 
long as the money deposited, as fungible property, are being used by the depositary, 
according to his discretion.288 Depositaries in Estonia bear the obligation of returning 
the money deposited and the depositors assume the risk of any loss after the delivery 
of money. All the provisions on loans apply for bank deposits likewise.289 Greek 
legislation does not provide an explicit definition of bank deposit, which is mainly 
regulated by principles of contract law. The main characteristic of bank deposits in 
                                                                
283Civil Code in the version promulgated on 2 January 2002 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I 
page 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738), last amended by Article 4 paragraph 5 of the Act of 1 October 2013 
(Federal Law Gazette I page 3719), Section 700 
284French Civil Code Act No. 2013-404 of 17 May 2013, Articles 1930, 1932 
285Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code (Part Five: The Code of Obligations), Article 
481 
286Civil Code of the Italian Republic, approved by Royal Decree No. 262 of March 16, 1942), Article 
1782 and 1834 
287Civil Code of Netherlands, Article 7(600) 
288Latvian Civil Code 1937, Article 1992 
289Estonian Law of Obligations Act, section 896 
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Greek law is the reinforcement of bank’s power through the depositing of depositor’s 
money there, which is temporary and lasts until the depositor demands his money 
back.290 
Under English law, the bank-customer relationship is similar to the debtor-creditor 
relationship. By the time money is deposited in the bank, the same amount should be 
repaid, either on depositor’s demand, for current accounts, or on a date agreed, for 
term deposits or savings accounts. While being deposited in the bank, money can be 
disposed. As it was stated in Foley v. Hill, ‘[t]he money paid into the banker’s, is 
money known by the principal to be placed there for the purpose of being under the 
control of the banker; it is then the banker’s money; he is known to deal with it as his 
own; he makes what profit he can, which profit he retains to himself… The money 
placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of the 
banker, to do with it as he pleases; he is guilty of no breach of trust in employing it; 
he is not answerable to the principal if he puts it into jeopardy, if he engages in a 
hazardous speculation’. 291  Such argument demonstrated the debtor-creditor 
relationship, which was also supported by scholars. ‘Whilst it would be misguided to 
attempt to define the relationship of banker and customer in terms of status rather than 
of contract, it is realistic to concede that it constitutes a sui generis contract 
incorporating elements of specific, well-defined contracts, such as that of debtor and 
creditor.’292 In such a debtor-creditor relationship, the bank is not under an obligation 
to advise customers on how it disposes the money deposited and the risk to which 
those funds are exposed, in contrast with its obligation to advise customers who buy 
investment products. If bank directors were under a fiduciary duty to protect the 
                                                                
290Ολ ΑΠ 35 / 97 ΔΕΕ 1997, 980 
291Foley v Hill (1848) 2 H.L. Cas 28; 9 E.R. 1002 at 1005-1006 
292P. Ellinger et al., Modern Banking  Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2002) 96 
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depositors’ interests, then depositors would have been equalized with beneficiaries in 
investment business.293 To place it in the context of this thesis, these considerations 
indicate that, in the light of the financial crisis, bankers cannot be found liable for the 
way they have used depositors’ money and for the fact that they have not inform the 
for the risk to which their money are exposed, even if those risks resulted in the 
collapse of the bank and the loss of their savings. 
In the US, a general deposit passes the title to money from the depositor to the bank, 
thus it creates a relationship of debtor-creditor. At that time, the money becomes part 
of the bank’s property, and can be repaid after the depositor’s demand.294 In case of 
insolvency, the general depositors’ repayment, as creditors, follows the repayment of 
privileged creditors. Under Cypriot law, bank deposits must be repayable either with 
or without simple or premium interest, either on demand or on an agreed date, and it 
is distinguished from the sale or supply of goods and assets, the provision of services 
and the issuing of debentures or shares.295  
From this section it can be inferred that there are four main models of the bank-
depositor relationship. Firstly, there is the model of the depositum irregulare that 
emerged from the Roman law tradition and provides that the ownership of money 
deposited is transferred to the depositary, i.e. the bank, which should promote the 
interests of the depositor. This model is adopted by some continental, civil law 
countries, such as France, Switzerland and Italy. Secondly, there is the model that 
treats deposits as loans and considers all the provisions on loans identically applicable 
for bank deposits. The second model is found in countries like Germany, Latvia and 
                                                                
293D. Singh and J. R. La Brosse, ‘Northern Rock, depositors and deposit insurance coverage: some critical 
Reflections’ (2010) 2 Journal of Banking Law 60 
294Uniform Commercial Code, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections (2002) 
295 Ν. 66(Ι)/97 , Ο περί Τραπεζικών Εργασιών Νόμος του 1997, Article 2 
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Estonia. Thirdly, the Netherlands and Greece apply the simple principles of contract 
law in disputes relating to bank depositors. Finally, common law countries consider 
the bank-customer relationship as a debtor-creditor relationship. Depending on the 
model that each country employs, the rights of depositors and the obligation of banks 
vary accordingly.   
From the four models, the two former let the bank use the money deposited according 
to its discretion, either by fully acquiring its ownership and the risk to get lost, or by 
disposing them as money loaned. Thus, in the case of the financial crisis and the 
litigation in this area, it is rather difficult for bank depositors to prove bank’s liability. 
In contrast, the two latter models seem more beneficial to depositors, as they can base 
their claims on grounds of breach of contract by the bank or on the responsibility of 
bank to repay the same amount to depositors in a debtor-creditor relationship. Based 
on the different treatment of bank deposits by different national legal orders, it is 
expected that the approach that States adopt during the financial crisis regarding their 
banks will vary too. This will be examined in Chapter 4, when discussing the approach 
of courts towards the protection of bank depositors.  
Since the financial crisis is not a phenomenon limited to a particular country only and 
one of the basic methodologies of this thesis is transnational legal process, the analysis 
should now move to a higher level, the supranational one.  
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IV. THE NOTION OF ‘DEPOSIT’ AND ‘DEPOSITOR’ UNDER EU LAW 
Under EU law, any person who holds a deposit is called depositor. Directive 
94/19/EC296 defines ‘deposit’ as any credit balance which results from funds left in 
an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions 
and which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions 
applicable, and any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a credit institution. The 
notion of ‘deposit’ does not cover bonds.  
According to the abovementioned Directive, a deposit may be considered 
‘unavailable’, when it is ‘due and payable but has not been paid by a credit institution 
under the legal and contractual conditions applicable thereto, where either: (i) the 
relevant competent authorities have determined that in their view the credit institution 
concerned appears to be unable for the time being, for reasons which are directly 
related to its financial circumstances, to repay the deposit and to have no current 
prospect of being able to do so; Or (ii) a judicial authority has made a ruling for 
reasons which are directly related to the credit institution's financial circumstances 
which has the effect of suspending depositors' ability to make claims against it, should 
that occur before the aforementioned determination has been made.’297 
The Commission made some comments on the notions of deposit and credit balance 
in its draft:  ‘The idea of deposit as it appears in para (1) has been envisaged from the 
depositor’s point of view. The depositor has a ‘credit balance’ or ‘claim’ whereas in 
the Directives relating to annual accounts, this naturally appears in the credit 
institution’s accounts in the form of ‘debt’ or ‘loan’… The idea of ‘credit balance’  is 
                                                                
296Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes [1994] OJ 2 135/05 
297Ibid., Article 1(3) 
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relatively clear: in particular it is used for current accounts but it is supplemented by 
the idea of ‘funds left in accounts’, which is intended to indicate savings books or 
accounts or any other instrument in which funds generally remain for longer than in 
current accounts.’298 
The original Directive has been substantially amended in the light of the Eurozone 
financial crisis, so as to facilitate access to Deposit Guarantee Schemes for depositors, 
by extending the scope of their coverage, expediting repayment periods and 
enhancing the funding requirements.299 The amendment of this Directive had the 
ultimate purpose of embellishing ‘consumer confidence in financial stability 
throughout the internal market’.300 Under Directive 2014/49/EU, ‘deposit’ means a 
credit balance which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations 
deriving from normal banking transactions and which a credit institution is required 
to repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, including a fixed-term 
deposit and a savings deposit.301 ‘Exclusions exist relating to credit balances whose 
existence can only be proven by a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(17) of 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1); their 
principal is not repayable at par; or their principal is only repayable at par under a 
particular guarantee or agreement provided by the credit institution or a third party’.302 
The Directive characterises ‘eligible’ to repayment a deposit if it is not excluded from 
protection pursuant to Article 5. Any part of an ‘eligible deposit’ that does not exceed 
                                                                
298Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on deposit-guarantee 
schemes’ 1992, COM (92) 188 final, Commentary on the Articles, Article 1, paragraph 1 
299 Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) [2014] OJ 2 173/149, Preamble, Recital 7 
300 Ibid. 
301Ibid. 
302Ibid., Article 2(3) 
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the coverage level laid down in Article 6 is classified as ‘covered deposit’.  The 
definition of ‘unavailable deposits’ remained unchanged.  
The only statutory definition of ‘depositor’ can be found in Article 2 of Directive 
2014/49/EU,303 in which ‘depositor’ is defined as the holder or, in the case of a joint 
account, each of the holders, of a deposit. If an account has been opened in the name 
of two or more persons, or if over that account two or more persons have rights that 
are exercised by means of the signature of one of more of those persons, then this 
account is considered as a joint one.  
In other words, money deposited in a bank is a bank deposit. Bank deposit creates a 
contractual relationship between a banker and a depositor. The depositor or the 
account holder retains a right to get repayment on demand. The bank owes a liability 
to the depositor. In a bank’s financial statement, a deposit is shown as the asset of a 
bank. 
In order to fully appreciate the notion of ‘depositor’ under EU law, one should also 
examine some more terms that are relevant to it and can put some limitations to the 
subject matter of the thesis. These terms are ‘creditor’, ‘consumer’ and ‘investor’, 
since it cannot be doubted that a depositor is also a creditor and a consumer of the 
bank.  
Under EU law, the term ‘creditor’ is commonly used, but without any explicit 
definition available, apart from one given in the context of consumer protection. 
According to it, a ‘creditor’ is defined as any natural or legal person who grants credit 
                                                                
303Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) [2014] OJ 2 173/149 
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in the course of his trade, business or profession, or a group of such persons.304  After 
being amended, Directive 2008/48/EC provides that ‘creditor’ means a natural or 
legal person who grants or promises to grant credit in the course of his trade, business 
or profession.305 Directives 2008/48/EC306 and 2014/17/EU307 interpret ‘consumer’ 
as a natural person who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession. Clearly, bank depositors 
fall within the definitions of ‘creditors’ and ‘consumer’ but their distinct 
characteristics ask for a particular treatment by law.  
Finally, Directive 97/9/EC defines ‘investor’ as any person who has entrusted money 
or instruments to an investment firm in connection with investment business.308 
Though the definition of ‘investor’ and ‘bank depositor’ are not the same, it seems 
that a bank depositor can also fall below the category of ‘investor’. 
As it can be extracted, the term ‘creditors’ includes depositors and investors, either 
individuals and businesses, and States. For the purposes of this thesis, States are 
excluded, and depositors and investors are examined in parallel, or from a 
comparative perspective, without employing the term of ‘creditors’. 
  
                                                                
304Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
the Member States concerning consumer credit [1986] OJ 2 042/0048 
305 Article 1(2)(b), Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers [2008] OJ 2 133/66, Article 
3 
306Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers [2008] OJ 2 133/66, Article 3 
307Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable 
property [2014] OJ 2 60/34 
308Directive 97/9/EC on investor-compensation schemes [1997] OJ 2 084/022 
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V. THE NOTION OF ‘BANK DEPOSIT’ UNDER PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The position of English law in section ii is presented as a starting point for discussion, 
but what is more useful for this thesis is the relevant approach of the international 
legal order and, in this case, the ECHR is examined.   
Bank deposits have been included in the sphere of ‘possessions’ for the purposes of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR. Since the ECtHR has decided cases concerning bank 
deposits on the basis of the right to property on several occasions, it could be 
understood that a bank deposit constitutes property, which should be protected by the 
relevant State, against any interference that prevents its peaceful enjoyment. 
However, this obligation on the States does not extend to the protection of the 
purchasing power of the money deposited. If the funds deposited have been interfered 
only on their value, this does not constitute an infringement of the depositor’s right to 
property. The case law of the ECtHR involves a number of examples that demonstrate 
this position. 
In Flores Cardoso v Portugal309  the Court held that the right to property of the 
applicants was not affected by the inflation and the decreased purchasing power of 
the Mozambiquen escudos, since Portugal could not be held liable for not protecting 
its citizens from the consequences of inflation. Similar judgments were delivered in 
the cases of Appolonov v Russia310 and Rudzinska v Poland.311 In the former case, the 
economic reforms in Russia affected the value of the applicant’s savings in a bank 
account but the State was not under the obligation to revalue the deposits. In the latter 
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case, it was declared that Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention does not entail the 
obligation of maintaining the purchasing power of amounts deposited in banks. The 
argument of the applicant, that she could not buy the house she intended because 
Poland reduced the guarantees offered to holders of housing savings accounts, 
rendered the application inadmissible since the ambit of the right to property did not 
cover the right to become the owner of property.312   
Since the restriction on a bank account’s holder to access his money is considered 
interference with his right to property, the ECtHR has to examine whether that 
restriction fulfils the requirements of lawfulness and proportionality. Regarding 
proportionality, a temporary restriction could be accepted more easily than a 
permanent prohibition of disposing the money deposited.  
The freezing of bank deposits and the payment in State bonds of the ‘old’ foreign-
currency saving accounts in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had to be 
examined by the Court in order to be demonstrated whether it constituted an 
unreasonable interference with the right to property of the affected depositors in the 
case of Trajkovski v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 313  It was 
demonstrated that the control of the use of property in this case was not a 
disproportionate measure. Taking into account the fact that the applicant was able to 
withdraw specific amounts in euros and the difficult economic conditions of the State 
at that time, the Court held that the measures were reasonable violation of Article 1 
of Protocol No.1. The ECtHR followed a similar approach when considering the 
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conversion of money deposited in banks in ‘old’ foreign currency in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to privatisation coupons and State bonds.314 
Finally, in Zolotas v Greece315 it was alleged that a statute of limitation on claims to 
bank deposits implemented by the Greek civil code was in breach of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR. The applicant asked for the balance in his bank account 22 years 
after the opening of that account, and his inquiry was rejected, because the account 
remained inactive all those years. The ECtHR underlined the principle of 
proportionality, namely that any interference with the right to property could not be 
reasonable only if it imposes an excessive burden on the person affected. Furthermore, 
the Court reiterated that Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR renders States responsible to 
guarantee the effective enjoyment of the right to property and possession. Based on 
the principle that the relationship between a banker and a customer is a relationship 
of trust, the bank was considered to be obliged to have informed the applicant a priori 
of the statute of limitation that was  about to impede his claims.  Since Greece had 
failed to set up such an obligation, the Court held that there was a violation of the 
right to property. 
This case law can lead to some initial conclusions regarding the case of bank 
depositors in the financial crisis. Firstly, since the interference of their deposits was 
not only on their value, but a restriction on their access to their money, thus the right 
to property is presumed to be violated. The ECtHR should only examine whether the 
measures ate stake fulfil the requirements of lawfulness and proportionality. The 
former is clearly satisfied, because all measures were provided either by EU, 
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international or national legislation. What is intricate is the satisfaction of the latter 
requirement, and this is analysed in Chapter 4.   
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VI. BANK DEPOSITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
‘Investment’ is a word very commonly used, thus it might be assumed that defining the 
term is straightforward. However, the notion of investment is broad enough and it receives 
various interpretations in everyday, financial, economic and legal usage.  
The numerous interpretations of investment under EU law and international law stress the 
necessity for establishing a clear definition that will encompass all the different aspects 
that each legal order covers.  
Initially, in this part a financial and economic definition is given (a).  Moreover, an 
analysis of the interpretation of investment under international (b) and EU law (c) follows. 
The purpose of this analysis is to extract the essential features of ‘investment’ in order to 
examine whether bank deposits fulfill the criteria so as to be considered ‘investments’ 
(d). Bank depositors could be entitled to the protection offered by investment law, in case 
they are regarded investors, either under international or EU law. 
1. Financial and Economic definition of ‘Investment’ 
The common sense considers ‘investment’ as money committed with the aim of achieving 
additional income. Economic science often assumes that an investment involves the 
transfer of funds for the establishment of a longer term project, having the purpose of 
regular income, with the person who transferred the funds, participating in the 
management of the project, assuming a business risk.316 
The definition of investment in financial terms is that there is a commitment of the 
investor’s funds in order to obtain income in the future. That income could take various 
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forms, including interest and dividend. Activities which can produce financial assets are 
regarded as investments for financial purposes.317 
Turning to the economic definition of investment, this includes ‘the net additions to the 
economy’s capital stock which consists of goods and services that are used in the 
production of other goods and services’.318 This explanation focuses on the creation of 
new and profitable capital.  
The difference between the financial and the economic definitions lies in the fact that in 
the financial sense, an investment must produce financial assets; whereas in the economic 
sense, the investment must produce physical assets.319 However, it can be noticed that 
both definitions have the same foundation, which is the commitment of money for the 
procurement of some assets, either financial or physical. Moreover, both definitions 
acknowledge that investments have some specific characteristics. 
Definitely, an investment is made in the expectation of a return. In particular, the purpose 
of investing an amount of money is to derive return. The value of the return is determined 
by various factors, such as the nature and the management of the investment and the 
duration of it. The return of capital must be certain, in the sense that the investor must 
feel safe that his capital will be returned without losing his money or effort.  
In addition, the assumption of risk is intrinsic to investments. This risk may relate to loss 
of capital, the alteration of returns, delay in repayment of capital, or non-payment of 
interest. The nature of the investment determines the risk to a great extent. For example, 
investments in ownership securities like equity shares carry higher risk compared to 
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investments in debt instruments like debentures and bonds. 320  Moreover, the risk is 
analogous to the return. In other words, the higher is the risk, the higher is the return.  
The afore-mentioned features of investment in the financial and economic sense of the 
notion, will be used below to examine whether bank deposits can qualify as investments. 
As it is demonstrated in the next section, both International and EU law interpretations of 
the term recognise most of these features, namely the commitment of money, the 
expectation of profit and the assumption of risk. It is not surprising that both legal orders 
provide for these common elements with the financial and economic sciences, since 
investment is an interdisciplinary concept, proving that concepts from one discipline can 
be transferred to another. Indicatively, it is supported below that bank deposits clearly 
share the two latter features, while the fulfillment of the commitment of money 
requirement is debatable.  
2. ‘Investment’ under International law 
‘Investment’ is not unanimously defined in international law, since customary 
international law and treaty instruments interpret the term differently. Each investment 
instrument serves different purposes and thus it defines the notion in various ways.321 
‘The multiplication of definitions of investment thus results from the proliferation of 
different sources.’322 
Initially, investments were protected by the law on state responsibility, and particularly 
by the rights of property held by aliens.323 The term ‘investment’ was not used; instead, 
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customary international law provided for ‘foreign property’.324 A foreign capital entered 
into a host country and took the form of property, that property becoming a foreign 
investment. Through the years, the concept of property expanded so as to include, in 
addition to physical property, intangible assets, contractual rights and other economic 
transactions. Therefore, considering any cross-border economic activity as an investment 
would be misleading. ‘Such a broad concept of foreign investment would significantly 
curtail state sovereignty and domestic control over economic activities, and would also 
lead to inconsistent overlaps with trade and other forms of cross-boundary economic 
regulation.’325 
The OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 326  shift the focus on the 
transfer of capital, by regarding investments as the most important activity of capital 
movement. According to the definition of direct investment in Annex A, the decisive 
features of an investment are the existence of a capital contribution, the creation of 
‘lasting economic relations with an undertaking’ 327  and the investor’s effective 
managerial control of the enterprise where it had invested.  
A more specific definition of direct investment can be found in the OECD Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, where it is stated that ‘direct investment is a 
category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct 
investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
an economy other than that of the investor (the direct investment enterprise). The 
motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term relationship between the direct 
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investment and the enterprise which allows a significant degree of influence by the direct 
investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise. The lasting interest ‘is 
evidenced where the director investor owns at least 10 per cent of the voting power of the 
direct investment enterprise’.328  Again, the principal characteristics of an investment 
remain the same, namely the contribution by the investor, the establishment of durable 
relations between the investor and an enterprise and the actual influence in the 
management of the enterprise by the investor. 
Most International Investment Agreements prefer a broad definition of investment, 
usually describing them as ‘every kind of assets’ without giving an exhaustive list of 
which are these covered assets. The reason of preferring such wide interpretations is that 
States, when negotiating this kind of agreements, aim at offering protection to as many 
economic activities as possible in order to attract more investors and contribute to the 
development of their national economies. Such wide definitions cover both direct and 
portfolio investment and they demonstrate the steadily progressive nature of the notion. 
An example of a multilateral instrument that interprets investment so broadly is the 
Energy Charter Treaty, in which Article 1(6) talks about ‘every kind of assets’ relating to 
economic activities in the energy industry.329 NAFTA is slightly more specific, providing 
of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, partnership, tangible and intangible 
property with a profit-making expectation. 330  Moreover, NAFTA excludes some 
categories of property from the area of investment.331 
                                                                
328OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (Draft) (2007)  OECD Global Forum on 
International Investment, 4th edition, 261 
329Energy Charter Treaty, entered into force in April 1998, available at: 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf (accessed 12 September 2017) 
330North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 1139, available at: https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement (accessed 12 September 2017) 
331For example, money claims arising solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services 
113 
 
Tribunals have tended to interpret ‘every kind of asset’ broadly in order to encompass 
various types of assets. The more recently drafted IIAs tend to define ‘investment’ more 
specifically, rejecting the general interpretation that was traditionally employed. The 
reason for that change lies in the deficiencies of the initial definition, the most significant 
being that it does not reflect the common understanding of investment since it does not 
refer to the expectation of profit or the risk assumption.  
In the same line with multilateral treaties, Bilateral Investment Treaties construe 
‘investment’ as ‘every kind of asset’ accompanied by a non-exhaustive list of types of 
foreign investments that are protected. It has been observed that most BITs define 
investments based on four specific foundations, i.e. ‘the form of the investment; the area 
of the investment’s economic activity; the time when the investment is made; and the 
investor’s connection with the other contracting state’.332 The non-exhaustive lists usually 
include movable and immovable property, debt and equity investment, claims to money 
and claims under a contract with a financial value. The use of broad definitions allows 
the protection of both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments.333 
A typical sample of the general definition of investment can be found in the German 
Model BIT,334 which illustrates the traditional approach,335 even if it was only drafted in 
2005. According to it, not every asset could constitute an investment, but rather only the 
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examples given. Among the examples of the list are the ‘movable and immovable 
property and any other property rights’.336 It is not clarified whether property must relate 
to the undertaking or be used for a business purpose.  Another example is any ‘shares of 
a company and other kinds of interest in companies’.337 Various interests in companies 
can be included there, such as debentures and other debt-type instruments, as well as 
portfolio investments. Furthermore, ‘claim to money that has been used to create an 
economic value or to any performance having an economic value’338 also qualifies as 
investment. Potentially, such a wording covers a wide range of commercial contracts and 
transactions. While the abovementioned Model BIT provided for an exhaustive list of 
activities that qualify as investments, the 2004 US Model BIT339 constitutes another 
example of how States approach the notion of investment. Investment is interpreted as 
every asset which is either owned or controlled by the investor ‘which has the 
characteristics of an investment’ and includes, apart from the traditional examples of 
investment, debts instruments, ‘futures, options and other derivatives’. 340  The 
abovementioned ‘characteristics of an investment’ consist of ‘the commitment of capital, 
the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk’.341 An even broader definition 
is given in the Belgium-Luxembourg Model BIT which explains investment as ‘any kind 
of asset and any direct or indirect contribution in cash, in kind or in services, invested or 
reinvested in any sector of economic activity’.342 
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Due to the broadness of the definitions given in most BITs, the arbitral tribunals are 
usually asked to rule on this matter. Thus, the definition of investment could also be 
extracted from the interpretation of tribunals, when they have been asked to decide 
whether a particular activity constituted investment.  
In Eureko B.V. v Poland,343 the ad hoc arbitration was called to determine whether the 
possession of shares and the deriving corporate governance rights could be entitled to 
protection under the 1992 Netherlands-Poland BIT. It was held that since shareholding 
was regarded as an investment, as well as any rights derived from shares, then Eureko’s 
corporate governance rights had some economic value and they had to be protected, since 
they constituted investment.  
Without doubts, the most significant illustration of the argument that investment is not 
only a broad term, but rather an autonomous legal concept, can be found in the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention). Although the ICSID Convention does not contain a 
clear definition of the notion, it stresses the importance of delimiting its nature by 
providing in Article 25(1) that ‘the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment’. The reason behind the absence of an explicit 
definition is expressed in the World Bank Executive Directors’ Report, which stated that 
‘no attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’ given the essential requirement of 
consent by the parties, and the mechanism through which Contracting States can be made 
known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would 
not consider submitting to the centre’.344 In other words, the parties’ agreement that their 
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dispute arises out of an ‘investment’ and their consequent consent to jurisdiction could be 
a major factor for recognising an activity as an investment.345 
However, the parties’ consent, either in the case of two private investors or in the case of 
investor-State arbitration, could not constitute the only determinant criterion. Even if it is 
acknowledged that ICSID arbitral tribunals can interpret ‘investment’ according to the 
facts of each particular case, their freedom is restricted, as it was stated in the Joy Mining 
v Egypt: ‘The parties to a dispute cannot by contract or treaty define as investment, for 
the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction, something which does not satisfy the objective 
requirements of Article 25 of the Convention. Otherwise Article 25 and its reliance on 
the concept of investment, even if not specifically defined, would be turned into a 
meaningless provision.’346 
The first definition of investment was given by the arbitral tribunal in Fedax NV. v 
Republic of Venezuela. 347  Five criteria were presented as ‘the basic features of an 
investment’, and they consisted of certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and 
return, the risk assumption, a substantial commitment and a contribution to the 
development of the host State.348 Among the five criteria in this approach, four were 
widely accepted, and only the relevance of the regularity of profits was doubted.  The 
four characteristics (substantial commitment, certain duration, assumption of risk and 
significance for the host state’s development) were established in the Salini Construttori 
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S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A v Morocco,349 and they are usually referred to as the ‘Salini 
criteria’.350 
This four-criteria approach has not avoided criticism. In Saba Fakes v The Republic of 
Turkey,351 the tribunal tried to define ‘investment’ based on the ordinary meaning of the 
word, thus it only focused on capital contribution, duration and risk assumption and it 
rejected the contribution to the economic development of the host state, as it was 
considered uncertain at the time of the investment.  
Furthermore, in Phoenix v Czech Republic352 two more criteria were added. According to 
the tribunal, an investment could be covered by ICSID Convention if the assets were 
invested in accordance with the laws of the host state and they were invested bona fide.353  
The importance of the contribution to the development of the state was doubted, because 
designating the contribution of an investment is ‘impossible to ascertain’.354 The criterion 
of contribution to the economy – not to the development- of the host state was preferred, 
and that contribution could be demonstrated by the existence of the three first factors 
(capital contribution, duration and risk assumption). 
The recognition of financial instruments as investments was considered in the Fedax v 
Venezuela355 and CSOB v Slovak Republic,356 which supported that loans and promissory 
notes could be qualified as investments. The tribunal in Fedax v Venezuela expressed the 
view that ‘Loans qualify as an investment within ICSID’s jurisdiction […] Since 
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promissory notes are evidence of a loan and a rather typical financial and credit 
instrument there is nothing to prevent their purchase from qualifying as an investment 
under the Convention in the circumstances of a particular case such as this.’357 In the same 
line, the loan in question in the CSOB v Slovakia was held to involve ‘a significant 
contribution by CSOB to the economic development of the Slovak Republic […] this is 
evident from the fact that CSOB’s undertakings include the spending or outlays of 
resources in the Slovak Republic in response to the need for the development of the 
Republic’s banking infrastructure.’358 
However, in Joy Machinery Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt,359 bank guarantees 
were not regarded as investments, after the application of the criteria presented 
beforehand. In particular, it was held that a bank guarantee only constitutes a contingent 
liability and ‘to conclude that a contingent liability is an asset… and hence a protected 
investment, would really go far beyond the concept of investment, even if broadly 
defined, as this and other treaties normally do’. 360 
Two conclusions can be drawn regarding these three arbitral awards. Firstly, generally, 
tribunals are not negative to recognise financial and credit instruments as investments ab 
initio, therefore it cannot be excluded that bank deposits can be found ‘investments’ in an 
arbitration dispute. Secondly, and as a limitation to the former inference, tribunals try to 
apply the Salini criteria in the facts of each particular case and, having in mind that 
arbitrators are not bound by the doctrine of precedent, it is difficult to establish a general 
principle on which financial instruments qualify as investments.   
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3. ‘Investment’ under EU law 
In antithesis to international law, there is no precise definition of ‘investment’ in EU law, 
probably due to the fact that the area of investments initially fell below the exclusive 
competences of the Member States. The first explicit citation of the term has appeared in 
the Lisbon Treaty,361  under which the Common Commercial Policy covered foreign 
direct investment (FDI) thereafter. Primary EU law did not include the notion of foreign 
investment until the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, since its protection was 
encompassed in the competence of the Member States and not the EC.362 
Article 207 TFEU refers merely to foreign direct investment, disregarding portfolio 
investment and other forms of foreign investment, thus it does not provide a 
comprehensive definition of the term.  A definition of foreign investment can be derived 
from a broad analysis of EU law.  
Foreign investors are protected by EU law provisions on capital movement and 
establishment. The TFEU provides for absolute liberalization of capital movements, both 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries.363 The Council 
Directive 88/361/EEC364 defined investments as ‘Investments of all kinds by natural 
persons or commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish 
or to maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the 
entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order 
to carry on an economic activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest 
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sense.’ The characteristics that can be extracted from the above definition are the 
provision of capital in order to accomplish an economic activity, the creation of an 
enduring and direct link, and the managerial control of the enterprise by the person who 
supplies the capital. 
Moreover, the CJEU case law provides that ‘movements of capital are financial 
operations essentially concerned with the investment of the funds in question rather than 
remuneration for a service… The physical transfer of bank notes may not therefore be 
classified as a movement of capital where the transfer in question corresponds to an 
obligation to pay arising from a transaction involving the movement of goods or 
services.’365 By distinguishing between payment for the provision of goods or services 
and transfer of capital, the CJEU demonstrated two more features of investments, namely 
the profit expectation and the risk assumption. In other words, investments are 
characterised by their ultimate purpose to make profit, but with an element of 
unpredictability for the outcome of the undertaking.366 
Capital movements are interpreted broadly enough in Directive 88/361/EEC, so as to 
include – in addition to direct investment – all operations in equity or debt securities, 
namely shares and bonds, which are dealt with on the capital or on the money market.367  
Therefore, it could be argued that portfolio investments are considered as capital and they 
should be regulated in the same manner as direct investments. 368  Since portfolio 
investments constitute capital movement, then they have also the aforementioned key 
features that are derived by EU law.  
                                                                
365 Judgment of 31 January 1984, Luisi and Carbone, Joined cases C-286/82 and 26/83, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:35 
366 For example, in the case of sales of goods, even if there is a profit expectation, such profit is rather 
predictable, thus there is no any risk.  
367A. Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012) 44 
368Ibid. 
121 
 
Furthermore, capital movements for personal or commercial purpose are also covered by 
the provisions of free movement of capital. This means that physical transfer of money; 
credits and financial loans regarding commercial transactions are regulated by the EU law 
provisions on capital movements. Nevertheless, such capital movements do not meet the 
profit expectation and the risk assumption characteristics, which identify investments, 
thus they are not treated as investments under EU law. As it can be noticed, ‘capital’ and 
‘investment’ cannot be equalized under EU law, since the term of capital is very broad 
and it includes inter alia investments.    
Evidently, Articles 206 and 207 TFEU refer solely to FDI, leaving aside inter alia 
portfolio investments and money claims. ‘This does not mean that EU law does not 
consider them as foreign investment, as the other Treaty rules remain significant for their 
determination and regulation.’369 It rather means that the Common Commercial Policy 
principally deals with FDI.370    
The inclusion or not of portfolio investments on the FDI, and consequently on the 
Common Commercial Policy, has constituted the subject of a continuous debate between 
the Member States and the EU Commission. On the one hand, a narrow interpretation 
was asserted by the German Constitutional Court, which demonstrated that FDI 
exclusively comprises ‘investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an 
enterprise’. 371  On the other hand, the EU Commission supported that the exclusive 
competence of EU covers ‘both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment’.372 
                                                                
369A. Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012) 44 
370 The EU competences in the field of investment are discussed in Chapter 6.  
371BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009 - 2 BvE 2/08 - Rn. (1-421) available at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. (accessed 17 
September 2015) 
372Financial Responsibility Regulation proposal COM (2012) 335 final,  2012/0163 (COD) 
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The EU Council seems to promote a textual interpretation of the relevant TFEU 
provisions by describing portfolio investments as an area of mixed competence.373 
Even if a clear definition of ‘investment’ is absent from EU law, a definition can be 
constructed based on a synthesis of characteristics recognised in many areas of primary 
and secondary EU law. Firstly, there must be a commitment of capital for the performance 
of an economic activity. Secondly, the investor must establish a long-lasting link with the 
enterprise. Thirdly, the investor must have the control of the undertaking. Fourthly, the 
capital commitment should have a profit-making orientation. Finally, the investor must 
assume the risks of such an activity. Apart from the third feature, namely the managerial 
control of the enterprise by the investor that international law does not provide for, both 
legal orders acknowledge the same key characteristics that an investment should have.   
4. Bank deposits as investments 
After examining how the notion of investment is interpreted by international and EU law, 
and also by the financial and economic sciences, the focus will now be shifted on whether 
bank deposits could be treated as investments or, instead as only claims of their depositors 
against the relevant bank. Bank depositors could be entitled to the protection offered by 
investment law, in case they are regarded investors, either under international or EU law. 
As a consequence, the avenue of international investment arbitration could be available 
for them, in addition to the option of litigation in national and international courts. 
The variety and ambiguity of definitions of investment cannot always provide clear 
guidance as to which activities qualify. Both international law374 and EU law recognise 
                                                                
373Commission Press Release 16943/12 (29 November 2012) on negotiation for investment with Canada, India 
and Singapore 
374See the ‘Salini criteria’ 
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some key features in common, the existence of which is usually determinant to decide 
whether an activity, including bank deposits, constitutes an investment.  
Firstly, an investment principally involves a commitment of economic value. In other 
words, an investment consists of assets. Through the years, the notion of investment has 
been expanded so as to recognise new forms of property and modern types of economic 
transactions. Secondly, the duration of the investment is always taken into consideration. 
Thirdly, investments are mainly characterised by profit expectation and risk assumption. 
Inevitably, expecting profit entails some risk, which the investor has incurred or shared 
the business risk associated with the set up of an investment. ‘The existence of risk and 
profit becomes crucial for differentiating investment from mere commercial 
transactions.’375 Fourthly, an investment should contribute to the development of the host 
state. ‘Development’ has also been interpreted very broadly, thus each State has to 
determine for themselves what is regarded advantageous for their development.  Finally, 
EU law adds that the investor must have the managerial control of the investment. 
Some BITs expressly acknowledge bank deposits as investments. On the other hand, there 
are other more restrictive BITs which expressly exclude them. For example, it is stated in 
the Uruguay – United States BIT that ‘Some forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, 
and long-term notes, are more likely to have the characteristics of an investment, while 
other forms of debt, such as a bank account that does not have a commercial purpose and 
is related neither to an investment in the territory in which the bank account is located nor 
to an attempt to make such an investment, are less likely to have such characteristics.’376 
                                                                
375A .Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012) 29 
376Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2005), footnote on Article 1  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf (accessed 12 
September 2017) 
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There are authorities which define investment as a simple ‘title to money’, a broad 
definition that can easily encompass bank deposits. The examination of the nature and 
characteristics of bank deposits in relation to the abovementioned general features of 
investments, might lead to some assumptions regarding whether bank deposits could 
qualify as investments and thus fall below the jurisdiction of international investment 
arbitration. 
At first, an investment involves a commitment of economic value, the purchase of an 
asset or the transposition of capital into a lucrative economic activity. The action of 
depositing money in a bank does not convert cash (or either cash-equivalents) into other 
assets.  Purchasing shares in a bank, or bank bonds or even certificates of deposit are all 
activities which could fulfill the commitment of economic value criterion, since they 
transform cash into other assets. However, opening a simple bank account cannot be 
considered as making a commitment of economic value, and thus it cannot indicate that 
a bank deposit qualify as investment. Furthermore, there is the argument that the operation 
of a bank deposit entails a commitment of economic value but from a reverse side.377 In 
particular, the bank invests the client’s money when it on-lends it to third parties. In such 
argument, the client becomes the lender to the bank, instead of being an investor in it.  
Moreover, the duration of an activity plays a key role in identifying the activity as an 
investment. Since there is no fixed time threshold, on the basis of which someone could 
assess whether a contribution may qualify as an investment, it is difficult to draw a general 
conclusion regarding bank deposits and their duration. It is clear that short-term bank 
deposits could not satisfy the duration requirement and long-term deposits might illustrate 
the establishment of long-lasting link with a country, while medium-term deposits are 
                                                                
377 P. Athanassiou, ‘On the Legal and Economic Treatment of Bank Deposits as Investments: Some 
Reflections’ (2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 717 
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more controversial. Measuring time is a matter of common sense. For example, a 10-
months bank deposit is clearly a short-term one, while a 10-years deposit is considered as 
long-lasting. 
The third feature of investment relates to the profit expectation and the assumption of 
risk. Bank deposits are income-producing, since depositors have at least a minimum 
return, in the form of the interest returned to them. As every profitable activity, bank 
deposits involve some risk. ‘That bank deposits are not risk-free placement is one of the 
bitter lessons of the recent financial crisis, which has seen depositors in several European 
banks come close to losing or actually losing some of their deposits’.378 Since most 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes provide for the protection of a maximum amount of money 
deposited,379 the rest of the deposit remains uninsured. Therefore, the deposits in excess 
of the deposit guarantee threshold constitute unsecured claims of the depositor on the 
bank, and they can be bailed-in, contrary to the initial supposition that money deposited 
are available to be returned to their owners on demand. In particular, by transferring the 
burden of rescuing a bank to the depositors, based on the Single Resolution Mechanism, 
implies that deposits have been changed from bank credits to taxpayers’ money available 
in emergency conditions, thus ‘nobody’s money is safe from the tax collector’.380 
Furthermore, an investment is generally considered to contribute to the development of 
the country. Strictly speaking, an individual bank deposit cannot be advantageous for the 
development of a country in a direct way. However, the long-term importance of bank 
deposits in a country’s economy is priceless. The banking sector in an economy is likened 
                                                                
378P. Athanassiou, ‘On the Legal and Economic Treatment of Bank Deposits as Investments: Some 
Reflections’ (2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 716, see for example 
Northern Rock, the banks in Iceland and Cyprus’s Laiki Bank  
379 In EU this amount is usually 100 000 euros 
380 G. C. Georgiou, ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, (2013) 24 Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 67 
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to the heart in a body and the capital it provides is likened to blood that circulates in it. In 
other words, if banks do not provide finance, the economy of a country will suffer and 
finally fail. The ability of banks to provide finance depends on their ability to mobilise 
sufficient amount of deposits in the economy. Some clients deposit their money in a bank 
and some other clients borrow money from those resources, therefore the banking 
industry transform deposits into real productive capital, which contributes to the 
development of a country. Consequently, bank deposits are the foundations of an 
economy, since banks cannot function without deposits.381  
What EU law describes as the managerial control of the investment, lacks direct 
application in the case of bank deposits. A bank depositor does not have voting rights and 
thus he cannot influence the management of the bank. While shareholders can affect the 
business strategy and the whole behaviour of a bank, depositors do not have such a power. 
The only means of influencing, in a very indirect way, the bank’s management is by 
threatening to remove their deposits when they disagree or worry about the policy of the 
bank. ‘However, a depositor’s threat to move his deposits is hardly a substitute for the 
voting rights of shareholders in a bank not least because of the relatively weak 
competitive forces within the banking sector and its relatively high degree of 
concentration.’382 
In addition to the assessment of the main characteristics of an investment, the intention 
behind opening a bank account should also be taken into consideration. Someone who 
has excess cash has the option of a bank deposit, as well as the option of purchasing other 
investment products. In other words, bank deposits are regarded as a part of the 
                                                                
381 Among the functions of banks in a country’s economy are also the provision of clearing and settlement 
systems that expedite trade, and of various products to deal with risk and uncertainty 
382 P. Athanassiou, ‘On the Legal and Economic Treatment of Bank Deposits as Investments: Some 
Reflections’ (2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 717 
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‘investment’ options. The holder of the cash will decide whether to deposit the money on 
a bank, instead of purchasing shares for example, based on the elements of profit 
expectation and wealth-allocation. Such elements are inherent in the nature of 
‘investment’. ‘The volitional conduct element is all the more prominent where foreign 
depositors, with no permanent ties to a giver jurisdiction, choose to bring in it and deposit, 
with one or several local banks, excess liquid funds: their decision to do so would appear 
to bear all the hallmarks of an investment decisions, dictated by business 
considerations.’383 In other words, choosing in which bank the account will be opened 
requires the consideration of similar elements with choosing in which country or which 
industry to establish an enterprise, i.e. an investment. 
  
                                                                
383P. Athanassiou, ‘On the Legal and Economic Treatment of Bank Deposits as Investments: Some 
Reflections’ (2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 716 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is clear and undeniable that bank depositors can avail themselves to the protection 
offered by the ECHR under Article 1 of Protocol 1. What is disputable is whether they 
can also enjoy the protection offered by international investment law and, 
consequently, by international investment arbitration. 
Even if at first glance, investment can be easily defined; such an impression does not 
reflect the reality. Investment has been interpreted in various ways, through economic 
and financial sciences and in different legal orders.  
There is no clear answer whether bank deposits can qualify as investments. Though 
some of the principal characteristics of investments are present in bank deposits, most 
importantly the assumption of risk, there are other characteristics whose presence is 
controversial, such as the long-term duration.   
The fact that some BITs expressly cover bank deposits also strengthens the argument 
that bank deposits are investments for the purposes of investment arbitration. 
Moreover, deposits may well qualify as investments from an economic perspective, 
since the expectation of return and the assumption of risk requirements are met, as it 
was explained in the previous section.  
One possible approach would be that bank deposits cannot be regarded as investments 
up to the amount protected by the deposit guarantee schemes, but they can be regarded 
as investments for the unsecured amount. For example, if there is a bank deposit of 
€250 000, it can be argued that the €100 000, which are secured under most EU 
deposit guarantee schemes, cannot constitute an investment, while the remaining €150 
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000 do constitute investment. Such an argument makes more sense in the case of 
larger amount of money being deposited.  
Whether bank deposits qualify as investments is a matter of high importance, since it 
either allows or prevents the protection of depositors by the provisions of investment 
law. The rest of this thesis builds on the assumption that bank deposits can be treated 
as investments. Thus, international investment arbitration is examined in order to see 
whether it could be beneficial for bank depositors regarding their effective protection 
during the financial crisis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE APPROACH OF COURTS TOWARDS THE PROTECTION 
OF BANK DEPOSITORS AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The global financial crisis has brought essential changes in the EMU’s architecture384 and 
its constitutional foundations and the success and future of European integration have 
been intensely challenged. Post-crisis austerity measures 385  implemented by those 
Member States that were heavily hit by the crisis, to fulfil the criteria in order to receive 
financial assistance by international lenders, have given rise to numerous questions 
regarding the level of protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. Further 
considerations relate to the transparency and efficiency of crisis management mechanisms 
at the EU, and -consequently, also national- level. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the various approaches that the CJEU, selected national courts and the ECtHR 
have followed when asked to review the legality of the post-crisis measures adopted at 
the EU and national level. Thus, analysis is made of some of the most prominent litigation 
arising out of the measures adopted in Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia 
and Cyprus. Those countries have been chosen due to the rigorous, and in some cases 
unprecedented, measures that have arguably restricted the fundamental rights of citizens, 
and in some cases, depositors in particular. In addition, selective case law of the ECtHR 
dealing either with the financial crisis or the protection of depositors and shareholders of 
                                                                
384 Although the crisis started in the financial/banking sector, it pushed the EU economy into severe 
recession and affected simultaneously the two central policies of the Union, namely the EMU and the 
internal market, and underlined the need for public intervention in the financial/banking sector, in the 
form of state aid, state guarantee or liquidity measures and recapitalisation, and the need for permanent 
and integrated crisis systems. Remarkably, the European Banking Union has been developed after the 
crisis arose.  
385 Either affecting the banking sector of the State (for example, banks restructuring and bail-in) or the 
social and employment rights of the citizens (for example, increase in taxation, reductions in public sector 
workers’ salaries and pay cuts in the pensions of retired citizens) 
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failing banks is analysed. The constitutional 386  and social 387  perspectives of those 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes have already been extensively studied by legal 
scholarship. Therefore, those aspects will be slightly touched upon on this chapter, with 
the focus being shifted to the protection of individuals, either as depositors, shareholders 
or investors in banks.  
The protection offered will be assessed on its effectiveness. In the EU legal order, 
effective judicial protection is preserved in Article 47 of the Charter which encompasses 
the right to an effective remedy of every individual in case of violation of EU law, the 
right to a fair trial and the right of defence and legal aid. The Lisbon Treaty gave to the 
principle of effective judicial protection a Treaty basis of its own, with Article 19(1) 
TEU; 388  until then, it only constituted a ‘mere’ general principle deriving from the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States and Article 6 ECHR.  As it will be 
explained below, arguably, EU law prefers only a procedural approach towards effective 
judicial protection, while this chapter will try to examine the application of effectiveness 
on the substance of a case. 
1. National courts 
Applicants have often brought proceedings in national courts in order to challenge the 
post-crisis measures, based their arguments on the obligation of States to protect their 
fundamental rights and on their national constitution allowances to create or participate 
in supranational instruments, outside the sphere of EU law, such as the ESM. The 
overview in this chapter aims to be rather indicative than exhaustive. Litigation at the 
national level could be classified based on the subject-matter of cases. In particular, two 
                                                                
386 In other words, the legal competence of the relevant authorities on EU bail outs and bail ins 
387 In other words, the effects of the programmes on employment and labour social rights 
388Article 19(1) TEU creates the obligation of Member States to provide sufficient remedies to ensure 
effective judicial protection only in areas protected by EU law. 
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classes of actions can be identified. Firstly, there are cases where the relevant national 
court had to rule on the compatibility of the national adjustment programme with 
guarantees regarding social rights and general principles of law 389  provided in their 
constitution. Examples of this class are the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Secondly, 
there are cases where the national courts were asked to decide on the legality of general, 
supranational reforms of the EMU structure and their compatibility with national 
constitutions, as they allegedly intrude with national sovereignty and democratic 
legitimacy. Remarkable in this area is the example of Ireland. The case law on bank 
depositors and investors can be argued to belong either to the first class, as in Slovenia 
and Cyprus, or the second class, as in Iceland. Notable deference to the political process 
can be identified in both classes of cases, but the degree has been higher in the context of 
the second type, since courts had to evaluate the constitutionality of more general reforms. 
2. CJEU 
Generally, the CJEU has operated as a catalyst for the architecture of the EMU, in relation 
to its legal perspective, with the political process being deliberately ignored. Prior to the 
crisis, the jurisprudence of the CJEU concerned only the effectiveness and enforceability 
of the Stability Growth Pact and underlined the political and discretionary character of 
the excessive deficit process, which constitutes an underpinning of the EMU. Post crisis, 
it is argued that the Court remained deferential to the mechanisms employed at the EU 
level, though it had a lot of opportunities to criticize the amendments and developments 
of the EMU. The relevant case law can be classified into two categories, reflecting the 
double role of the CJEU during the crisis. Firstly, the legality and constitutionality of 
some general reforms of the EMU’s architecture were examined, such as in the Pringle 
                                                                
389 The main general principle of law examined by the courts on those cases was the principle of equality.  
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case.390 Secondly, the Court had to rule on the nature of MoUs and their interaction with 
EU law, since national courts, for example in Portugal, Slovenia etc, made preliminary 
references when they dealt with the adverse effects of the rescue packages and austerity 
measures.391  
3. ECtHR 
Though limited, due to the requirement of prior exhaustion of all domestic remedies, the 
recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR contains rulings on the legislative austerity measures 
because of the Eurozone crisis, against Greece, Portugal, the UK, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, and Lithuania. This chapter will only study the cases against the first four 
countries. It is not surprising that the Court has repeatedly held that, under those 
exceptional circumstances, the adoption of laws that aim to balance State expenditure 
normally have a political character that prevails over social matters. In other words, the 
Court used the concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ in a rather broad sense, so that any 
action made by the State can be found to fall within this latitude, unless it is considered 
disproportionate. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the ECtHR clarified that 
economic policy falls outside of its scope of application, since the ECHR does not protect 
economic and social rights. However, some legal bases do exist for initiating proceedings 
against States before the ECtHR, these being the principle of fair trial,392 the right to 
property and peaceful enjoyment of possessions393 and the freedom of association and of 
collective bargaining.394  
                                                                
390 Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 
391 For a thorough analysis on the approach of the CJEU towards the crisis, see A. Hinarejos, The Euro 
Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford University Press 2015) 
392 ECHR, Article 6 
393 ECHR, Article 1 of Protocol 1 
394 ECHR, Article 11 
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Arguably, all the aforementioned courts have preferred a deferential approach towards 
the political aspects of the policies and measures adopted by the Union and/ or the 
Member States. While each case examined in this chapter has its particular features, it is 
submitted that what all have in common is the acknowledgment of emergency and of 
exceptional circumstances due to the fear of collapse not only of the national financial 
sector, but also of the whole Eurozone. For example, in the cases of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain the notion of emergency is demonstrated in the adoption of ‘legislation of 
emergency’, while in the cases of Ireland and Iceland emergency was used as an 
explanation for the legal organs and processes implemented at the EU / supranational 
level. 
This chapter will critically analyse the position of the CJEU, national courts and the 
ECtHR so far, from the scope of effectiveness of protection offered to applicants. It is 
important to clarify that the chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of all the case law regarding the Eurozone crisis throughout the Union. Instead, the 
chapter purports to evaluate the effectiveness of protection offered by national and EU 
courts and the ECtHR when confronting with the challenging task of ruling during the 
crisis. To this effect, the chapter first explains the concept of effectiveness of protection 
(i). It then outlines the litigation that concerned various Member States, both before 
national courts (ii) and before the General Court and the CJEU, either through Article 263 
TFEU or through Article 267 TFEU (iii),395 and a selection of rulings of the ECtHR 
concerning the protection of bank depositors and the compatibility of austerity measures 
with the ECHR (iv). The case law on this area can be categorised in accordance with the 
methodology used in the Literature Review. Thus, each legal order will be examined 
                                                                
395 In the case of Iceland, the decision of EFTA Court is analysed: Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance 
Authority v. Iceland (Icesave)[2013] 
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separately, and then, within each legal order, cases are firstly discussed based on the right 
to access to justice and then on the principle of proportionality. In other words, the 
approach chosen here is to discuss the admissibility or inadmissibility of cases at each 
legal order, so as to identify whether access to justice was hindered or not. Then, those 
cases that were held admissible are categorised according to whether the principle of 
proportionality, as analysed in the literature review, or any other similar measure of 
assessment have been employed by the relevant court. It concludes with an evaluation of 
the role of effectiveness on the approach of those courts (v).  
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I. EFFECTIVENESS OF PROTECTION 
1. Effectiveness of courts 
The existing and, arguably, speedily growing empirical literature on judicial effectiveness 
faces the significant problem of lack of a coherent definition of ‘effectiveness’, as they 
mostly described judicial effectiveness as sharing the same meaning with judgment-
compliance, usage rate and influence on the conduct of States. 396  At the moment, a 
comprehensive theory on the notion of judicial effectiveness has not been developed yet. 
According to the social science literature, ‘an action is effective if it accomplishes its 
specific objective aim’.397 The satisfaction of such test requires the initial recognition of 
the action’s aims, 398  and the time-frame over which those aims are expected to be 
fulfilled.399  
An approach that emerges from this definition and has been followed for the purpose of 
‘measuring’ the effectiveness of international courts focused on the extent to which 
international courts have met the expectations of the states and international courts that 
created them, known as mandate providers. Such a goal-based approach supports that 
courts should both follow the legal mandate that demonstrates their objectives and also 
clarifies the limits of their powers and also pursue the normative expectations of their 
mandate providers. Factors that should be taken into account are the legal powers of the 
court, its resources, the extent of its independence and impartiality, its reputation, and, 
finally, its interplay with external political environment. The latter is the factor being 
more evident in the decisions given in relation to the financial crisis, on which political 
                                                                
396 E. A. Posner and J. C. Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 California 
Law Review, 28-29 
397 Y. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (Oxford University Press, 2004), 14 
398 See R. F. Zammuto, Assessing Organizational Effectiveness (State University of New York Press, 
1982) 12 
399 Y. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (Oxford University Press, 2004), 14 
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considerations played a crucial role and the interplay between the politics and the 
judiciary was noticeable. 
2. Effective judicial protection under EU law 
The right to effective judicial protection is a universal fundamental right which can be 
found in most national constitutions and international legal instruments and has been 
characterized as ‘an essential element of democratic accountability’.400 It is a general 
notion that comprises various specific rights such as access to justice,401 the right to an 
effective remedy,402 the right to a fair trial and due process.403 All these rights could be 
characterized as rather procedural, in the sense that none of them relates to the 
effectiveness of the courts’ decisions on the merits of disputes. 
Since individuals should be fundamentally entitled to obtain judicial protection of the 
rights they derive from EU law, such a right establishes a general principle of EU law.  In 
the EU legal order, effective judicial protection is preserved in Article 47 of the Charter 
which provides for the right to an effective remedy of every individual in case of violation 
of EU law, the right to a fair trial and the right of defence and legal aid. By virtue of 
Article 6(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter constitutes a binding provision of primary EU 
law.404 The issue of effective judicial protection has been considered by the CJEU years 
before 2004, when the Charter was adopted. Evidently, in 1985 the Court described 
effective judicial protection as a principle ‘which must be taken into consideration in 
                                                                
400 L. M. Lavo, ‘The Role of the Principe of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and its Impact on 
National Jurisdictions’ (2012) Sources of Law and Legal Protection (Triestine Lecture; 1), EUT Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, 101, at 102 
401 Judgment of 15 October 1987, Unectef v Heylens, C-222/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:442; Judgment of 3 
December 1992, Borelli, C-97/91, ECLI:EU:C:1992:491; Judgment of 11 September 2003, Salafero, C-
13/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:447  
402 Judgment of 29 October 2009, Pontin, C-63/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:666 
403 See F. Francioni (ed.), Access to justice as a human right (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
404 According to Article 6(1) TEU ‘the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union […] which shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties’ 
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Community law’, since it ‘underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States and [...] is laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 405  Consequently, the CJEU 
interpreted effective judicial protection over time based on the interpretations given by 
the national courts of Member States and on the relevant case law of the ECtHR.406 The 
reference to the ECHR was introduced in Article 52(3) of the Charter, which states that 
the meaning and scope of fundamental rights laid down in the Charter, that correspond to 
rights provided by the ECHR, such as Article 47 of the Charter, are to be identical, 
including inter alia the approaches followed by the ECtHR. It is important to note that 
the abovementioned Article does not preclude a wider application of the right under EU 
law, and this is indicated by the fact that Article 47 of the Charter applies to administrative 
law matters, such as fiscal law, while the scope of Article 6 ECHR is limited to ‘civil 
rights and obligations’ and ‘criminal charges’.407 In essence, Article 47 of the Charter can 
be found to be applicable in disputes challenging fiscal measures, while the same dispute 
would beyond the scope of Article 6 ECHR.  
The concrete application of the principle aims at reinforcing the judicial protection of 
individuals, by ensuring the accomplishment of an effective EU system of legal remedies, 
both at national level, when domestic courts consider the enforcement of rights and 
obligations derived from EU law; and at international level, regarding the relationship 
between EU and national remedies.408 
                                                                
405 Judgment of 15 May 1986, Johnston, C-222/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, paragraphs 1 and 2 
406 See very explicitly Judgment of 22 December 2010, DEB, C-279/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811  
407 In fiscal matters Article 6 ECHR only applies to fiscal fines, because they qualify as a ‘criminal 
charge’ - See Janosevic v. Sweden App no. 34619/97 (2002) 
408 L. M. Lavo, ‘The Role of the Principe of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and its Impact on 
National Jurisdictions’ (2012) Sources of Law and Legal Protection (Triestine Lecture; 1), EUT Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, 101 
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It could be argued that the obligation placed upon national courts to ensure effective 
judicial protection was inherent in the doctrine of direct effect, as this was established in 
the Van Gend en Loos case.409 In that case the Court authorised national courts to ensure 
the application and enforcement of the rights conferred by EU law upon individuals in 
their legal systems, by exercising effective judicial control, based on the duty of sincere 
cooperation established in Article 4(3) TEU and the principles which govern the 
effectiveness of EU law in the national legal orders.  
The emergence of the principle of effective judicial protection is dating in the mid-1970s 
and the case of Rewe, where the CJEU demonstrated the obligation of national courts to 
ensure the protection of citizens regarding the rights derived by EU law.410 Ten years 
later, the Court in Von Colson ruled that Member States should choose sanctions that 
guarantee real and effective protection411 and in Johnston it was explicitly recognised that 
‘all persons have the right to obtain an effective remedy in a competent court’.412 The 
initial recognition of effective judicial protection as a general principle of law in the area 
of equal treatment was shortly extended to the area of free movement of workers,413 but 
also to areas where the principle could not be attached to a Treaty freedom.414 Finally, its 
scope expanded to encompass not only the protection of individuals, but also the 
protection of Member States against European institutions or the protection of the latter 
in disputes inter se.415  
                                                                
409 Judgment of 7 March 1985, Van Gend & Loos, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1985:104 
410 Judgment of 16 December 1976, Rewe, C-33/76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188  
411 Judgment of 10 April 1984, Von Colson, Case 14/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153  
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Despite the absence of an express recognition of effective judicial protection in EU 
legislation, the principle gained a ‘constitutional’ status416: firstly, as a main source of 
interpretation of EU law and national provisions; secondly, as a ground for reviewing the 
legality of EU provisions of secondary law or national law implementing it; and, finally, 
as a principle binding on Member States and EU institutions when examining the 
remedies before European courts for the enforcement of rights relating to EU law.417  
Due to the lack of general rules on remedies and procedures at EU level, it is a 
responsibility for national courts to achieve effectiveness of EU law and judicial 
protection of individuals in those areas covered by EU law according to their domestic 
legal procedures and remedies. However, such a system implies the risk of heterogeneity 
of the application of judicial protection within the Union. Thus, the CJEU started 
assessing the compatibility of national procedural and jurisdictional legal norms that 
could prejudice the uniformity between Member States on this field.418 The procedure of 
preliminary reference also contributes to the elimination of heterogeneities between 
Member States. National courts, which constitute the ‘natural forum’ 419  that offers 
judicial protection to the interests of individuals, ask for the interpretation of the CJEU 
when EU law rights are violated because of some failures committed by any private party, 
a Member State or the EU institutions.  
However, it has been argued that the interpretation and application of the principle of 
effective judicial protection by the CJEU diversify according to the specific 
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circumstances of each case and the result that is pursued.420 Case-law of the CJEU also 
illustrates that the effectiveness of judicial protection enhances EU procedural rights, but 
also subjective rights of individuals, ‘implying different consequences as to how this can 
affect the role of national courts and the application of domestic rules on remedies and 
procedure’.421 
A progress of the traditional judicial position of the CJEU towards a more human rights–
centred approach could be deduced from some recent rulings of the Court which 
suggested an interpretation and application of domestic rules on procedure and remedies 
that is rather based on some principal subjective rights of individuals. In other words, 
effective judicial protection has changed status; while it just constituted a general 
principle that Member States and the EU institutions had to comply with, it is now a 
distinct source of self-standing rights that both EU and national courts should protect in 
applying EU law. 422   On the one hand, such a development could result in the 
establishment of a new test aiming at achieving a better balance between the fundamental 
right of effective judicial protection and the competing EU or national interest. On the 
other hand, this development could lead to difficulties on the coordination, or rather a 
conflict, between the ECtHR and national jurisprudence.423 
The Lisbon Treaty gave to the principle of effective judicial protection a Treaty basis of 
its own, while until then it only constituted a ‘mere’ general principle deriving from the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States and Article 6 ECHR.  Now Article 19(1) 
TEU refers to effective judicial protection, but only in its horizontal dimension, since it 
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establishes an obligation only on the Member States to provide sufficient remedies to 
ensure effective legal protection in those fields covered by EU law. In this sense, the 
provision serves the principal task of enforcing rights and obligations deriving from EU 
law, rather than protecting fundamental rights. 
Evidently, EU law prefers a procedural approach towards effective judicial protection, 
without involving this concept on the substance of a case. This chapter, and the next one, 
tries to examine the substantial effectiveness of the various courts’ and arbitral tribunals’ 
approach. Such test focuses on whether applicants were given the opportunity to have 
their cases considered on the merits, instead of just being limited to the question of 
jurisdiction and whether the relevant legal framework has been applied in their disputes, 
even if ultimately liability does not arise against the defendants. 
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II. JUDICIAL PROTECTION THROUGH DIRECT ACTIONS AT 
NATIONAL COURTS 
Generally, it is difficult to evaluate the operation of national courts and their effectiveness 
in a consistent manner, due to their diversity. Among the factors that do not allow for a 
coherent appraisal are the differences between the various legal traditions, the different 
attitudes of each country’s judiciary regarding the preservation of the rule of law, general 
principles of law and constitutional values and the extent to which political considerations 
affect court decisions. Thus, a comparative analysis could illustrate how different national 
courts in the EU legal order approach the legality and constitutionality of measures 
adopted in response to the financial crisis and the question of whether these measures 
infringe the rights of individuals. The purpose of this analysis is, firstly, to examine 
whether national courts in general protected individuals effectively and, secondly, to 
identify the approach of which national courts have been more effective. 
Individuals can judicially challenge austerity measures before their national courts, based 
on the provision of their national law that implements the respective MoU and can 
allegedly be in conflict with their constitutions. This path was chosen by several claimants 
in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus. As it is discussed in this section, some 
of the actions were successful, while in the rest of them, national courts avoided to shift 
their focus towards the effects of the measures under challenges on individuals, in the 
fear of sovereign default.  
In particular, the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Cyprus held that 
the cases before them were inadmissible due to lack of jurisdiction to rule on the particular 
matters.  
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1. Access to justice 
Spain is generally characterised by a weak judicial enforcement of welfare rights, known 
as the principios rectores of social and economic policy.424 This weaknesses has been 
evident during the Eurozone financial crisis, since there are only few examples of rulings 
given by the Spanish Constitutional Court on the protection of social rights affected by 
the financial measures adopted in the country, and even those rulings do not essentially 
derogate from the previous case law on social rights. The main reasons for this 
phenomenon is, firstly, the traditional deferential approach of the Court to the Parliament 
– most cases result on the inadmissibility or dismissal of constitutional challenge and only 
on some interpretations in conformity with the Constitution – and, secondly, the fact that 
in Spain ‘Regions are in charge of the main social policies’. What this means in practice 
is that most judgments relating to the protection of welfare rights, even during the 
financial crisis, only concern the matter of correct allocation of legislative powers 
between the State and the Regions. Therefore, all cases have been brought as preliminary 
references of constitutionality of the measures implemented in response to the financial 
crisis and have been declared inadmissible. 
A preliminary reference425 challenged the reduction of public salaries426 as a breach of an 
existing collective agreement, and this, as an infringement of the right to collective 
bargaining427 and the right to freely join a trade union,428 was declared inadmissible and 
the Court did not even consider the protection of fundamental rights. Another 
consequence of the financial crisis was brought as a preliminary reference, dealing with 
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the protection in mortgage eviction.429 In Spain, the mortgage enforcement proceedings 
are absolutely independent from any proceedings against an illegal or unfair mortgage 
contract. As a consequence, the ownership of a house may change, in case the mortgage 
remains unpaid, disregarding the legality of the mortgage contract. The Constitutional 
Court was asked to examine whether such legal framework is in breach of the prohibition 
of arbitrary action by public authorities,430 the right to effective judicial protection431 and 
the right to enjoy decent and adequate housing.432 In declaring the reference inadmissible, 
the Court held that the matter in question was rather political than legal, as it asked for 
the Court to implement a new legislation, an action that belongs to the competence of the 
Parliament, and thus it went beyond its remit. The Spanish legal regime regarding 
mortgage was examined by the CJEU regarding its compliance with an EU Directive on 
unfair terms in consumer contract.433 According to the CJEU, the national mortgage 
legislation violated debtors’ right to effective judicial protection. 434  Such a ruling 
indicates that the Union has offered a superior level of protection to Spanish debtors 
having unfair mortgage contracts during the financial crisis than the State. 
Generally, the domestic case law demonstrates the self-restraint approach that the 
Constitutional Court prefers to follow when adjudicating the effects of the financial crisis 
on social rights. 
This self-restraint approach was also followed by the Supreme Court of Cyprus when it 
was asked to consider the legality of the financial measures implemented in the country. 
When Cyprus fell into a deep financial crisis in 2011, the rescue package that was 
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proposed and applied by the international lenders in 2013 was considered ‘unique’, as it 
was the first time that the bail-in tool was used in the EU. On the 16th of March 2013, 
Cyprus dominated the news worldwide, as the Eurogroup and the President of the 
Republic of Cyprus reached an agreement on the implementation of a rescue package, 
which provided for the bail-in of all insured and uninsured depositors in all banks of the 
island.435 The initial proposal of international lenders required ‘all bank deposits to bear 
the brunt of the haircut’.436 While debt haircut was the measure adopted in other countries, 
a deposit haircut was given to Cyprus, with such an unprecedented proposal being 
presented as necessary because of the small number of bondholders in local banks, who 
were unable to assume all the losses on their own.437 According to the relevant Eurogoup 
statement, the measures proposed included ‘the introduction of an upfront one-off 
stability levy applicable to resident and non-resident depositors... the increase of the 
withholding tax on capital income, a restructuring and recapitalisation of banks, an 
increase of the statutory corporate income tax rate and a bail-in of junior bondholders’.438  
Though the first proposal was rejected by the Cypriot House of Representatives, the take-
it-or-leave-it approach of the Eurogroup obliged the government to accept the terms of a 
revised bailout on the 25th of March 2013.439  The difference between the new and the 
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prior proposal was the fact that in the new proposal only depositors of Laiki Bank and the 
Bank of Cyprus would be affected; and deposits of less than 100.000 Euros deposited 
would be guaranteed.440 Laiki Bank was forced to close, and a ‘good bank’ and a ‘bad 
bank’ were created instead. In particular, the bad bank would absorb all toxic assets, i.e. 
deposits of more than 100.000 Euros, and non-performing loans, and the good bank would 
consist of all the guaranteed deposits and would constitute a part of the Bank of Cyprus, 
which operated under restructuring and downsizing, and also terminated the operation of 
all its branches in Greece.441 
Though the bail-in had not been imposed on any other Member State yet, all the necessary 
steps for authorizing such a measure were taken. Arguably, the bail-in tool used in Cyprus 
expedited the finalisation of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, with the relevant Directive 
being implemented one year later,442 and, subsequently, the bail-in tool was introduced 
as a concept in EU legislation. 443  Without doubt, the case of Cyprus constitutes a 
precedent of capital controls within a common monetary area, such as the eurozone, 
which was followed two years later in Greece.444 
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There is no case law of Cyprus national courts on the constitutionality of the ESM Treaty 
or of the measures adopted by Member States acting under the ESM to deal with the 
crisis. However, the Supreme Court of Cyprus was asked to examine the legality of the 
measures affecting Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus, as those were taken by the CBC 
and approved by the Ministry of Finance. A vast number of recourses were filed against 
the so called ‘bail in’ Decrees in actions brought by depositors and investors against the 
CBC, its Governor and the Republic of Cyprus through the Attorney General and the 
Ministry of Finance. 445  The Decrees that were challenged were the Sale of certain 
Operations of Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd Decree 104 of 2013446 and Bailing-in 
of Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited Decree 103 of 2013.447 In details, Decree 
104 provided for the resolution of Laiki Bank, the transfer of all deposits below 100,000 
Euros to the Bank of Cyprus and the writing off all deposits above 100,000 Euros, while 
Decree 103 provided for the recapitalisation of Bank of Cyprus. Both Decrees derived 
from the Law 17(1)/2013 passed on 22nd of March 2013 within the frame of the 
agreement reached by the Government with the Eurogroup. The Supreme Court, by a 
majority of seven to two, and in full chamber, issued on June 2013 its judgment and 
dismissed the Decrees on the ground of non-admissibility.448 
In an examination of the locus standi of applicants to challenge the Decrees, the Court 
concluded that the whole legal dispute belonged to the sphere of private law and 
considered the relationship between the bank and its depositors and investors, the 
relationship between the two banks, regarding the transfer of assets from the one to the 
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other, and the relationship between the bank and the buyer of its assets. All those 
relationships give rise to disputes under contract law and tort law, and they are not of 
administrative law nature. In particular, the two Decrees at stake do not regulate relations 
of the State with its citizens, but relations pertaining to the operations of Laiki Bank and 
the Bank of Cyprus only, thus they only concern the two banks and not the applicants 
themselves. Applicants’ interests are not directly affected by the Decrees, but any effect 
of those depositors comes through the actions of Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus and 
their failure to meet their contractual obligations towards them. By virtue of these 
findings, the Court decided that the legality of the measures taken on the basis of the two 
Decrees should be challenged through lawsuits before the District Courts which could 
extend also to any civil liability resulting from previous actions of the Republic of Cyprus, 
being the authority that caused the infringement of banks’ obligations towards their 
depositors/ investors by issuing the Decrees. Such lawsuits could also be addressed 
against the Central Bank of Cyprus, as the resolution authority.449  
The Supreme Court clearly stated that the Republic could not raise the defence of ‘Act of 
Government’ before the lower courts, by stressing as follows: ‘The material rights of 
depositors of Laiki and BOC are not in the least affected by the view that they do not have 
locus standi to challenge the administrative actions and that their complaints fall within 
the realm of private rather than public law. To the contrary, while an administrative 
review of the legality [of an administrative action] has a restricted scope, the civil 
procedures are particularly suitable for the examination of every aspect that may be 
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relevant to the substantial matter. The question of jurisdiction should not, obviously be 
confused with the substance of the rights.’450 It should be explained here that in Cyprus a 
newly-established Administrative Court operates as a first instance court in disputes 
concerning administrative law. However, the function of this Court has the peculiarity of 
reviewing only the legality of an act or omission made by the administration, 
distinguished from the assessment of the substance of the dispute, which still falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court remains the 
responsible organ for the determination of whether the legality of an administrative act 
can fall under judicial challenge.   
Regarding the contractual relationship between the bank and depositors, it was stressed 
that:  ‘Where the debt/obligations of the bank towards its depositors are affected, the 
depositor should primarily turn towards the bank in any civil action, for its contractual 
default in repaying the deposit, with a possible claim against the Republic as having 
caused the breach of the contractual obligation by means of the Decree.’451 Furthermore, 
the Court made a distinction between the holders of bank deposits and the depositors in 
safe deposits and shareholders and excluded the application of the concept of 
expropriation to simple bank deposits.452  
The same findings apply both for Decree 104 of 2013 relating to the resolution of Laiki 
Bank and Decree 103 of 2013 relating to the Bank of Cyprus. The relationship between 
depositors and the bank is a contractual one and the effects on depositors result from the 
breach of the contractual obligations of the banks in the context of their resolution.  
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2. The principle of proportionality  
Contrary to the aforementioned cases, the courts in Greece, Portugal and Slovenia 
accepted that they had jurisdiction on the applications before them in relation to the 
austerity measures imposed in each country. Thus, the focus is now shifted on whether, 
and how, they applied the principle of proportionality. Both Greek and Portuguese courts 
applied the principle in all the cases before them, with mix results.  
Undeniably, Greece has heavily suffered because of the financial crisis within the 
Eurozone, probably more than any other Member State. In 2010, the huge public debt 
compelled the Government to ask for external financial assistance by the international 
lenders, 453  which resulted in the adoption of two MoUs and the implementation of 
numerous austerity measures, including reductions in salaries, benefits and pensions of 
public servants. Those reforms were challenged as infringing freedoms and fundamental 
rights that are otherwise protected in the Greek legal order, either at national, EU or 
international level. Thus, the constitutionality of the austerity measures was examined 
several times by the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State. At the EU level, it was 
established that the responsibility of any loss suffered by private holders of Greek debt 
instruments did not lie to the ECB but to the economic risks intrinsic in the activities of 
the country’s financial sector, since the ECB’s actions were only pursuant to the safeguard 
of the stability of the price market.  
In its decision 668/2012,454 the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State was asked to 
cancel the austerity measures of MoU I as they were contested as incompatible with the 
Constitution and international conventions. It was held that the measures of MoU I,455 
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though restrictive in nature, did not violate the Constitution or Article 1 of Protocol 1 
ECHR, since they were implemented for the purpose of rescuing the national economy. 
The notion of public interest is protected by Article 106 of the Greek Constitution and 
operates as ‘the restriction of the restrictions’, which should take into account all the 
conflicting interests. The argument that the measures were contrary to the general 
principle of equality456 and the equality before tax was countered by the transitional and 
exception character of the measures and the alleged violation of the right to property and, 
therefore, the right to the wage, were found inapplicable as the wage cuts did not lead 
wages to a level below the threshold of poverty.457 
In a following case, the cut in pensions and holidays allowances as were introduced by 
the Law 3845/2010458 were challenged by the national Union of Pensioners of the Public 
Power Corporation, which sought the cancellation of the Joint Ministerial Decision which 
derived from MoU I. In its decision 1285/2012,459 the Plenary Assembly of the Council 
of State held that the adoption of the MoU by the Greek Government and the related 
policies for the implementation of the austerity measures were legitimate as they pursued 
a superior public interest purpose and constituted the last option to prevent the State’s 
bankruptcy.  
Finally, in the decision 2307/2014,460  the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State 
considered the conformity of the austerity measures derived from the MoU II regarding 
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employees in the private sector with the national and international rules, including the 
TFEU,461 the ECHR,462 the European Social Charter and the ILO Conventions Nos. 87, 
98 and 154. It was held that all measures were in compliance with those international 
instruments, apart from the measures amending recourse to labour arbitration, which were 
held contrary to the constitutionally protected principle of collective autonomy.463 This 
decision was reached after the application of ‘the theory of exceptional circumstances’ 
and the identification of ‘reasons of higher social interest’,464  to decide whether the 
implemented austerity measures were not infringing neither the Greek Constitution, nor 
international labour agreements and the ECHR. Applying that test, it was found that the 
restrictive measures were proportionate and exceptional in nature.  
The Portuguese case law is very similar to the Greek cases. Portugal has been severely 
affected by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with Stability and Growth Programmes 
being implemented in an attempt to diminish the budget deficit. In particular, the first 
Portuguese Stability and Growth Programme provided for numerous austerity measures, 
mainly increase in taxation, reductions in public sector workers’ salaries and pay cuts in 
the pensions of retired citizens. The Economic and Financial Adjustment Programme and 
the rescue package received from international lenders465 have functioned as a catalyst of 
national legislation drafted in order to import the commitments to the national legal order. 
This budgetary legislation introduced several austerity measures, the constitutionality of 
which have been challenged before the national Constitutional Court. It is worthy to note 
that the constitutional review in Portugal was triggered by Members of the Parliament, 
                                                                
461 Articles 125 and 136 TFEU 
462 ECHR, Article 11 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 
463 Article 22, paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution 
464 The concept of general social interest is equivalent to the concept of public interest, thus it justifies 
restrictions to the right of collective autono.my only under strict conditions.  
465 i.e. the EFSM, the EFSF, and the IMF 
154 
 
the Ombudsman and the President of the country, instead of affected individuals. 
Individuals and associations brought proceedings before the domestic Labour Courts, 
with some preliminary references being made to the CJEU.  
The most analysed line of cases considers the constitutional challenges to provisions of 
the Portuguese Budget Acts. In its judgment 396/2011,466 the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court examined whether the reduction of the salaries of public servants467 infringed the 
principle of equality. It was stated that some distinction between those receiving public 
funds and those working in the private sector was permissible, thus the alleged measures 
could not be classified as unjustifiably discriminatory. The Court held that the cuts in 
wages for public servants salaries did not exceed ‘the limits of sacrifice’ for those working 
in the public sector, because of the temporary character of the reductions and the width 
of its applicability.468 
Though the public interest prevailed over the rights affected in all the above cases, the 
principle of proportionality illustrated that the national courts of both countries were also 
willing to scrutinise the austerity measures at stake if they found that the severity of the 
measures was not in balance with the purpose to be pursued.  
Contrary to its previous decisions, the Council of State, in the decision 3354/2013,469 
found that the austerity measure of abolishing the permanent positions because of the 
automatic dismissal and the position in the preretirement suspension status of the 
employees of the public sector, were infringing the Constitution of the country. It was 
recognised that the Public Administration can be reorganized based on financial reasons, 
                                                                
466 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 396/2011, judgment of 21 September 2011 
467 The 2011 budget provided that salaries of public employees that exceeded 1500 euros, would be 
reduced from 3.5% to 10%, according to their amount. 
468 Namely, they pointed that the reductions did not apply to lower scale salaries, and did not exceed 10%. 
469 Council of State (Plenary Assembly) 3354/2013 
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but without affecting its rational, effective and sustainable operation and without violating 
the relevant constitutional guarantees. The conclusion reached was that the legislation at 
stake was in contrast with the constitutional principle of equality and the aims pursued, 
particularly the reduction of public expenditure, did not contribute to the reform of the 
organization necessities of the Public Administration in a rational manner.  
Similarly, the approach of the Portuguese Constitutional Court changed over time. In 
2012 and 2013, the Court gave two rulings declaring that the austerity measures under 
challenge were disproportionate and they exceeded the limits of sacrifice. The suspension 
of the 14th monthly salary and the temporary pension and wage cuts of public employees 
imposed by the 2012 Budget Act470 were held excessive and unconstitutional.471 ‘The 
increase by a new reduction of 14.3% of annual income, which would more than triple, 
on average, the amount of the initial reductions, attains a percentage value of such high 
degree that it now becomes evident that these limits have been exceeded.’472 Although 
declaring the measures disproportionate, the Court suspended the effects of its decision, 
appreciating the exceptional public interest of the country to receive the external financial 
aid. As Ribeiro commented, ‘the Government would thereby have to pay both subsidies 
in 2012, an expenditure not foreseen in the last year’s budget. Since there was no time to 
design policy alternatives that could compensate the imbalance, the decision would imply 
a serious aggravation of the budget deficit’.473 
                                                                
470 Public sector employees and pensioners, whose salaries or pensions exceeded 1100 euros had their 
Christmas and holiday pays suspended, while public sector employees or pensioners whose salaries were 
between 600 and 1100 euros would receive reduced holiday and Christmas payments. 
471 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 353/2012, judgment of 5 July 2012 
472 Section 5 of the decision: ‘o acréscimo de nova redução, agora de 14,3% do rendimento anual, mais do 
que triplicando, em média, o valor das reduções iniciais, atinge um valor percentual de tal modo elevado 
que o juízo sobre a ultrapassagem daquele limite se revela agora evidente’  
473 G. de A. Ribeiro, ‘Judicial Activism Against Austerity in Portugal’ (2013) Blog of the International 
Journal of Constitutional Law and ConstitutionMaking.org, available at:  
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/12/judicial-activism-against-austerity-in-portugal/ (accessed 5 
December 2016) 
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Judgment 187/2013 consolidates this position of the Portuguese Constitutional Court.474 
The 2013 Budget Act implemented pay cuts for public workers, the suspension of holiday 
pay and contribution to unemployment or sickness benefits. The reduction of public 
deficit was not recognised as a justification and the measures were held disproportionate 
and in violation of the principles of equality, legal certainty and the protection of 
legitimate expectations.475 In particular, the Court demonstrated that the alleged measures 
set the demand of an extra effort from public sector workers, as opposed to workers in 
the private sector. That judgment was not suspended by the Court, which means that the 
Government had to reconsider the measures it implemented. However, it cannot be 
disregarded that the constitutional framework on which the Court was based made its 
modification more difficult than it would have been had the judgment being relied on 
individual constitutional rights.  
In conclusion, the Greek domestic courts seem to mostly rule in favour of the 
compatibility of the austerity measures at stake and the basic grounds of their findings are 
the notion of public interest and, particularly, the prevention of the country’s bankruptcy 
and the exceptional circumstances under which those measures were adopted. However, 
the existence of a case that declared that the measures at stake violated the Greek 
Constitution, after applying the principle of proportionality indicates the absence of a 
clear-cut position of the national courts of Greece.   
Furthermore, in a nutshell, constitutional review in Portugal focused on the question of 
proportional infringements in socio-economic rights, in particular the right to wage. It is 
evident that the approach of the Portuguese Constitutional Court has become more severe 
                                                                
474 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 187/2013, judgment of 5 April 2013 
475 It should be emphasised that the Court did not examine the effects of the alleged measures on the right 
to work or other social rights 
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from 2011 to 2013. The Court’s original deference, though with warnings, in 2011, has 
been changed into a comprehensive reasoning explaining why further reductions in 
salaries solely for public servants could not be acceptable. As expected, such approach 
has been the subject of criticism by academics, who supported that the Portuguese Court 
partly ignored the wider context of the crisis that affects the whole Eurozone, as far as the 
decisions of the Portuguese Government, that the Court reviewed, were influenced by, 
and in respect of, the positions of other Member States and its commitments towards its 
international lenders. In addition, the Court had to take into consideration all the political 
negotiations that led to the adoption of the alleged austerity measures. Irrespective of that 
criticism, it can be argued that from the scope of view of this thesis, the Portuguese courts’ 
approach can be characterised as more individuals-friendly rather than more supportive 
of the public interest.  Indeed, the example of Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision 
no 353/2012, judgment of 5 July 2012 can be supported to reflect the principle of 
effectiveness in its substantial perspective, in the sense that the measures at stake were 
held disproportionate but, at the same time, the effects of the decision were suspended 
due to the exception circumstances involved. In other words, both individuals’ rights were 
recognised and protected and the country’s public interest was also respected.   
Instead of the principle of proportionality, the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle was 
employed by the Slovenian Constitutional Court, which does not directly examine 
whether the measures under challenge are proportional or not, but, impliedly, it provides 
for a means of balance between the consequences of the measure adopted regarding a 
bank and the consequences of an ordinary insolvency of the same bank. 
In the light of the crisis of the Eurozone, five banks in Slovenia had noticed serious 
deficits on their capital to such an extent that their assets were insufficient in relation to 
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their creditors and the value of their deposits. Thus, the Bank of Slovenia (the Bank 
Slovenije) decided the implementation of exceptional measures including the 
recapitalisation, the rescue and the winding up of those banks,476 and asked for State aid 
which was authorised by the European Commission. National legislation was adopted in 
order to establish the legal framework for burden-sharing of the falling banks, 477 
according to the requirements provided by the relevant Banking Communication.478 The 
purpose of this Communication was to provide States with the necessary guidelines 
regarding the criteria on the compatibility of State aid granted to a financial sector during 
a crisis, with the internal market. The constitutionality of that national law was challenged 
before the Constitutional law of the country (the Ustavno sodišče) by the National Council 
(the Državni svet), the Ombudsman (the Varuh človekovih pravic) and some individuals.  
According to the decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, Article 350.a of the 
Slovenian Banking Act was unconstitutional, as it did not afford effective judicial 
protection to stakeholders affected by Banka Slovenije’s extraordinary measures. Thus, 
Banka Slovenije was held liable to compensate all shareholders and creditors affected by 
its extraordinary measures, provided that the ‘no creditor worse off principle’ is 
satisfied.479  The compensation should be paid either by Banka Slovenije or the State, in 
case Bank Slovenije is not found liable. For the assessment of the bank’s and the State’s 
liability, a special committee of experts should be appointed in order to act as an advisory 
body to the court for complex questions requiring specialist knowledge. The role of this 
                                                                
476 Specifically, Nova Ljubljanska banka, Nova Kreditna banka Maribor were recapitalized, Abanka Vipa 
was rescued and Probanka and Factor banka were wound up. 
477 The measures at issue included writing off equity capital and subordinated debt. 
478 Commission Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules 
to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) COM (2013) 
216/01   
479 They should prove that the extraordinary measures resulted in a less favourable treatment of their 
qualified liabilities compared to insolvency or regular liquidation proceedings initiated on the day the 
extraordinary measures were imposed 
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committee will be limited to cooperate with the court by explaining facts that go beyond 
the court’s knowledge. The appointment of such committee may be considered as 
promoting effective protection of all affected stakeholders of the bank, since it ensures 
that technical matters are examined correctly by experts on the fields.  
In addition to the decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, and despite being 
declared inadmissible, the Cyprus Supreme Court’s decision regarding the bail in, 
includes an interesting discussion on the ‘no creditor worse off principle’. The Supreme 
Court underlined that, in applying the relevant private law principles, the District Courts 
should apply the ‘no creditor worse off principle’, as provided in section 3(2)(d) of Law 
17(1)/2013, for the assessment of the measures’ at stake legality in order to demonstrate, 
if any, non-contractual liability arising out of the actions of the two banks or the actions 
of the CBC and the Ministry of Finance.480. This principle is established at the EU level 
in the SRM Regulation, and grants creditors, including depositors, and shareholders the 
right to be compensated if it can be demonstrated that they have suffered ‘greater losses 
than would have been incurred if [the credit institution subjected to resolution] had been 
wound up under normal insolvency proceedings’. 481  Initially, depositors should 
demonstrate that they were individually and adversely affected by the measures in 
question. According to the wording of the Supreme Court, ‘[w]here the debt/obligations 
of the bank towards its depositors are affected, the depositor should primarily turn 
towards the bank in any civil action for its contractual default in repaying the deposit, 
with a possible claim against the Republic as having caused the breach of the contractual 
                                                                
480 Myrto Christodoulou et al [2013] 3 CLR 427 (majority decision) 
481 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of 
credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a 
Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ 2 225/1, Article 
15(1)(g)  
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obligation by means of the Decree’.482 After establishing jurisdiction, depositors should 
prove that the loss they suffered was the consequence of the Decrees and the parallel 
agreements that each bank entered into for the transfer and selling of its assets and it was 
in excess of the loss they would have suffered had the banks gone into liquidation. 483 In 
other words, the object of the civil cases should be whether depositors are worse off, as a 
result of the restructuring measures, in comparison with the financial position they would 
have been if the decrees were not issued and the banks were either allowed to operate 
normally, in the case of the Bank of Cyprus, or gone through normal liquidation, in the 
case of Laiki Bank. Particularly for the depositors of the Bank of Cyprus, some specific 
factors to be taken into consideration by the District Courts were declared to be the 
compulsory conversion of the deposits into shares, the sufficiency of that exchange, the 
exceptions applied and the evaluation of the bank’s property. The same test was held to 
apply equally to the case of shareholders of the Bank of Cyprus.484  
It can be argued that the above-mentioned test established by the Supreme Court sets a 
remarkably high standard of proof. 485  In essence, its difficulty lies in the fact that 
depositors are asked to estimate the extent of losses that would have caused in the 
fictitious case of insolvency, without having any asset valuation assumption established 
in advance. This kind of test may attract significant legal challenges, which put the 
depositors’ right to effective judicial protection in risk.486 
                                                                
482 Myrto Christodoulou et al [2013] 3 CLR 427 (majority decision) 
483 See also C. Kombos and S. Laulhé Shaelou, ‘The Cypriot Constitution under the Impact of EU law: An 
Asymmetrical Formation’ in A. Albi and S. Bardutzky (eds), National constitutions in European and global 
governance: democracy, rights and the rule of law (TMC Asser Press, 2017)  
484 Cases 1034-6272/2013, Vias Demetriou et al [2014] not reported yet 
485 It should be underlined that this high threshold was not ‘created’ by the Supreme Court, but it actually 
resonates the test established by the SRM Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ 2 225/1, Article 15(1)(g)) 
486 S. Laulhé Shaelou and A. Karatzia, ‘Some preliminary thoughts on the Cyprus bail-in litigation: A 
commentary on Mallis and Ledra’ (2018) European Law Review (forthcoming) 
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Contrary to the approach of the majority ruling, Judge Erotokritou gave a dissenting 
judgment487 on which he discussed the distinction between private law and public law 
actions before domestic courts and he concluded that it is only the Supreme Court of the 
country, under its mandate to exercise judicial administrative control of the measures 
under challenge, that can apply a test of proportionality and reasonableness, based on 
principle of EU law, and particularly the Charter and the legal regime on free movement 
of capital. In other words, he supported that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide 
the case and exercise administrative control of the relevant measures applying a test of 
proportionality and reasonableness and principles of EU law. 488  In particular, the 
commencement of judicial dialogue between national courts and the CJEU was 
recognised as available, when national courts will need to apply a ‘compatibility test’ 
which is based on rules and general principles of EU law.  
Generally, all Cyprus domestic courts, even the lower District courts, are allowed to 
initiate judicial dialogue with the CJEU.489 However, the classification of the Decrees and 
the relevant measures as ‘Acts of Government’ does not imply that they cannot be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, thus Judge Erotokritou expressed his disagreement with 
the dismissal of the applications on the ground of non-admissibility. Such compatibility 
test should examine whether there is a balance between the public interest and the 
infringement of the rights of individuals, an expression of the principle of proportionality. 
Since this test should be applied within the framework of the Constitution and of the EU 
Treaties, it can only belong to the exclusive administrative revisional jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, such jurisdiction being in force even in times of crisis. Moreover, the 
                                                                
487 Myrto Christodoulou et al [2013] 3 CLR 427 (dissenting judgment) 
488 Specifically, reference was made to the free movement of capital and the EU Charter 
489 See C. Lycourgos ‘Building Intra-Judicial Dialogue: The Relationship between the ECJ and Cypriot 
National Courts’ (2016) 5 European Law Review 623 
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dissenting judgment rejected the argument that the measures at stake constituted ‘political 
decisions’ resulting from extreme pressure at national and the EU level, and therefore 
should escape the compatibility test and could be in violation of the rule of law. 
Remarkably, this judgment, albeit dissenting, mentioned the EU Charter and the 
protection of the fundamental rights of the depositors, despite the fact that it was already 
established that the restructuring and bail-in measures do not fall within the ambit of EU 
law.490 Specifically, the right to property491 and the principles of equality before the 
law492 and non-discrimination493 were recognised as relevant to this case, with all of them 
including a test of proportionality to identify their potential infringement.  
Even without a preliminary reference request or in the failure to establish direct effect of 
Union law, the Cyprus national courts are still emboldened to take into consideration EU 
law, including its general principles and relevant secondary legislation, when interpreting 
domestic law, reflecting the concept of indirect effect. At least for the time being, there 
is a case reported in a Cypriot District court, where the judge referred to the BRRD, 
though before being implemented into national law, when examining the bail-in 
measures.494  
Based on the lack of clear guidelines to the lower courts regarding the application of the 
‘creditor worse-off’ principle and of the compatibility concerning the bail-in pending 
cases, it can be assumed that individual rights will still be adversely affected and not enjoy 
effective judicial protection through a case-by-case approach. At this particular point, this 
thesis suggests the adoption of the Slovenian example and the establishment of a special 
                                                                
490 See Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 
491 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ 1 326/02, Article 17(1) 
492 Ibid.,  Article 20 
493 Ibid., Article 21(1) 
494 See District Court, Case no. 4602/14, Institute of Archbishop Makarios III and others v CBC, Bank of 
Cyprus Plc, Resolution Authority, Attorney General of the Republic, Antri Antoniades (in her capacity as 
special administrator of Laiki) and Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd, 26 August 2014 
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committee of experts which will function as an advisory body to the court, focusing only 
on specific questions which require specialisation and expertise on technical areas. The 
creation of such a committee can enhance effective judicial protection of bank depositors 
and ensure that they will receive the appropriate remedies, including fair compensation, 
at the national level. 
Finally, the Spanish Supreme Court did not consider the principle of proportionality or 
any other balancing test at all, but gave a ruling based on the individuals’ rights to 
effective judicial protection. In addition to the domestic case law on the violation of 
citizens’ social rights, due to the austerity measures implemented, the judiciary in Spain 
had also to consider a case brought by bank investors against Bankia for the loss of their 
shares after being bailed out. After Bankia’s bail out in 2012, investors sued the bank for 
over €800 million alleging that they were misled during its initial public offering one year 
before.  
The seven savings banks that formed Bankia were merged and a public offering was 
made, in which the bank raised a considerable amount of money. 495  After Bankia 
disclosed that it needed about €22 billion to avoid collapse, the Spanish government 
seized its control and negotiated a European banking bailout of the bank.496 In 2015 two 
judgments were given on this matter declaring the subscription and acquisition of shares 
in Bankia by the applicants null and void and asking Bankia to compensate the investors 
                                                                
495 Bankia raised over €3 billion in its initial public offering. The seven saving banks (cajas) that 
comprised Bankia were merged, under the leadership of Mr Rato, a former finance minister and managing 
director of the IMF. That merger was included in a broader consolidation of the national banking sector, 
after the first signals of the financial crisis in the country, aiming at the creation of stronger banks, able to 
absorb the mortgage losses of the weaker banks. The stock offering of Bankia took place after its merger.  
496 Bankia needed financial support equivalent to almost half of the 41 billion euros of European rescue 
funding. After suffering a loss of 19.2 billion euros in 2012, Bankia returned to profit in 2013, under new 
management.  
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for the amount they paid out plus interests.497 In its appeal, the bank based its arguments 
on the relevant extraordinary appeals for procedural default and cassation and the 
existence of criminal prejudice regarding the pending criminal proceedings against two 
of its former ministers for alleged fraud in the public stock offering of BANKIA.498 The 
Civil Courtroom of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.499 It held that ‘the serious 
inaccuracies’ in the prospectus made by the bank for the public offering of stock led the 
small investors to error, which constituted misrepresentation regarding its solvency and 
the profitability of their shares. In reaching this conclusion, the Court compared the 
situation of small investors with large investors which may have access to more 
information. In its words, ‘small investors (…), contrary to other more qualified investors, 
lack other means (other than the prospectus) to obtain information on the economic data 
affecting the company whose stock are to be traded and which are important to take the 
investing decision.’ 
In response to the argument of Bankia that the proceedings should be postponed to avoid 
criminal prejudgment, the Supreme Court stressed that the outcome of one case should 
not affect the other since different tests and criteria are applied by the Criminal and the 
Civil Courts. The fact that the Criminal Court acquitted the defendant could not change 
the approach of the Civil Courtroom which had to consider the accounting and the stock 
exchange rules in order to decide liability in Bankia’s stock purchase. In any case, an 
adjournment of the civil proceedings waiting for the decision of the Criminal Court, 
which could be long-lasting due to the complexity of the issues at stake, would cause 
undue delays that would infringe the investors’ right to effective judicial protection. 
                                                                
497 Judgments of 7th January 2015, of the Ninth Section of the Provincial Appeal Court of Valencia, and 
of 11th May 2015, of the Fifth Section of the Province Appeal Court of Oviedo 
498 Mr. Rodrigo Rato and Mr. Ángel Acebes 
499 Judgments nos 23/2016 and 24/2016, of 3rd February 
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Summarily, it is illustrated that Spanish courts have treated the principle of effective 
protection in an inconsistent manner. On the one hand, they did not ensure effective 
protection of applicants by refusing to proceed with a preliminary reference to the CJEU 
and declaring the matter rather political than legal. On the other hand, effective judicial 
protection was protected in the case of the investors against Bankia, since the court 
decided to continue the civil proceedings in order to give a ruling to the applicants 
promptly. 
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III. JUDICIAL PROTECTION THROUGH DIRECT ACTIONS AT THE 
EU COURTS UNDER ARTICLE 263 TFEU AND THROUGH 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE CJEU UNDER ARTICLE 
267 TFEU 
As the discussion in the previous section showed, most national courts preferred to keep 
a distance from scrutinising the legality of austerity measures and MoUs and their 
compatibility with their national constitutions and the general principles of law. 
Therefore, those individuals who considered the judicial protection of their national 
courts ineffective, turned to the CJEU, by exercising their right to challenge Union 
institutions’ decisions under Article 263 TFEU. It should be repeated here that, under 
Article 263 TFEU, natural or legal persons are allowed to challenge ‘regulatory acts’ that 
do not ‘entail implementing measures’ that have direct, but not necessarily ‘individual 
concern’ on them.  
The CJEU has the legal mandate to closely examine the legality of measures taken and 
implemented at the EU level, both in the form of legislative acts and administrative 
actions, and to ensure the uniform interpretation of EU law throughout the Union.  
The criticism against the judicial effectiveness of the CJEU is based on its interaction 
with Member States and their political interests. Firstly, in an empirical research that took 
place in 2008, the effect of the positions of various Member States on the judicial 
effectiveness of the CJEU was examined,500 from the point of view of the limits on the 
independence of the Court imposed by the political pressures by Member States.  The 
research reached the conclusion that the independence of the CJEU is rather restricted, 
                                                                
500 C. Carruba et al., ‘Judicial Behaviour under Political Constrains: Evidence from the European Court of 
Justice’ (2008) 102 American Political Science Review 435 
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since ‘threats of exercise of political constraints by Member States had a systematic and 
significant effect on judicial rulings by the CJEU’.501 Furthermore, the impact of Member 
States on the effectiveness of the CJEU can be seen in the practice of Member States to 
remove some issues from the scope of EU harmonization and the adoption of exceptions 
in particular harmonized areas.502 To achieve these ‘selective exits’ from the Courts’ 
jurisdiction, Member States used to either delay the completion of their market and 
political integration or even overturn the process of Union harmonization any time they 
consider that the CJEU acts in excessive judicial activism.503 
In the context of economic integration, the CJEU has been used to create new legal norms, 
establish new rights and interests and promote new policies. The whole process in this 
area has a normative character, since the changes introduced by the Court regarding 
economic governance and the role of various, national and supranational, actors involved, 
give rise to further litigation which results in deeper integration.504 This can be evident in 
the context of the financial crisis, and it is expected that the case law discussed in this 
thesis will generate further litigation on the role of EU institutions on the financial and 
economic governance of the Eurozone and the role of the principle of the EU Treaties and 
the Charter. 
The absence of any involvement of EU law to the austerity measures adopted and to the 
supranational treaties and mechanisms established in order to handle the Eurozone, and, 
also the global, financial crisis has constituted the primary reason for numerous cases to 
be declared inadmissible by the CJEU, which have been either brought as direct actions, 
                                                                
501 Y. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (Oxford University Press, 2004), 294 
502 G. Gaja, ‘The Growing Variety of Procedures Concerning Preliminary Rulings’ in D. O’Keeffe 
(ed), Liber Amicorum Gordon Slynn of Hadley (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000)  
503 Y. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (Oxford University Press, 2004), 266 
504 A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ (2010) 2  
Living Reviews in European Governance, available at: http://www.europeangovernance-
livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2010-2/download/lreg-2010-2BW.pdf (accessed 28 November 2016) 
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according to Article 263 TFEU, or through the preliminary reference procedure, 
according to Article 268 TFEU.  
1. Access to justice 
The legal aspects of DGSs have not been extensively examined at the international level, 
with the exception of some cases before the ECtHR which dealt with the State guarantee 
of deposits in the Former Yugoslavia.505 In the Icesave case the European Free Trade 
Association Court (EFTA Court) issued the first judgment regarding the protection of 
deposits in the shed of the financial crisis, 506  in an action brought by the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority which challenged Iceland’s responsibility under Directive 
94/19/EC.507 The EFTA Court dismissed the application and concluded that Directive 
94/19/EC imposed the obligations on EEA States to introduce and officially recognise 
DGSs and supervise them in order to ensure their proper operation. However, this 
obligation does not extend to ensuring compensation if a DGS is unable to compensate 
deposits due to a system crisis.  
Iceland implemented the Deposit Protection Directive 94/19/EC by Act No 98/1999508 
and established the Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund (TIF). Landsbanki, an 
Icelandic bank, operated branches offering online saving accounts in the UK and in the 
Netherlands, known as Icesave. According to Article 4(3) of Directive 94/19/EC, the 
British and Dutch branches were made responsible to TIF, instead of the local creditors’ 
deposit insurance. As a result of the financial crisis, online access to the deposits in the 
British and Dutch branches became unavailable, and one day later, Landsbanki collapsed, 
                                                                
505 Alisic and others v Bosnia and Herzegovina and others, App. no.60642/08 (2012); Molnar Gabor v. 
Serbia, App. no. 22762/05 (2009); Suljagic v Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. no. 27912/02 (2009); 
Trajkovski v ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, App. no. 53320/99 (2002) 
506 Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland (Icesave)[2013] 
507 Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes [1994] OJ 2 135/05 
508 Act No. 98/1999 on Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Scheme (Act) 
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on 7 October 2008. As a result, New Landsbanki was set up by the Icelandic Government 
under the Emergency Act for the restructuring of the country’s credit institutions,509 and 
domestic deposits of the bank were transferred to that new bank. That transfer of deposits 
made them remain available to their holders, for the purpose of providing reimbursement 
under Directive 94/19/EC. Iceland received emergency payments from the EU, with the 
approval of the IMF, providing that the country should have applied strict capital controls 
that would restrict almost all transnational foreign currency movements. Although such a 
condition aimed at avoiding a further devaluation of the national currency,510 it resulted 
in the depositors of Landsbanki in the two foreign branches being uncompensated from 
the TIF. The UK and Dutch governments decided to temporarily substitute the TIF and 
compensated depositors in their respective countries, and then requested Iceland return 
them the money paid. The citizens of Iceland voted negatively in two referendums held 
in 2010 and 2011 and rejected the proposal that their country should repay the UK and 
Dutch governments for the billions of euros paid to foreign savers of Icesave.511 The 
application of ESA against Iceland consisted of three pleas. Firstly, the ESA sought a 
declaration that Iceland failed to comply with the obligations of the Directive 
94/19/EC,512 by failing to ensure compensation of Icesave depositors in the two foreign 
branches. Secondly, it claimed that indirect discrimination took place against those 
foreign savers, also in contrast with the provisions of the Directive.513 Thirdly, the final 
                                                                
509 Act No. 125/2008 of 8 Oct. 2008 on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual 
Financial Market Circumstances 
510 Icelandic króna 
511 In two referendums held in March 2010 and April 2011, the people of Iceland rejected the proposal 
that Iceland repay the 3.9 billion euros paid out to 340,000 British and Dutch savers affected by Icesave’s 
bankruptcy. See K. A. Curtis et al., ‘I Save for Icesave: Self-Interest and Sovereign Debt Resettlement’ 
(2012) Working Paper, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder; C. Deloy, 
‘Referendum on the Icesave Agreement Law (2011) Fondation Robert Schuman 
512 Articles 3, 7 and 10 of the Directive 
513 Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Directive 
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plea was based on the argument that Iceland breached Article 4 of the Directive because 
of its discriminatory treatment.   
Regarding the first plea, the EFTA Court interpreted the obligation imposed by Article 
7(6) of Directive 94/19/EC514 as an obligation to implement a deposit guarantee fund and 
excluded the performance obligation on States. In other words, the EFTA Court held that 
EEA States were only obliged to provide for an effective procedural framework for DGS, 
and did not extend to ensuring that the DGS was in a position to pay the minimum amount 
guaranteed in case a system crisis arose.515 Thus, Iceland was found not to have failed to 
comply with Directive. In the Court’s construction, Article 3516 and Article 7517 of the 
abovementioned Directive created an obligation of form to establish a DGS in general, 
but not an obligation of result to establish a DGS which would be capable of 
compensating depositors up to the amount provided. The Court reached this conclusion 
based on three arguments. Firstly, the DGSs should be financed entirely by the credit 
institutions that are members to them; an aspect that is not covered by the Directive, as 
Article 10 provides only for the obligation to compensate. 518  Secondly, since the 
compensation of depositors would constitute public sector funding, the State aid rules 
were triggered and an obligation to provide State aid is not found in the Directive.519 
Thirdly, according to Recital 24 of the Directive, EEA States are excluded from liability 
as long as they set up and recognise the DGS.520 
                                                                
514 ‘Member States shall ensure that the depositor's rights to compensation may be the subject of an action 
by the depositor against the deposit-guarantee scheme’ 
515 Paragraphs 133-135, 144 and 152 of the judgment  
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517 ‘Deposit-guarantee schemes shall stipulate that the aggregate deposits of each depositor must be 
covered up to ECU 20 000 in the event of deposits being unavailable.’ 
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In order to address the second plea, the EFTA Court examined a specific anti-
discrimination rule, as it derived from Article 4 of the Directive.521 In particular, the Court 
stated that, based on the principle of home State deposit protection, all the foreign 
branches of a credit institution should belong to the DGS of the home EEA State,522 thus 
both domestic and foreign depositors should be equally compensated under the Directive. 
Since the depositors of Icesave already belonged to the domestic DGS, the EFTA Court 
held it was not Iceland that discriminated against foreign depositors on the basis of 
nationality, but the DGS itself with the way it used its funds. Domestic deposits remained 
available in the sense of Article 1(3) of the Directive, as their transfer to the New 
Landsbanki took place before the Iceland Financial Supervisory Authority triggered the 
application of Directive 94/19/EC. The TIF was not involved in that transfer, therefore 
the transfer could not be considered as a difference in the treatment of depositors or a 
difference in the payment of the funds by the TIF  
Concerning the third plea, originating from the violation of Article 4 of the EEA 
Agreement the EFTA Court identified a self-limitation of the ESA, as it did not challenge 
Iceland for an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground that it 
did not transfer all the foreign deposits to the New Landsanki, as happened in the case of 
domestic deposits. Such an approach by the ESA, left unchallenged whether the 
continuance of the UK and the Dutch Icesave deposits with the old, failing Landbanki 
constituted a breach of the non-discrimination principle of the EEA. The EFTA Court 
held that Iceland was not liable for discrimination, as it was not bound to assume such 
obligation of result.523 In particular, it held that Article 4 EEA was not applicable, as it 
asked for comparable situations being treated similarly, but the compensation Icesave 
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depositors lacked any comparable situation.524 Obiter, based on the Sigmarsson case,525 
the EFTA Court supported that, even if the third plea had been constructed differently by 
ESA, the margin of discretion of EEA States in matters of economic policy during a 
system crisis should have been taken into serious consideration and could have justified 
a potential discrimination.  
Interestingly, the EFTA Court set aside the rationale of Paul and Others v Germany,526 
arguing that this case considered only the liability of German authorities which acted 
negligently in conducting banking supervision.527 While in Paul v Germany, the State 
failed to implement Directive 94/19/EC and was held liable, in Icesave the DGS was 
established and the State was not found in any breach of EU law. This distinction implies 
that the liability of an EEA State is limited to the establishment of the DGS, and once this 
happens, the Directive cannot give rise to any further claim against the State.  
In Paul v Germany, 528  the CJEU established that Directive 94/19/EC conferred on 
depositors the right to be compensated in case of insolvency of the bank, but not the right 
to require that the supervisory authorities implement supervisory measures in their 
interest. The Court supported its decision by referring to Recital 24 of the Directive, 
which clearly declares that the Member States, or the national supervisory authorities, 
cannot be held liable towards depositors, once they ensure that one or more DGSs have 
been officially set up in their countries. This point of the decision is in full compliance 
with the EFTA Court’s decision in Icesave.  
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Furthermore, the Court set some delineations on the use of Directive 94/19/EC as a basis 
for applications against a State. The Icesave ruling excluded the liability of the State to 
individuals from the scope of its proceedings, by arguing that national courts are the 
appropriate fora for actions brought by individual depositors challenging the statutory or 
contractual obligation to compensate for the insured deposits. 529  The Court also 
demonstrated that the Directive applied only to the failure of individual banks, thus the 
State liability in the case of systemic crisis was excluded. 530  Finally, the Court 
distinguished the liability of the State from the liability of the DGS. Though the ESA 
argued that the TIF was an emanation of the State and its actions were attributable to 
Iceland,531 the EFTA Court responded that any failure of the DGS could not affect the 
liability of the State, irrespective of the close links between them, since the Directive did 
not have any primary liability rules in the first place.532 
A final comment concerns the legal framework applicable at the date of the dispute. While 
the Icesave decision was based on the Directive of 1994, it is questioned whether the 
EFTA Court would reach a different result if the Directive of 2009533 or the Directive of 
2014534 constituted its legal basis. The Court commented on this, but only in obiter, by 
expressing the view that the Deposit Directive of 2009 imposes the liability of the DGS’s 
operation on the State,535 dues to the change in the wording of Article 7(1),536 which is 
now more robust and remains the same in the Directive of 2014.537 Such wording shifts 
                                                                
529 Icesave, paragraph 123 
530 The Court supported this opinion by mentioning a number of provisions of the Directive of 1994 
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531 Icesave, paragraph 82  
532 Ibid., paragraphs 181-184 
533 Directive 2009/14/EU on deposit guarantee schemes [2009] OJ 2 68/3 
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least EUR 50000 in the event of deposits being unavailable.’ 
537 H. Kupelyants, ‘Protection of Private Creditors and Deposit Insurance’ (2014) Legal Studies Research 
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the responsibility to underwrite the obligations of the DGS in default to the Member 
States. Consequently, the obligation to protect depositors was also shifted from the DGS 
itself to the Member States. Remarkably, the EFTA Court, still in obiter, queried 
‘[w]hether this obligation is limited to a banking crisis of a certain size would require 
further assessment.’538 In future litigation on the current Directive of 2014, it is assumed 
that the Court would limit its scope to failures of individual banks only, as it did in the 
Icesave case under the Directive of 1994.  
It can be concluded that this decision indicated that the protection of depositors in the 
single market is rather limited because the responsibility of State is confined to the 
establishment and not the operation of DGSs, and could not ensure the availability of 
deposit guarantee schemes in the event of another systemic banking crisis. The Court 
seems to have put the ball back into the legislator’s court, keeping depositors away from 
their right of effective judicial protection. In other words, the EFTA Court implies that 
the question of whether to provide deposit insurance guaranteed a state in the context of 
the single market, should be answered by the relevant parliament and not the national or 
the EU courts. This decision has implications for depositors, the CJEU and the Union as 
such. According to the Icesave ruling, depositors only have the option of recourse to their 
national authorities, which does not necessarily mean their national courts. In essence, 
they can only proceed with petitions to their national parliaments, provided that there is 
such an option available in their country. Moreover, this decision seems to exclude the 
CJEU from assuming jurisdiction on such kind of disputes, by declaring that the whole 
matter belongs to the competence of the relevant parliament and not the national or the 
EU courts. Finally, the EU and the Union institutions are excluded from any liability on 
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any disputes concerning DGSs, since their only task was to draft the Directive that impose 
an obligation to Member States to establish DGSs. 
Two more cases that were held inadmissible by the EU courts relate to the bail-in 
measures adopted in Cyprus. After the decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, some 
depositors and investors brought proceedings to the General Court, asking for the 
annulment of the Eurogroup statement of March 2013 stating the bail-in in Cyprus and 
the ‘haircut’ on uninsured bank deposits, which were declared inadmissible. The 
statement under challenge announced the agreement between the Eurogroup539 and the 
Cypriot authorities including the Memorandum of Understanding between the country 
and the international lenders,540 which provided inter alia for the resolution of Laiki 
Bank, the restructuring of the Bank of Cyprus and the subsequent ‘haircut’ of the 
uninsured national and foreign bank deposits. In the case of Mallis and Malli,541 the 
applicants claimed that Decrees 103 and 104 constituted the implementation of the 
Eurogroup decisions, as those were announced in its statement of March 2013, and thus 
they challenged the validity and legality of this statement. The General Court considered 
the features of Eurogroup and its relationship with the European Commission and the 
ECB and concluded that the Eurogroup is only an informal forum for discussion,542 
independent from the structure of the two Union bodies, hence their participation in 
Eurogroup meetings does not imply that its decisions are or instructed, or even just 
guided, by them.543 Furthermore, the Court assessed whether the Eurogroup statement 
produced legal effects and, thus, capable of being the subject of judicial review under 
                                                                
539 An informal group consisting of the finance Ministers of the Eurozone Member States 
540 European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, also with the 
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541 Order of 16 October 2014, Mallis and Malli, T-327/13, ECLI:EU:T:2014:909   
542 With a set organisational structure and an elected president  
543 According to Protocol 14 to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ 
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Article 263 TFEU. The answer to this lied in the nature of Eurogroup; as long as it is not 
a decision-making body, its statements cannot produce legal effects on third parties. The 
conclusion of the General Court was that the Eurogroup is not an EU institution and its 
decisions cannot be submitted to judicial review under Article 263 TFEU, hence the first 
claim was declared inadmissible. Furthermore, the applicants brought proceedings 
against the European Commission and the ECB claiming that those authorities, de facto, 
wrote of the Eurogroup statement and the two Decrees in Cyprus implemented the 
decisions of those two Union institutions. Thus, the applicants asked for the declaration 
that the Eurogroup statement was a joint decision of the European Commission and the 
ECB. The second claim was also declared inadmissible, because the Court does not have 
the power to issue declaratory judgments, without providing for any legal remedies.544 
By holding the claims inadmissible, the doors were closed to depositors from Cyprus who 
wished to challenge the decisions and agreements that led to the adoption of Decrees 103 
and 104. However, this ruling enlightened the application of the law at the District Courts 
of Cyprus. Since it was decided that the Eurogroup, the European Commission and the 
ECB were not responsible for the adoption of Decrees 103 and 104, then the entire 
responsibility lied on the Cypriot authorities, thus it is the Republic of Cyprus that should 
be sued for damages.  
Another case brought to the General Court, Ledra Advertising Ltd,545 based on very 
similar grounds with Mallis and Malli, against the European Commission and the ECB, 
claiming that the responsibility for the measures adopted in Cyprus should be attributed 
to those two authorities. Once again, the Court held that the MoU between Cyprus and 
the ESM, from which the measures derived, did not originate from the two Union 
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545 Order of 10 November 2014, Ledra Advertising, T-289/13, ECLI:EU:T:2014:981   
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institutions. The applicants in this case further asked for damages from the European 
Commission and the ECB on the ground that they infringed their right to property. They 
relied on Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR and Article 17 of the Charter and they argued that 
the European Commission, operating as the guardian of the Treaties,546 failed to protect 
their rights by failing to guarantee the consistency of the MoU with EU law. The Court 
did not find a causal link between the damages suffered and the alleged failure of the 
Commission, as the damages were found to be caused by the two Decrees, which were 
implemented before the adoption of the MoU. Consequently, the application in Ledra 
Advertising was declared inadmissible. 
After the dismissal of all these actions as inadmissible by the General Court, the 
applicants appealed to the CJEU seeking to have the orders of the General Court set aside. 
The appellants claimed that the ruling of the General Court lacked any assessment of the 
relationship between the Eurogroup and the two EU institutions and, thus, the conclusion 
that the bail-in was not caused by the decisions of the European Commission and the ECB 
was wrong. In other words they argued that, due to an alleged misrepresentation of law 
and the facts of the cases, the cases were wrongly declared inadmissible, and the General 
Court ‘failed to attribute any conduct or act or decision whatsoever either to the 
Eurogroup or to the defendants or to the defendants within the Eurogroup’.547 
According to the Opinions of Advocates General, the General Court correctly dismissed 
the applications and the CJEU should uphold its orders. Advocate General Wathelet 
considered the actions for annulment of the Eurogroup statement of March 2013 and 
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Advocate General Wahl examined the action for damages against the European 
Commission and the ECB.  
Advocate General Wathelet supported that the two EU institutions operate only as agents 
of the ESM in the stage of negotiations and signing during the financial assistance 
procedure, and they are not acting in their own name in the adoption of the MoU. 
Moreover, the two Union bodies have not delegated any powers to the Eurogroup and 
they cannot review or make any recommendations or give any instructions regarding the 
Eurogroup statements. Finally, the alleged statement cannot produce binding legal effects 
on third parties, so it cannot constitute the subject of judicial review under Article 263 
TFEU. All these findings of Advocate General Wathelet led to the conclusion that the 
General Court have not erred in law or in fact in any point.548 
Advocate General Wahl argued that the ESM is not an institution of the Union549 and the 
MoU is not originating from the European Commission or the ECB.550 As a consequence, 
in support of the General Court order, the loss suffered by the appellants cannot be 
attributed to the Union institutions. What the Advocate General suggested is that 
depositors can bring actions before national courts against the Eurozone Member States 
which consist the ESM, since it is the ESM that conceived the MoU and should bear the 
responsibility for it.551  
                                                                
548 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 21 April 2016, Mallis and Malli,  Joined Cases C-105/15 P 
to C-109/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:294 
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Following the Opinions of the two Advocate Generals, the CJEU upheld the orders of 
General Court regarding the actions for annulment of the Eurogroup statement.552 In 
particular, the CJEU reaffirmed that the alleged statement does not constitute a joint 
decision of the European Commission and the ECB, as the ESM Treaty does not confer 
them the power to make decisions on their own. The participation of the two EU 
institutions in the Eurogroup meetings does not affect the nature of the latter’s statements, 
so the alleged statement concerning Cyprus does not express the decision-making power 
of those two institutions. Finally, the Court observes that the adoption, by the Cypriot 
authorities, of the legal framework necessary for the restructuring of the banks cannot be 
regarded as having been imposed by an alleged joint decision of the Commission and the 
ECB that was given concrete expression in the Eurogroup statement of March 2013. 
Consequently, the CJEU upheld the General Court’s orders and dismissed the appeals.  
The two aforementioned cases were the result of direct actions at the EU courts under 
Article 263 TFEU. Going back to the litigation on national courts, it has been illustrated 
that effective judicial protection against austerity measures does not only involve national 
measures and their compatibility with national constitutions, but also the supranational 
raison d’être of these measures. 553  If the austerity measures were the result of the 
implementation of EU directives, the preliminary reference mechanism would be 
willingly activated by national courts. In particular, national courts would justify the 
actions of the State based on Article 288(3) TFEU554 so as to refuse legal review at the 
national level and bring preliminary questions to the CJEU regarding the validity of the 
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relevant Directive. However, the austerity measures are the result of either supranational 
treaties, such as the ESM Treaty,555 or MoUs, and neither of them can easily meet the 
requirement set by Article 267(1)(b) TFEU, namely that it should be an act ‘of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’.  According to Repasi, a preliminary 
reference can be admissible, albeit MoUs do not produce legal effects themselves, as far 
as they contribute to the consequences of another Union act that produces legal effects.556 
However, there have been instances where the CJEU detached itself from any authority 
to rule on the austerity measures and the supranational mechanisms created during the 
financial crisis, by underlining the absence of any link of those mechanisms and measures 
with EU law. 
Ireland became important regarding the case law of the CJEU on the financial crisis with 
the Pringle case,557 since it was the first time the Court considered the legal consequences 
of the sovereign debt crisis and shed some light on the legal aspects of the crisis 
management instruments created within the Eurozone since 2010. The importance of this 
case is shown by the fact that eleven governments and the European Parliament 
intervened in the proceedings. Most importantly, the European Council made an 
intervention in the proceedings of a case before the CJEU for the first time ever.558 The 
principal legal question submitted to the Court was whether the Member States which 
concluded the ESM Treaty559 were in breach of EU law. An affirmative answer by the 
CJEU would cause a serious deterioration in the Eurozone mechanisms for the 
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management of the crisis, since all the edifice created to deal with the financial crisis 
should have been destroyed and new mechanisms should have been established.  
In February 2012, a Treaty was signed by the Eurozone countries establishing the ESM, 
an international financial institution, aiming at mobilising funding and providing 
‘stability support under strict conditionality... to the benefit of the ESM Members which 
are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the Euro area as a whole and of its Member States’.560 
During the process of ratification of the Treaty by Ireland, Mr Thomas Pringle, as a 
member of the Irish Parliament, opposed the participation of the country, since its 
ratification would transfer many sovereign monetary powers to a new international 
institution and it would violate EU law. His case reached the Irish Supreme Court, which 
made a preliminary reference to the CJEU consisting of three questions. Firstly, it asked 
to verify the validity of the European Council Decision 2011/199, which amended Article 
136 TFEU by inserting Article 136(3) regarding the establishment of a stability 
mechanism. Secondly, it referred to the interpretation of Articles 2, 3, 4(3) and 13 TEU, 
Articles 2(3), 3(1)(c) and (2), 119-123 and 125-127 TFEU, and of the general principles 
of effective judicial protection and legal certainty. In essence, the Irish Supreme Court 
asked whether a Eurozone Member State was entitled to conclude and ratify an agreement 
in the form of the ESM Treaty according to the abovementioned articles and principles. 
Thirdly, it asked whether Member States were allowed to conclude and ratify the ESM 
Treaty before the formal modification of the TFEU by Decision 2011/199. 
Regarding the first question, concerning the validity of an act by the European Council, 
the Court had to examine whether Decision 2011/199 interfered with the exclusive 
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competence of the Union in the area of monetary policy or in the competence of the Union 
in the area of co-ordination of economic policies of the Member States of the Eurozone. 
It was held that the monetary policy of the EU, as enshrined in Article 3(1)(c) TFEU, 
aims at maintaining price stability, while ESM had the aim of ensuring the stability of the 
euro. 561  Moreover, as long as the instruments used by the ESM do not fall within 
monetary policy, the ESM belongs to the area of economic policy.562 However, since the 
Union is not entitled to establish a stability mechanism in the form of the ESM,563 its 
competence in the area of co-ordination of economic policies of the Member States 
remains unaffected.564  
Considering the second question, the Court had to analyse the relationship between the 
ESM Treaty with various provisions and principles of EU law. Articles 3(1)(c) and 127 
TFEU are not violated, since the ESM falls within economic and not monetary policy.565 
Article 122(2) TFEU was also not violated; since it does not indicate ‘that the Union has 
exclusive competence to grant financial assistance to a Member state’566 and the ESM 
does not prohibit EU from granting ad hoc financial assistance to a Member State.567 
Furthermore, Article 123 TFEU was held to apply only to the ECB and the national 
central banks, thus it does not impede the establishment of an international financial 
institution or a mechanism under which the assistance is provided by the Member States 
themselves. 
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The CJEU gave particular focus on the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU568 and argued 
that it ‘is not intended to prohibit either the Union or the Member States from granting 
any form of financial assistance whatever to another Member State.’ 569  Thus, the 
budgetary policy of a Member State is compatible with Article 125 TFEU if three 
requirements are satisfied; firstly, the Member State should remain responsible for its 
commitments; secondly, financial assistance can be granted only when essential for the 
maintenance of financial stability of the Eurozone; and, thirdly, financial assistance 
should be subject to strict conditions.570 All the three requirements are fulfilled in the case 
of the ESM Treaty, thus it is not in breach of Article 125 TFEU. Furthermore, the ESM 
Treaty does not violate Article 4(3) TEU, as it contains provisions which ensure that its 
operation will be in compliance with EU law. The Court also examined whether each EU 
institution acted within its powers, according to the Treaties, as provided in Article 13(2) 
TEU. It held that, since its activities fall outside the exclusive competence of the EU, as 
a mechanism of economic policy, Member States can entrust tasks to the ECB and the 
Commission and the duties the ESM confers on them ‘do not entail any power to make 
decisions of their own’.571 
As regards the third question, the CJEU held that the ratification of the ESM was not 
subject to the entry into force of Decision 2011/199, because Member States had already 
the competence to establish such a mechanism.572 
The question of the relationship between the ESM Treaty and the principle of effective 
judicial protection is left to be examined. The Irish Supreme Court sought to ascertain 
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whether the establishment of the ESM violated the right to effective judicial protection, 
as enshrined in the Charter. As the Irish judges thought, the fact that the ESM operated 
outside the EU legal order could mean that the mechanism was placed beyond the duties 
that the Charter creates. The Court’s decision was that the ESM constituted an 
international financial mechanism, so the ESM Member States were not implementing 
EU law and were acting outside the scope of the Charter, thus the principle of effective 
judicial protection could not prevent a Member State from ratifying the ESM Treaty.573 
The Court recalled that, according to Article 50(1) of the Charter, the latter applies only 
when Member States implement EU law. Specifically, ‘under Article 51(2), the Charter 
does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union, or 
establish any new power or task for the Union or modify powers and tasks as defined in 
the Treaties’.574 It further stated that ‘the Member States are not implementing Union law, 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, when they establish a stability 
mechanism such as the ESM where, as is clear from paragraph 105 of this judgment, the 
EU and FEU Treaties do not confer any specific competence on the Union to establish 
such a mechanism’.575 
After examining the Court’s decision, an important issue is raised that is worth 
commenting in the context of this thesis; the sidelining of EU law by an international 
agreement, in other words, the exclusion of the Charter from the scope of the ESM Treaty. 
Among others, by excluding the application of the Charter, the right to effective judicial 
protection seems to be excluded too. It is worthy to note here that it was after 4 years, in 
the case of Ledra Advertising v Commission and the ECB,576 that the CJEU recognised 
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that the EU institutions are subject to the Charter, even when they are acting within the 
framework of the ESM Treaty, thus outside the EU legal order.  
The adoption of the ESM Treaty challenges the relationship between the EU legal 
framework and international agreements concluded beyond the sphere of it. As the CJEU 
acknowledged, on the one hand, there is the lack of any power of the Union to establish 
the ESM and, on the other hand, there is the competence of Member States to conclude 
the ESM Treaty, though they remain under the ‘duty to comply with European Union law 
when exercising their competences in that area’.577 However, it remained unclear whether 
the provisions of EU law offering individuals protection are safeguarded. In other words, 
the position of the ESM Treaty and the decisions of ESM, such as the MoUs, with regard 
to EU law is left uncertain. Thus, the Pringle decision is argued to create a paradox; 
though Member States are required to comply with EU law when establishing a 
mechanism like the ESM, individuals might not be able to invoke EU law against 
measures designed by EU institutions and implemented by Member States as ESM 
Members. This assumption is based on the argument that MoUs are negotiated by the 
ESM, which does not constitute an institution of the Union, thus it is not bound by EU 
law.578  
The decision of the CJEU regarding the status of the Charter in relation with the ESM 
could be challenged based on two grounds. Firstly, according to Recital 4 of the Preamble 
of the ESM Treaty, its signatory States should observe EU law and particularly ‘the 
economic governance rules of the European Union’ as provided by the TFEU. 579 
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Secondly, the fact that the Charter enjoys the same legal status as the Treaties580 renders 
the Court’ s ruling inconsistent with the provisions of the ESM Treaty. In simple terms, 
the ESM Treaty provides that its member states should observe EU law and the Charter 
and the Court, in interpreting the ESM Treaty, held that the Charter does not apply to it.   
Such a decision not only contradicts the text of the Treaty itself, but also the previous 
case law of the Court. As it has been established in previous cases, the duty of Member 
States to observe EU law extends to the case they enter into bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, to which the Union is not a signatory party. Specifically, Article 4(3) TEU 
establishes the so-called duty of sincere co-operation, under which Member States should 
refrain from any action or from enacting any Act that would be in conflict with EU law 
or would threaten the achievement of the Union’s objectives. 581  This Article was 
repeatedly interpreted as binding upon Member States when they negotiate, conclude, 
ratify or implement international agreements, even if the Union is absent from such 
actions.582 That duty covers also the respect for fundamental rights, as they are provided 
by the Charter or recognised by EU law. Disregarding its previous decisions, the CJEU 
in Pringle demonstrated that the Member States are not obliged to consider the Charter 
when acting as parties of the ESM Treaty, since it is an international agreement on which 
the Union is not a signatory party. Such a radical conclusion created the argument that 
there was an essentially political motivation behind the Pringle decision.583 
                                                                
580 TEU Article 6. See also Judgment of 26 February 2013, Akerberg Fransson, C-617/10, 
EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 45-48 where the Court applied its jurisprudence on primacy to the provisions 
of the Charter 
581 TEU, Article 4(3) 
582 See Judgment of 12 February 2009, Commission v Greece, C-45/07,  ECLI:EU:C:2009:81; Opinion of 
19 March 1993, Re ILO Convention 170 on Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, ECI:EU:C:1993:106;  
Judgment of 2 June 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-266/03 ECLI:EU:C:2005:341 
583 G. Beck, ‘The Court of Justice, legal reasoning, and the Pringle case-law as the continuation of politics 
by other means’ (2014) 39 European Law Review, 234, at 247 
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Attorney General Kokott in the Opinion she gave on this case, underlined that ‘[t]he 
Commission remains, even when it acts within the framework of the ESM, an institution 
of the Union and as such is bound by the full extent of European Union law, including 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights’,584 despite she found that EU law was not violated in 
that case. Regarding the right to effective judicial protection, AG Kokott firstly recognises 
that according to Article 37(2) of the ESM Treaty, the ESM is subject to a limited power 
of review by the CJEU, though the proceedings can only be brought by the Eurozone 
Member States. In other words, the CJEU’s power of review of the ESM does not include 
proceedings brought by individual litigants. 585  However, as long as the preliminary 
reference mechanisms, provided by Article 267 TFEU, is still an available tool, AG 
Kokott concluded that effective judicial protection is not infringed by the ESM Treaty.586  
A final aspect of this ruling relates to the social aspects of the financial crisis.587 Though 
EU citizens are heavily affected by the measures implemented for the rescue of the euro-
zone, the ESM Treaty seems ignorant of the social consequences of its provisions and of 
the crisis in general. Following the same oblivious approach, the CJEU in Pringle focused 
only on the economic and monetary aspects of EU law rather than the social policy of the 
Union. It would not be surprising, if the Court denies enforcing social rights against 
measures implementing the ESM Treaty provisions, claiming that they fall outside the 
scope of EU law. 588  Arguably, this constitutes a further intimation of the immense 
economic pressure which has, though, gone too far. It is a paradox that the ultimate 
                                                                
584 Opinion of AG Kokott of 26 October 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, paragraph 176 
585 Ibid., paragraph 192 
586 Ibid., paragraph 194 
587 See N. Alkiviadou, ‘Sustainable Enjoyment of Economic and Social Rights in Times of Crisis: 
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objective of the stability mechanism was to assist the EU citizens, and it is that stability 
mechanism which was decided to have no relation to the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens.589   
The following cases does not consider the compatibility of a supranational mechanism 
with EU law, but the legality of austerity measures imposed. Apart from the rulings of 
the national Constitutional Court developed in the previous section, the Portuguese 
Labour Courts made three preliminary references to the CJEU regarding the compatibility 
of cuts on the wages in the public sector with the Charter.590 These preliminary references 
are a clear indication of the difficult position of the national courts to classify the 
relationship between the MoUs and the principles of EU law. The CJEU found a failure 
of the applicants to illustrate a link between the national austerity measures and EU law, 
and, thus, it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. As was stated, Article 51(1) of the 
Charter provides that Member State are bound by the Charter only to the extent that they 
apply EU law. In that case, the Portuguese State Budget Act under challenge was not 
implementing EU law. Legal scholars criticised the approach of the CJEU as being rather 
pathetic and asked for a more active role by the Court in recognizing a link between 
national measures according to the conditions of MoUs and EU law, arising from the 
Council Decisions adopting the macroeconomic adjustment programmes, even if the 
applications would be dismissed later on their merits.591 Other scholars suggested a more 
                                                                
589 A similar approach with Pringle was adopted by the CJEU in Gauweiler case (Judgment of 16 June 
2015, Gauweiler, C-62/14, EU C:2015:400), which concerned the European Central Bank’s Outright 
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economic policy and the respective role of the ECB in both. As argued, this case ‘builds on Pringle 
providing normative legitimization to the austerity model whilst granting the ECB a distinct role in 
monetary policy but also in shaping the general economic policy of the Union.’ (T. Tridimas and N. 
Xanthoulis, ‘A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case between monetary policy and constitutional conflict.’ 
(2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 17) 
 
590 Order of 7 March 2013, Sindicato dos Bancários, C-128/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149; Order of 26 June 
2014, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros, C-264/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036; Order of 21 
October 2014, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros, C-665/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2327 
591 A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (OUP, Oxford 2015)   
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active approach by the CJEU, in the sense that it could review, both in procedural and 
substantive grounds, the financial assistance conditions.592 The rulings given by the CJEU 
remain consistent with its previous decisions on the same matter, such as in Pringle case. 
The Court confirmed its reluctance to intervene in areas of financial policy, in the context 
of the Eurozone financial crisis, by excluding the applicability of EU law on them. That 
position deprives EU citizens from their right to effective judicial protection by EU 
courts, by declaring lack of jurisdiction to decide their cases.  
Moving to the cases that were admitted by the CJEU, it is remarkable that the principle 
of proportionality was applicable in none of them. Instead, the Court applied the 
Bergaderm test593 and the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle in two respective cases.  
2. The principle of proportionality 
Commencing with the Bergaderm test, the CJEU in the case of Ledra Advertising 
concerning the Cyprus bail-in, set aside the orders regarding the actions for 
compensation,594 but gave a judgment itself, on the merits, and dismissed the actions.  
The CJEU held that, despite the fact that the role of the European Commission and the 
ECB as provided by the ESM Treaty does not entail the power to make decisions of their 
own, the institutions can still be found liable for unlawful conduct regarding the adoption 
of the MoU and damages can be claimed against them. However, the Court made it clear 
that the powers conferred on the Commission by the EU and FEU Treaties are not limited 
or affected by the tasks the ESM Treaty conferred on it. Thus, the Commission, still 
operating as the guardian of the Treaties,595 it has to abstain from signing a MoU which 
                                                                
592 A. Poulou, ‘Austerity and European Social Rights: How can Courts Protect Europe’s Lost 
Generation?’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 1145 
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594 Judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising, Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:701 
595 Article 17(1) TEU 
190 
 
might not be consistent with EU law. Therefore, it was concluded that the General Court 
erred in law by deciding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the actions for 
compensation. The orders were set aside and a new judgment was given on the merits.  
The principle on non-contractual liability of the Union or its institutions was restated. As 
established by the CJEU in Bergaderm case,596 in order for the Union to incur liability, a 
set of conditions should coincide. Firstly, the defendant institution should have breached 
a rule of law which is intended to confer rights on individuals; secondly, the breach must 
be sufficiently serious; and, thirdly, there must be a direct causal link between the breach 
of the obligation resting on the defendant institution and the damage suffered by the 
injured parties. Examining the first condition, the CJEU pointed that the rule of law which 
could be alleged to be violated is the right to property, protected by Article 17(1) of the 
Charter. 
Though in the previous case law of the CJEU it was held that the Member States do not 
implement EU law when acting within the framework of the ESM Treaty,597 thus the 
Charter is not addressed to them, 598  in this judgment, the Court noted that the EU 
institutions are subject to the Charter, even when they are acting outside the EU legal 
order. Consequently, the Commission was obliged to ensure that the MoU it signed was 
in consistency with the Charter. However, the two Union institutions were found to escape 
non-contractual liability, because the purpose of adopting the MoU corresponded to the 
general interest of ensuring the stability of the banking system and the Eurozone in 
general. In other words, the Court impliedly applied the proportionality test, tried to 
                                                                
596 Judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm, C-352/98 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, paragraphs 41 and 42 
597 Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756  
598 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ 1 326/02, Article 51(1) provides that 
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balance the nature of the measures at stake with the impending risk of financial losses 
that depositors would have suffered had the two banks were let to fail. Since the 
restrictions were held justified, the first condition of the non-contractual liability test of 
the EU was not met and the actions for compensation were dismissed. 
Since, at the end, the CJEU did not effectively protect the applicants, this resounds the 
suggestion made by the Dissenting judgment of Judge Erotokritou.599 In essence, his 
Dissenting judgment constitutes a motivation for the lower national courts to activate the 
preliminary reference mechanism, according to Article 267 TFEU, regarding the 
application of the Charter to the bail-in measures.  
Regarding the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, a preliminary reference was made 
regarding the validity and interpretation of some provisions of the Banking 
Communication. Among the questions raised before the CJEU, there was the 
compatibility of points 40 to 46 of the Banking Communication with the principle of 
legitimate expectations and the right to property which are both protected by EU law, as 
developed in the Literature Review in Chapter 2. Points 40 to 46 set out the condition that 
State aid can be granted only if bank shareholders have already contributed to the 
absorption of the losses suffered by that bank to the same extent as in the absence of State 
aid. 
According to the Opinion of AG Wahl, which is worth to be discussed due to its 
comprehensive analysis of the matter, neither the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations nor the right to property has been violated by the provisions of the Banking 
Commission and the relevant national legislation. In particular, he underlined that a 
legitimate expectation exists only when ‘authorised and reliable sources’ assure the 
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affected individual precisely, unconditionally and consistently.600 In that case, investors 
have not received any assurance that their investments would remain unaffected by any 
public measure regarding the banking sector, and Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, which 
provides for the conditions of granting State aid and which does not include burden-
sharing measures, could not be considered as ‘precise, unconditional and consistent 
assurance’. As it was stressed, the Commission should adjust its approach towards Article 
107 TFEU to the changing circumstances in the markets that need State aid. Regarding 
the right to property, Attorney General Wahl supported that implementing measures 
affecting the property of the investors is not a prerequisite according to the Banking 
Commission and that ‘such measures can also be adopted voluntarily by, or with the 
consent of, the bank or its investors’.601 However, he clarified that any measures adopted 
by national authorities and which fall within the scope of EU law, do not escape the 
obligation to be compatible with fundamental rights. Since the right to property is a 
qualified one, it was argued that the aim of ensuring financial stability without excessive 
public spending and consequences in competition can justify its restriction. Furthermore, 
AG supported that national courts are more appropriate to assess the compatibility of the 
national legislation in question with the rights at issue. As he explained, ‘it is the Member 
States’ authorities that are legally responsible for deciding to grant aid in a situation and 
ensuring that envisaged aid measures comply with any other applicable EU, national or 
international law’.602 The role of the Commission is limited only to the assessment of the 
compatibility of the proposed measure with the internal market. Finally, some guidance 
was given on the interpretation of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle by national judges. 
As point 46 of the Banking Communication states the affected parties ‘should not receive 
                                                                
600 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 18 February 2016, Kotnik, C-526/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:102, , 
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less, in economic terms, than what their instrument would have been worth if no State aid 
were to be granted’.603 The necessity of the measure, the risks for the relevant financial 
system without any such measure, the need to avoid excessive public spending, and the 
reasonableness and reliability of the economic evaluations made by the public authorities 
are some of the matters to be taken into account when applying the aforementioned 
principle.604 
The Court, examining whether the principle of legitimate expectations was breached, 
observed that no guarantee was given by the Commission that the measures adopted in 
order to grant State aid would leave shareholders, subordinated creditors and investors 
unaffected.605 It was also underlined that economic operators could not claim legitimate 
expectations in relation to an existing situation which is subject to the discretion of the 
EU institutions, ‘particularly in a field such as State aid in the banking sector, whose 
subject matter involves constant adjustment to reflect changes in the economic 
situation’. 606  Moreover, the Court applied the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and 
concluded that the shareholders’ right to property was not violated, since the losses they 
suffered due to the burden-sharing measure are the same with the losses they would have 
suffered had the bank being insolvent. This decision can be compared to the case of 
Cyprus, where the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle was also applicable. Their main 
difference, that can justify a difference in the findings, is the fact that in the Slovenian 
case the applicants were shareholders, while in the case of Cyprus the applicants were 
depositors. In case of the collapse of a bank, depositors, considered as creditors of the 
company, are entitled to the lion’s share of the remaining assets, while shareholders are 
                                                                
603 ‘Banking Communication’ (2013), paragraph 46 
604 AG Opinion, paragraph 91 
605 Kotnik, paragraph 64 
606 Ibid., paragraph 66 
194 
 
the last who are compensated, provided that there are sufficient assets to cover their 
compensation. Consequently, while the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle may lead to the 
conclusion that the shareholders’ right to property was not violated, the opposite result 
may be concluded in the case of bank depositors.   
Finally, in the two cases concerning Greek austerity measures, the CJEU’s rulings did not 
balance the public interest with the measures at stake at all, due to the different legal basis 
of them.  
In addition to the constitutionality of the austerity measures imposed in Greece, foreign 
investors challenged some other financial measures implemented in the country before 
the EU courts. The objectives and basic tasks of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) are provided in Article 127 TFEU and, according to the Protocol on the Statute 
of the ESCB those objectives and tasks include, inter alia, the protection of price stability 
and the sound management of the monetary policy. Due to the financial crisis in Greece 
which made the risk of collapse evident, the ECB and the Eurosystem607 and Greece 
entered into an agreement providing for the exchange of the Greek debt instruments held 
by the ECB and national central banks for new securities with the same nominal value, 
interest rate and interest payment and repayment dates but with different serial numbers 
and dates. In addition, the securities held by private creditors were exchanged and were 
haircut at a rate of 53.5 per cent. By introducing a new legislation,608 Greece implemented 
the exchange of all those securities by applying a collective action clause, even if some 
creditors denied the voluntary exchange offer. Additionally, according to the ECB 
Decision 2012/153, the use of Greek debt instruments that do not satisfy the minimum 
requirements of the Eurosystem for credit quality thresholds conditional upon the 
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provision by Greece to national central banks of a collateral enhancement in the form of 
a buy-back scheme.609  
Numerous foreign private holders of Greek securities initiated proceedings before the 
General Court, in Accorinti v ECB,610 claiming the damages suffered because of the 
exchange agreement of February 2012, which were estimated to €12 million. They 
accused the ECB of infringing their legitimate expectations, and the principles of legal 
certainty and equal treatment. The application was based on the argument that the ECB 
committed several unlawful acts capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the EU. 
In particular, the press releases and public statements of previous presidents of the 
ECB,611 indicated its opposition to the restructuring of the country’s public debt and its 
selective failure. Moreover, the exchange agreement enabled the ECB and national 
central banks to avoid the private sector arrangement, including the haircut enforced 
according to the collective action clause.  
The Court in its ruling underlined that the assumption of risk is inherent in the nature of 
monetary policy, since the continuous changes in economic circumstances require instant 
adjustments. Therefore, applicants could not base their allegations on the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations or the principle of legal certainty, as they are not 
applicable in such an area.  Private investors were expected to be aware of the extremely 
unsteady economic circumstances that led to the fluctuation in the value of the Greek 
securities, which could not exclude the risk of the restructuring of the public debt, 
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considering the various views within the Eurosystem and in the other relevant Union 
institutions.612 
The Court then clarified that the press releases and the public statements of succeeding 
presidents of the ECB were of a general nature, as they did not contain any specific 
assurance from authorised sources, and came from an institution which did not have the 
power to decide on a possible restructuring of the public debt of a Member State. For 
these reasons, the statements could not be found to create legitimate expectations to the 
private investors. 
Examining the principle of equal treatment, the General Court held that it could not apply 
in that case, as long as private investors and the ECB were not in a comparable status. 
Their main difference lies in the nature of their objectives. On the one hand, the ECB was 
acting in order to pursue the public interest, namely to safeguard price stability and to 
achieve sound management of the Union monetary policy. On the other hand, private 
investors were guided by private interests, mainly to make a maximum profit from their 
investments.  
Thus, it was stated that the loss suffered by the applicants was nothing else but the 
ordinary economic risks existing in such commercial activities relating to the financial 
sector, particularly in countries that present a downgraded rating such as Greece. The 
Court dismissed the application and excluded the ECB from being held liable. It could be 
expected that a similar approach would have been adopted in case the applicants were 
depositors rather than investors, since the loss they suffered could also be considered as 
an ordinary economic risk relating to the financial sector. As far as the Deposit Guarantee 
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Directive was already in force, it could be argued that depositors should have been aware 
of the risk of losing their savings, had their bank been heavily hit by the financial crisis.  
In the recent case of Nausicaa Anadyomene v ECB,613  the General Court remained 
consistent with its decision in Accorinti v ECB, which involved natural persons, and 
extended the absence of any liability on the part of the ECB to companies and banks. In 
this case, a French company and a French bank, both holding Greek debt instruments 
claimed the damages suffered due to the ECB’s Decision 2012/153, which were estimated 
to €11 million. In particular, they alleged the ECB for infringing their legitimate 
expectations and also the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment of private 
creditors. 
The General Court ruled that commercial banks cannot base their operation on the 
principles of legitimate expectation and legal certainty in the area of monetary policy, 
since the constant changes in economic circumstances ask for urgent adjustments. The 
Court continued by clarifying that none of the ECB's acts or statements can be considered 
as an encouragement for investors to obtain or keep possession of Greek debt instruments. 
The ECB simply restored the nature of collateral security of Greek debt instruments so as 
to defend the Eurozone’s stability and proper operation in the light of the exceptional 
circumstances that the financial market faced during the crisis. Thus, the General Court 
concluded that the ECB neither had provided any specific and unconditional assurances 
on that a Greek default would never take place, nor it invited any private creditor to obtain 
or hold Greek debt instruments. Furthermore, commercial banks are expected to be aware 
of the extremely unsteady economic conditions that define the fluctuation in value of the 
Greek debt instruments, as well as the highly significant risk of Greek default, thus they 
                                                                
613 Judgment of 24 January 2017, Anadyomène, T-749/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:21  
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are not excepted to base their actions on the ECB provisionally safeguarding the eligibility 
of those instruments. Therefore, commercial banks are nothing more than investors that 
undertake high risk.   
In examining the alleged violation of the general principle of equal treatment, the Court 
declared that commercial banks and the ECB cannot be equated or compared. On the one 
hand, the ECB and the national central banks purchased Greek debt instruments in order 
to maintain price stability and the sound operation of the monetary policy of the Union, 
since these objectives fall within their duties. On the other hand, commercial banks’ and 
other companies’ motivation behind purchasing Greek debt instruments is the expectation 
of profit, in other words the acquirement of maximum return on their investment. 
This decision of the CJEU left foreign investors unsatisfied, thus the option of 
international investment arbitration seemed an attractive option for them at that stage.  
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IV. JUDICIAL PROTECTION BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Supervising ‘the most effective human rights regime in the world’,614 the ECtHR has a 
heavy influence on the States that are members of the Council of Europe and it enjoys 
remarkable and long-lasting legitimacy.615 Usually, remedies were given in the form of 
‘declaratory’ violations made by States, and monetary damages were rather avoided. Such 
a fact could be argued to constrain the effectiveness of the ECtHR. However, through the 
years, States have been more and more ordered to take ‘individual measures’ to ensure 
restitutio in integrum 616  or ‘general measures’ to resolve extensive and serious 
matters.617 This section follows a slightly different structure, in the sense that all the case 
law being discussed were admissible and the proportionality principle was applicable. 
Only specific cases are examined, which have been selected because they are dealing 
either with the financial crisis or the protection of depositors and shareholders of failing 
banks. In any case, it is not argued that these are the only cases concerning this area. In 
essence, all austerity measures in the context of the financial crisis were found 
proportional, and only in the two cases that concerned bank restructurings but not in the 
context of the recent Eurozone crisis, the measures were declared disproportional.  
 
1. Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece618 
The austerity measures adopted by Greece and their relationship with the ECHR were 
examined in the case of Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece.619 The first applicant challenged 
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the cuts in wages and pensions, an austerity measure for the purpose of limiting public 
spending in response to the financial crisis, resulting from Greek Laws nos. 3833/2010, 
3845/2010 and 3847/2010, as amounting to a deprivation of possessions. The second 
applicant, the Public Service Trade Union Confederation, alleged violations of Article 
6(1), 8, 13, 14 and 17 of the ECHR based on the detrimental effect of the measures on the 
financial situation of its members.620 The ECtHR decided to hear both cases together, 
since they were similar both in terms of facts and in the substantive issues raised.621  
Initially, the Court, after recognizing that a salary belongs to the sphere of ‘possessions’ 
under Article 1(1), Protocol 1,622 clarified that the deductions in Koufaki’s salary does 
not constitute a ‘deprivation of possessions’ but, instead, an interference with the right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.623 It then applied the three-stage test to decide 
whether the particular interference violated the ECHR; it assessed whether the measure 
was legal, necessary and proportionate. The first stage was not difficult to be satisfied, 
since the pay cuts were provided in Laws nos. 3833/2010 and 345/2010.624 Regarding the 
second stage, the Court had to examine the public interest of the measure in order to 
decide whether it is justified. ‘Particular weight’ was given to the report accompanied 
Law no. 3833/2010 625  and to the reasoning of the Greek Supreme Administrative 
Court.626 The report presented the measures adopted by the Greek Government as ‘a 
national duty to achieve fiscal consolidation’627 with reductions in salaries being part of 
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621 Ibid., paragraph 29 
622 In this regard, the Court cited the previous decision of Stummer v. Austria, App no. 37452/02, (2011) 
paragraph 32 
623 Koufaki, paragraph 34 
624 Ibid., paragraph 45 
625 That report describes the ‘exceptional circumstances without precedent in recent Greek history’: ‘this 
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thwarted efforts to meet the country’s lending needs and pose[d] a serious threat to the national 
economy’. 
626 Koufaki, paragraph 36  
627 Ibid., paragraph 37 
201 
 
the general effort to restore stability in the country’s economy. These considerations 
resulted in the ECtHR deciding that the austerity measures were implemented by the 
Greek Government and Parliament in pursuing the public interest.628 The Court also took 
into account the amount the applicant lost because of the pay cuts and decided the 
reduction she suffered was not of such an extent so as to render her unable to provide for 
herself, thus it could not be regarded as an excessive burden on the applicant.  
It was not surprising that the uncertainty of the country’s financial position played a key 
role on the reasoning of the ECtHR. The decisive factor on finding a balance between the 
rights of the applicant and the austerity measures in Greece was the risk of 
macroeconomic instability in the Eurozone as a whole. Since it was demonstrated that the 
applicant was not at risk of destitution, the Court preferred to defer to the agreement 
between Greece and its creditors, and to the decision of the Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court. Interestingly, the ECtHR explicitly mentioned the MoU concluded 
between the Greek government and its international creditors,629 with the crisis being 
described as the greatest challenge for the country in its ‘recent’ history. Koufaki’s ruling 
was cited in cases concerning the austerity measures in Portugal630 and Lithuania.631 The 
former is discussed below, while the latter considered the reduction of Lithuanian judges’ 
salaries as part of a series of austerity measures regarding the whole public sector. The 
Court concluded that the austerity measure at stake was justified due to the difficult 
economic conditions in Lithuania and the need to pursue the public interest, including 
financing education, healthcare and social welfare. Finally, it was held that the temporary 
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reduction of the applicants’ salaries did not impose an excessive burden on them or 
affected their ability to perform their professional duties.  
2. Da Conceição Mateus v Portugal632 
In Mateus v Portugal, 633  which is similar to the previous one, the applicants were 
pensioners, receiving a state pension form the Portuguese government, which included 
holiday and Christmas bonuses. The country negotiated an Economic Adjustment 
Programme with the EU, the Eurozone Member States and the IMF, resulting to a MoU. 
According to the State Budget Act 2012, which came into force to implement some of the 
provisions of the IMF, public sector pensions were reduced, by decreasing the amount 
provided in holiday and Christmas holidays from 2012 to 2014. The Portuguese 
Constitutional Court found that the cuts in pension were unconstitutional, as there was 
not an equivalent reduction to private sector pensions, thus they violated the principle of 
‘proportional equality’,634 and this difference in treatment was unjustifiable, irrespective 
of the objective of the measure,635 in the existence of alternative measures to achieve it.636 
However, the Constitutional Court suspended the effects of its decision, as the State 
Budget Act 2012 was at an advance stage of implementation and it would not be easy for 
the government to design and implement any alternative measures at that time. Applicants 
challenged the relationship of the austerity measure with the Convention, since their 
payments were reduced, without invoking any specific provision under the ECHR. Thus, 
the ECtHR considered interference to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under 
Article 1 of Protocol No.1 as the appropriate basis for this application.  
                                                                
632 Da Conceição Mateus and Others v Portugal, App nos 62235/12 and 57725/12 (2013) 
633 Ibid. 
634 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 353/2012, judgment of 5 July 2012, 3846 
635 Namely, to reduce the public deficit to the level specified in the MoU 
636 Mateus, paragraph 10 
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Under Article 1 of Protocol 1, a country can reduce the amount of payment of a pension 
only for a public interest purpose, provided that a fair balance has been achieved between 
the general interest of the society and the protection of the individual rights affected. In 
order to examine this balance, the ECtHR took into account the fact that only the holiday 
and Christmas payments of the applicants were deduced, with the rate of their basic 
monthly pension remaining unaffected. As the Court held, a human right is violated only 
if the ‘essence of the rights’ has been infringed.637 In that case, the holidays and Christmas 
pensions were regarded as advantageous benefits that were provided only to specific 
groups of pensioners twice a year and did not constitute the normal monthly income of 
the applicants. 638  Moreover, the reduction would only last for three years, thus it 
constituted a temporary measure. In terms of quantity and time, the interference with 
applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of possessions was held not to have violated Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 and Portugal was held to have remained within its room for margin of 
appreciation to implement austerity measures to face with the severe economic conditions 
of the country. The ECtHR decided that a fair balance between the public interest and the 
individuals’ interest had been struck and the applications declared inadmissible, as being 
manifestly ill-founded.  
The Court gave particular weight on the financial and economic crisis and its 
consequences in Portugal. ‘The very fact that a programme of such magnitude had to be 
put in place shows that the economic crisis which was asphyxiating the Portuguese 
economy at the material time and its effect on the State budget balance were exceptional 
in nature, as the Constitutional Court indeed recognised in its decision of 5 July 2012.’639 
It is interesting that in this case the Court underlined the temporary nature of the austerity 
                                                                
637 Mateus, paragraph 24 
638 Ibid.  
639 Ibid., paragraph 25 
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measures, in assessing whether they constitute an infringement of the right to property, 
while in the Koufaki case the fact that the Greek measure was permanent had not 
prevented it from holding it as proportionate.640 
3. Dennis Grainger and others v UK641 
The ECtHR examined the cases in which shareholders are entitled to compensation in the 
case of Grainger v UK after the collapse and nationalisation of Northern Rock Bank. 
Facing the financial crisis of 2008, the UK Government, under the Banking (Special 
Provisions) Act 2008,642 allowed for the nationalisation and compulsory acquisition of 
shares of Northern Rock Bank. The affected shareholders claimed that their right to 
property was infringed, because of an unfair valuation of their shares, and that their 
treatment was less favourable than other banks.643 For the nationalization of the bank, a 
specific Compensation Scheme Order was introduced, under which compensation to 
Northern Rock shareholders would be assessed by an independent evaluator, who would 
examine what the bank would be worth if all financial assistance had been withdrawn and 
the bank placed in administration. Shareholders supported that the evaluator 
underestimated the value of their shares.644  
The High Court found that the nationalisation of Northern Rock was not in breach of 
shareholders’ right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 and dismissed their 
application for judicial review.645 It held that the procedure followed did not impose any 
                                                                
640 See paragraph 26: ‘Like in Greece, these measures were adopted in an extreme economic situation, but 
unlike in Greece, they were transitory.’  
641 Dennis Grainger and Others v UK, App no 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01 (2012) 
642 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, section 5(4) 
643 For example, Royal Bank of Scotland had received large capital injections from the government 
without outright nationalization 
644 The valuer decided in March 2010 that the value of the shares was zero, whereas the shareholders 
argued that £ 2-4 was their fair market value. 
645 R (on the applications of (1) SRM Global Master Fund LP (2) RAB Special Situations (Master) Fund 
Limited (3) Dennis Grainger and others) v The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury [2009] EWHC 
227 (Admin) 
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‘individual and excessive burdens’ on the applicants and that the government’s actions 
regarding other banks did not render the Northern Rock Compensation Scheme unfair or 
discriminatory. It also underlined that the Parliament acted within its margin of 
appreciation when decided to establish the particular compensation scheme. After 
exhausting all domestic remedies,646 shareholders reached the ECtHR. The legality of 
nationalisation was not challenged. What the applicants contested was the evaluation of 
the valuer which, they argued, resulted in the Compensation Scheme not striking a fair 
balance.  
In dismissing the application, the Court restated several rules on the protection of property 
and clarified that full compensation is not entitled to any circumstances, particularly in 
the light of a financial or economic crisis. ‘Legitimate objectives in the “public interest”, 
such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve 
greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.’647 It 
also highlighted that its role was rather limited, since the public interest of a country could 
be better perceived by the national authorities instead of international judges, due to the 
direct relationship the former have with the society and its needs.648 Thus, the role of the 
ECtHR was limited to the assessment of whether the parameters for compensation were 
within the UK’s margin of appreciation.  
In assessing this margin of appreciation, the Court considered the efforts of the UK 
Government to maintain financial stability in times of ‘exceptional circumstances 
prevailing in the financial sector, both domestically and internationally’.649 ‘The Court of 
                                                                
646 SRM Global Master Fund LP and others v Treasury Commissioners [2009] EWCA Civ 788 and R (on 
the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) and others (RAB Special Situations (Master) Fund 
Limited) v The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury UKSC 2009/0179 
647 Grainger, paragraph 37 
648 Ibid., paragraph 36 
649 Ibid., paragraph 39 
206 
 
Appeal took the view that the Government should be afforded a wide margin of 
appreciation in this case, since the impugned action arose in the context of macro-
economic policy…. The Court considers that the Compensation Scheme must be seen as 
integrally linked to the series of support measures which ended with nationalisation. 
Throughout the entire process, the Government’s focus was on protecting a key sector of 
the national economy.’650  
Furthermore, the Court made some powerful statements, while examining whether the 
measures adopted regarding Northern Rock were in the public interest and for the 
avoidance of ‘moral hazard’. ‘…the Court accepts that the Government’s objective 
throughout its dealings with Northern Rock during this period was to protect the United 
Kingdom’s financial sector. As part of this policy, they aimed to maintain depositor 
confidence in the safety of placing money with banks. On the other hand, however, they 
also sought to avoid encouraging the management boards of other financial institutions 
from making bad business decisions on the assumption that the State would provide a 
safety net…. In the Court’s view, it was entirely legitimate for the State authorities to 
decide that, had the Northern Rock shareholders been permitted to benefit from the value 
which had been created and maintained only through the provision of State support, this 
would encourage the managers and shareholders of other banks to seek and rely on 
similar support, to the detriment of the United Kingdom economy.’651 Finally, the ECtHR 
took into account the lack of any viable alternative measure at that time and concluded 
that opting to grant no compensation to Northern Rock shareholders did not violate their 
right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1. Among others, the ruling in Grainger v 
                                                                
650 Grainger, paragraph 39 
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UK demonstrates that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in adopting macro-
economic policy, including the resolution of banking and financial crises.  
4. Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’652 
The application of the principle of proportionality led to the opposite results in the case 
of Ališić. This case also considered the repayment of shareholders after the failure of a 
bank and the status of frozen bank accounts. However, it should be distinguished from 
Grainger v the UK, in the sense that the collapse of the bank was not the result of a 
financial crisis, but of a State succession. The applicants claimed that their inability to 
recover ‘old’ foreign-currency savings, which were deposited with two bank in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, after the dissolution of the former SFRY,653 constituted an infringement 
of their right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1. The Court found that the two old 
banks654 were liable for the ‘old’ foreign-currency savings in all their branches until the 
dissolution of the SFRY and, since then, they were liable for these deposits in their 
branches in the new countries Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Such a decision does not imply that any foreign branches of domestic banks would always 
be covered by the domestic DGS.655 Instead, the Court reached this conclusion in the light 
of the exceptional situation before it, as the branches in question were not foreign 
branches when the applicants deposited their money, but they became foreign branches 
after the dissolution of the SFRY. Moreover, the Court could not consider any rule 
regarding the rehabilitation of a collapsing private banks, since the status of the banks in 
                                                                
652 Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the ‘Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’, App no. 60642/08 (2012) 
653 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
654 Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana and Investbanka 
655Ališić, paragraph 118 
208 
 
question had always been State-owned or socially-owned.656 Nevertheless, and even after 
taking those special features of this case into consideration, the Court found that a fair 
balance had not been struck between the general interest of the society and the applicants’ 
right to property, and thus a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 was committed.  
Although the circumstances of this case does not concern a financial crisis, it can be 
argued that the Court did not only shift the focus on the public interest involved, but also 
considered the importance of individuals’ rights and underlined that a fair balance should 
always be achieved, by applying the principle of proportionality. 
5. Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria657 
Finally, the case of Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria gave the ECtHR the chance to examine 
the effects of the IMF on human rights, and the obligations of States under agreements 
with such an institution and under the ECHR. It decided that the withdrawal of a banking 
licence and the following compulsory liquidation constituted a violation of Article 6(1) 
and Article 1 of Protocol 1. Regarding the effective judicial protection of citizens in 
Bulgaria, the Court stated that ‘Government’s reliance on the alleged demands by the 
IMF to limit the courts’ involvement in the closing of ailing banks was misplaced, because 
Bulgaria could not avoid its obligations under the Convention under the guise of 
complying with the recommendations of an international organisation’.658 The stability 
of a country’s banking system was acknowledged as a ‘sensitive economic area’,659 thus 
a wide margin of appreciation was reasonable and appropriate. Nevertheless, the Court 
established that Bulgaria was not exempted from its obligations under the ECHR because 
of the term on the agreement between Bulgaria and the IMF which provided that judicial 
                                                                
656 Ibid. 
657 Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria, App no 4942/99 (2005) 
658Ibid., paragraph 90 
659 Ibid. 
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review should be prohibited. The temporal factor and the emergency situation in the 
country were decisive in Court’s ruling. As it stated, ‘there may be a paramount need to 
act expeditiously and without advance notice in order to avoid irreparable harm to the 
bank, its depositors and other creditors, or the banking and financial system as a whole’.660 
However, in that case ‘it does not appear that it was a matter of such urgency that any 
delay occasioned by some sort of formal procedure would have been unduly 
prejudicial’,661 even if the bank’s licence was revoked during a banking crisis. Probably, 
this is the most remarkable case on how the Court can depart from its wide interpretation 
of the margin of appreciation and the broad tolerance it showed in the rest of the cases of 
the measures the implement in the sake of rescuing their economies.  
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of some landmark cases on the austerity 
measures adopted by Eurozone Member States in receipt of financial assistance or on the 
new legal concepts and procedures in the context of the EMU. As we have seen from the 
tour d’ horizon of the national and EU litigation concerning Ireland, Iceland, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus, and also of ECHR litigation, judicial control has 
taken place to a varying extent.  
It should be stressed here that any conclusion in that stage662 should be drawn with 
caution, since account must be taken into the on-going developments of the European 
Banking Union, the differences between the macroeconomic adjustment programmes 
provided for each Member State, the traditions of each court in exercising judicial control, 
and the on-going litigation at national level and before the CJEU and the ECtHR. 
Moreover, any conclusion should not ignore the different kinds of objectives and 
mandates of these courts regarding the examination of the legality of the implemented 
post-crisis measures, as was explained in the Introduction of this chapter. 
National courts have acted ‘as defenders of their national constitutional settlement’,663 by 
showing notable deference to the political process, due to the nature of the matter and the 
emergency circumstances. In the fear of possible adverse consequences of a negative 
decision, national courts were highly deferential when they had to rule on reforms of the 
EMU, while they tried to be slightly critical, or less deferential, when they considered 
national measures in the same area. 
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663 A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford University Press 2015) 153 
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Clearly, the CJEU preferred to show a restraint when dealing with the legality of the ESM 
Treaty and declared inadmissible all applications made to review the compliance of 
national measures and the MoUs with the general principle of law and the Charter. It also 
refused to recognise any involvement of the EU institutions in the conclusion of the MoUs 
and the financial assistance programmes, under their competences as organs of EU law. 
Similarly, the EFTA Court declined to impose responsibility on the State to compensate 
affected depositors, and prefer to shift all the burden on the DGS. The principal hurdle to 
judicial review is the nature of the area, since controlling of economic policies requires 
particular expertise and democratic legitimacy, and the emergent character of those 
measures. However, individuals are in need of such judicial review during the crisis more 
than ever before. In addition, the denial of any link of EU law with the MoUs leaves 
citizens vulnerable, since no legal organ within the EU legal order has jurisdiction to 
consider the protection of their fundamental, economic and social rights.  
Despite, in its initial reaction in Pringle, the CJEU preferred to avoid to examine the 
actions of the Union institutions, in Ledra Advertising there was a slight change of this 
attitude,664 which can operate as a catalyst for the recognition that the Union institutions 
are still under the obligation to apply principles of EU law, even outside the EU 
framework. In other words, while, at first, the CJEU just ‘washed its hands’ of any 
responsibility regarding the involvement of the Union institutions on the austerity 
measures, it now recognised that these institutions are obliged to function within the EU 
legal order, notwithstanding that the austerity measures are imposed by virtue of legal 
instruments that function outside that order. It is prudent to acknowledge that this 
development constitutes a positive step towards enhancing the effectiveness of judicial 
protection offered to citizens in the context of the financial crisis.  
                                                                
664 Irrespective of the outcome of this case 
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However, the threshold for natural or legal persons to challenge the austerity measures 
through direct actions at the EU courts by initiating proceedings under Article 263 TFEU 
remains high. According to Fitzpatrick, it is ‘nigh on impossible’ for individuals that were 
affected by the austerity measures, such as bank depositors, to meet the procedural 
requirements of Article 263 TFEU and acquire the necessary locus standi.665 In essence, 
the doors to the action for annulment in the context of the measures relating to the 
financial crisis have become closed for affected individuals. However, the outcome of 
Ledra Advertising demonstrated that individuals’ only option for effective judicial 
protection by EU courts is through actions for damages under Article 340 TFEU and the 
concept of non-contractual liability of the Union and its institutions. Individuals should 
only satisfy the test established by the Court in the Bergaderm case and seek 
compensation for damages, rather than proving direct and individual concern of acts and 
ask for them to be nullified.666 
The ECtHR’s response to the Eurozone crisis cases demonstrates that the economic crisis 
at stake constitutes a major threat for the Eurozone, but also for the Union as a whole, so 
most measures adopted are proportionate and States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. 
Such an approach towards national authorities, could be found to undermine the role of 
an international court with the status of the ECtHR, which is to operate as an external 
dominion during a crisis, instead of granting States with a wide margin of appreciation. 
Regarding the rulings on Koufaki v Greece and Mateus v Portugal, it has been observed 
that the effects of States’ obligations, arising from international agreements, concern 
primarily the principle of proportionality, instead of the protection of human rights itself. 
                                                                
665 C. Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ (2014) 
10 European Constitutional Law Review, 394 
666 K. Gutman, ‘The evolution of the action for damages against the European Union and its place in the 
system of judicial protection’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, 695, at 710 et seq 
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‘Conflicting international obligations may not claim primacy over human rights 
obligations, but they might have an impact on the application of the proportionality 
principle, since they define the goals of the measures that need to be justified as 
proportional.’667 In essence, the reasoning of the ECtHR suggests that, in light of the 
severe economic conditions in those countries, any austerity measures implemented 
would be easily held proportionate, even if the right to property is clearly affected. Such 
an indication may prove the proportionality test inappropriate, or not the most suitable, 
for the protection of human rights in times of crisis.668 In contrast with the above, the 
human rights prevailed over the obligations of States to maintain financial stability and 
regulate their financial markets in the cases of Ališić v Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Capital Bank AD 
v Bulgaria. In all the above-mentioned case law, applicants focused on the socio-
economic consequences of a crisis, thus the Court did not have the opportunity to decide 
on a case where the derogation from the ECHR was the result of emergency economic 
circumstances, a scenario that would also invoke Article 15 ECHR. 
If the extent of effectiveness provided in the afore-analysed case law is examined from 
its procedural scope, it can be supported that all courts have offered sufficiently effective 
judicial protections, since applicants enjoyed access to justice and a fair trial. However, 
most of the rulings given have not focused on the protection of individuals’ rights, giving 
priority on economic and political considerations and the survival of the Eurozone. There 
is also the tendency that some of the most important actions taken in response to the crisis, 
with the European Commission and the ECB playing a crucial role in their adoption, are 
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held to fall outside the scope of EU law and the jurisdiction of the European courts. Thus, 
individuals should limit their judicial protection on their national courts, which seem 
reluctant to shift their focus towards the effects of the measures under challenges on the 
citizens. It is not argued that the public interest should not be taken into consideration. 
What is argued is that the courts, while applying the principle of proportionality, have not 
given sufficient weight to the interests of individuals, though the mandate of courts 
includes the protection of citizens and not only the protection of States. Such a 
misapplication of the proportionality principle has resulted in an insufficient effectiveness 
of substantial judicial protection.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE APPROACH OF ARBITRATION TOWARDS THE 
PROTECTION OF BANK DEPOSITORS AND EFFECTIVENESS 
After examining the approach of litigation towards the subject matter of this thesis, this 
chapter comparatively examine the approach of arbitration. Traditionally, diplomatic 
protection was the only available avenue for foreign investors to protect their rights. A 
State exercising diplomatic protection espoused the claim of its national against another 
State and pursued it in its own name. The recognition and consolidation of the right of 
access to international justice and to the courts of third states by private investors, for the 
enforcement of international investment awards, have strengthened the right of access to 
justice for foreign investors.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the approach that international arbitration has 
followed when arbitrators were asked to review the conformity of the post-crisis measures 
adopted at the EU and national level with the standards afforded to the protection of 
foreign investors. This approach will be correlated with the approach adopted by national, 
supranational and international courts that was the subject matter of the previous chapter, 
by employing the comparative method.  
A legal precedent on how arbitrators approach disputes on financial instruments and 
measures in response to the financial crisis is offered by the award given by the ICSID 
tribunal when dealing with the situation in Argentina, which defaulted on its sovereign 
debt, prompting a class action on an alleged violation of rights under a BIT after investors 
suffered a haircut of their investments. Argentina suffered a dramatic financial crisis at 
the turn of the century. Its sovereign default has been characterised as the greatest and the 
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most complex in history. In particular, Argentina defaulted on USD 120 billion in private 
debt and on more than USD 30 billion of public debt.669 In order to handle the crisis, 
which has been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, 
Argentina adopted a series of measures aiming at achieving financial stability and 
reinforcing political confidence. However, the bitter price for that restructuring was paid 
by those engaging with the country’s economy, among them being foreign investors. 
While the options for national citizens seeking legal recourse were limited, foreign 
investors opted for protection through international investment arbitration, which was 
offered under the regime of BITs that Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 
1990s. As a consequence, the measures imposed by the State of Argentina, either 
legislative or regulatory, became the subject of various cases in ICSID arbitration brought 
by foreign investors who claimed that their investments were heavily affected. In 
particular, they claimed that Argentina breached its contractual obligation to protect their 
investment, and, on its part, Argentina rejected those allegations and defended its position 
on the ground of dealing with a ‘state of necessity’ and emergency.  
The protection offered by international arbitration, both regarding the situation in 
Argentina and within the Eurozone, will be assessed on its effectiveness, as in Chapter 4. 
It should be repeated here that the analysis of Chapter 4 led to the conclusion that the 
CJEU and the EFTA Court remained restrained on dealing with the legality of the 
measures adopted at national and the EU level in response to the financial crisis, with 
their basic reasoning being the nature of the area and the emergent character of those 
measures. Similarly, national courts preferred to adopt a highly deferential position in 
order to keep a distance from the political processes that resulted in the measures at stake. 
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Finally, the ECtHR found most measures adopted proportionate and under the wide 
margin of appreciation of States. Consequently, citizens remained without any available 
option regarding litigation, in the sense that no legal organ within the EU legal order 
accepted that it has jurisdiction to consider the protection of their fundamental, economic 
and social rights. Thus, it is time to examine the alternative option of arbitration.  
This chapter will critically analyse the position of international arbitration so far, from 
the scope of effectiveness of protection offered to applicants. It is important to clarify that 
the chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the cases regarding 
the Eurozone crisis throughout the Union. To this effect, the chapter first explains a 
significant limitation of this analysis, namely the duty of confidentiality (i). It then 
outlines the financial crisis of Argentina, the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion in the 
leading case of Abaclat v Argentina 670  and its implications (ii), and a selection of 
arbitration cases in the Eurozone concerning the protection of foreign investors according 
to the standards of protection in BITs (iii). It should be stressed that most cases in section 
iii are still pending, thus only their factual framework is described at the moment. It 
concludes with an evaluation of the role of effectiveness on the approach of those arbitral 
tribunals (iv).  
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I. THE LIMITATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
A key feature of international arbitration is the fact that it constitutes a confidential, or at 
least private, dispute resolution mechanism, while the majority of national litigation are 
not confidential. As it has been stated, ‘the custom is not to say who arbitrated what’.671 
Traditionally, arbitration proceedings and awards have been fully confidential. It was 
only after the revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 2010 that the need of 
strengthening transparency was acknowledged, particularly in investor-State arbitration 
cases.672  
It should be clarified that privacy and confidentiality are two distinct concepts. In 
particular, the former precludes any stranger from attending arbitration proceedings, 
while the latter reflects the obligation not to disclose information relating to the content 
of the case.  
In litigation, hearings and court dockets are open to the public, competitors, press and 
regulators, and disclosure of evidence and submissions can be made publicly, all of them 
leading to the development of ‘trial by press release’.673  On the other hand, arbitral 
hearings are almost always closed to the press and the public, and the parties' submissions 
and tribunals' awards remain confidential. In some jurisdictions, the obligation of 
confidentiality is implied in international arbitration agreements as a matter of law, while 
it can be expressly imposed in some arbitration agreements or institutional arbitration 
rules.  
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(eds.), The Rise of Transparency in International Arbitration: The Case for the Anonymous Publication of 
Arbitral Awards (2013, Juris) xix-xxxii 
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It is interesting how the approach of national laws on the matter of confidentiality varies 
from country to country. 674  One of the most contentious matters is whether the 
proceedings should remain confidential, thus parties should be prohibited from revealing 
relevant facts or documents. For example, in the United States, confidentiality is not 
treated as a rule of law, but it is a well-recognised arbitral practice to comply with 
confidentiality. In England, the confidentiality has been established as a legal requirement 
through case law. In Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v Mew, 675  an English court 
established the implied right of confidentiality in every arbitration. Based on such an 
implied right, the court held that all the materials should be confidential. According to the 
court’s decision, ‘The concept of private arbitration derives simply from the fact that the 
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration particular disputes arising between them and 
only them. It is implicit in this that strangers shall be excluded from the hearings and 
conduct of the arbitration....’676 
The issues of confidentiality, transparency and public information in investment treaty 
arbitration have been extensively discussed in the Abaclat case, when considering 
whether to grant their Procedural Order No. 3 (Confidentiality Order).677  At an early 
stage of the proceedings, Parties disagreed on the matter of confidentiality.  Although 
their opinion on the publicity of the final award concurred,678 they adopted different 
approaches on other, intermediate, issues regarding confidentiality. Due to the difficulty 
to reach an agreement on the matter, the Claimants sought for a Confidentiality Order that 
would be applicable for the whole record of the proceedings. The Order was considered 
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to fall below the scope of Rule 19 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules that provides for the 
Tribunal’s power to determinate the conduct of proceedings. 
At first, the Tribunal shared the position followed by the arbitral Tribunal in Biwater 
Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania,679 namely that ‘In the absence 
of any agreement between the parties on this issue, there is no provision imposing a 
general duty of confidentiality in ICSID arbitration, whether in the ICSID Convention, 
any of the applicable Rules or otherwise. Equally, however, there is no provision 
imposing a general rule of transparency or non-confidentiality in any of these sources.’680   
Once the Tribunal examined a number of relevant authorities, it set out the general 
approach, which focuses on the duty of arbitral tribunals to achieve a balance between 
transparency and the integrity of arbitration proceedings, as it is explained below:  
‘72. [...] whilst the Tribunal shares the view that transparency in investment arbitration 
shall be encouraged as a means to promote good governance of States, the development 
of a well-grounded and coherent body of case law in international investment law and 
therewith legal certainty and confidence in the system of investment arbitration, it also 
believes that transparency considerations shall not justify actions that exacerbate the 
dispute or otherwise compromise the integrity of the arbitration proceedings [...]’681 
Further, after admitting the absence of any specific provision on the matter of 
confidentiality either in the ICSID Convention or in the ICSID Arbitration Rules, it was 
stated that ‘the Tribunal shall decide on the matter on a case by case basis and, instead of 
tending towards imposing a general rule in favour or against confidentiality, try to achieve 
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a solution that balances the general interest for transparency with specific interests for 
confidentiality of certain information and/or documents.’682 It can thus be understood 
that, although confidentiality is a principle that applies in investment arbitration in 
general, there are no clear, binding rules on the confines of this concept. 
In the Abaclat case, on the one hand, the Claimants sought that the only information that 
could be disclosed was ‘general updates on the status of the case’,683 since a general duty 
of confidentiality should have bound all the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, the 
Respondent State argued that ICSID arbitration does not provide for a general obligation 
of confidentiality. And, indeed, the Tribunal recognised that the Respondent’s submission 
of expert opinions and transcripts from other arbitral proceedings indicated that Argentina 
‘does not consider any such documents to be subject to any restriction, unless they relate 
to sealed proceedings’. 684  However, the Tribunal rejected both positions, as it both 
refused the existence of a general duty of confidentiality in ICSID arbitration but also 
underlined that parties do not have a ‘carte blanche’ to disclose documents used in the 
proceedings.685 Instead, a new approach was conceived: 
‘80.  Depending on the information and documents at stake, different considerations of 
confidentiality, transparency, public information, equality of the Parties’ rights, orderly 
conduct of the proceedings and other procedural rights and principles may apply, 
requiring a differentiated treatment.’ 
Applying this approach, the Tribunal ordered that: 
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‘[...] the parties may engage in general discussion about the case in public, provided that 
any such public discussion is restricted to what is necessary, and is not used as an 
instrument to antagonize the Parties, exacerbate their differences, unduly pressure one of 
them, or render the resolution of the dispute potentially more difficult [...] No 
confidentiality restriction shall apply to the publication of the award and its content [...] 
and of orders or directions of the Tribunal’686 
Among the matters that were discussed on the Confidentiality Order were the power and 
obligation of the Tribunal to order the continuity of confidentiality restrictions once the 
proceedings are completed,687 the application of national laws on privacy,688 and the 
distribution of materials used in previous arbitrations.689  Remarkably, the Tribunal’s 
reasoning for restricting disclosure of pleadings, written memorials and other written 
submissions of the Parties as well as of witness and expert statements690 reads as follows: 
‘101.   Pleadings and written memorials are likely to contain references to and details of 
documents produced pursuant to a disclosure exercise, and their uneven publication or 
distribution carry the risk of giving a misleading impression about these proceedings. 
102.  Indeed, based on their function and aim, pleadings and memorials of a Party often 
present a one-sided story of the dispute [...]’ 
It is interesting how the Tribunal suggests a differentiated treatment depending on the 
different interests involved regarding each material, in paragraph 80.  However, it could 
be commented that preventing sovereign states from disclosing their legal pleadings in an 
arbitration governed by public international law, by using as a justification some 
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unproven risks may adversely affect public confidence in the investment treaty 
arbitration. For sake of discussion, although the Respondent State argued that ICSID 
arbitration is not bound by any general duty of confidentiality, it did not make its 
pleadings publicly available.  
Undoubtedly, the confidentiality in international arbitration proceedings constitutes a 
serious limitation for this chapter. In particular, the fact that most cases are pending means 
that only limited information are available for the arbitral proceedings until the awards 
are given.  
 
 
  
224 
 
II. ABACLAT AND OTHERS V ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 691 
1. Factual framework of Argentina 
In the early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina proceeded to a radical restructuring of its 
economy, in order to promote growth by encouraging foreign trade and investment in the 
country. A broad programme of bilateral investment treaties was developed, with no less 
than 58 countries, which, in conjunction with the approval of a 35-years Standard Gas 
Transportation License, aimed at the privatization of state-owned companies on the 
sectors of gas and transportation.692 Moreover, the restructuring measures included the 
adoption of the Currency Convertibility law which fixed the Argentine peso at par with 
the U.S. dollar and prohibited any future price freeze to the tariff system unless 
compensation was paid to investors.693 
Among the BITs that Argentina negotiated, was the one with Italy, which came into force 
in October 1993. Furthermore, Argentina tried to boost its economic development by 
issuing sovereign bonds. In particular, it placed over a total of USD 186.7 billion in 
sovereign bonds across its domestic and international markets, mainly targeting Italy, as 
the two countries were historically and culturally connected. Italians responded positively 
to that call, by purchasing these bonds en masse. Thus, by 2001, 600,000 Italians owned 
USD 13.5 billion worth of Argentina bonds which were governed by laws of different 
jurisdictions.  
By the end of 2001, Argentina faced a financial collapse that has been characterised as 
‘the most complex in history’.694 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost 40% of its 
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value, having as a consequence the losses on banks. What followed was an economic 
catastrophe, during which, the living standard of over half of the population of the country 
fell below the poverty line, ‘income per person in dollar terms…shrunk from around 
$7,000 to just $3,500’ and ‘unemployment [rose] to perhaps 25%’.695  
The crisis was attributed partly to internal conditions, namely the national economic 
policies, and partly to external events, including the financial crises in Brazil and South 
East Asia.696  
Though, initially, expense cuts were adopted, the currency board that had fixed the peso 
to the USD was cancelled and all bank accounts were freezed in order to tackle the 
crisis.697 Argentina ‘had allegedly come to a point where it was unable to avoid deferring 
interest and principal payments on all of its external bond debt owed to both foreign and 
Argentine creditors’698 and thus ‘defaulted by publicly announcing the deferral of over 
USD 100 billion of external bond debt owed to both non-Argentine and Argentine 
creditors’.699 Those severe economic conditions resulted in a grievous devaluation of the 
peso and in a public debt equivalent to the 130% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
in 2002.700  
In the meantime, bondholders, in their majority Italian citizens, set up the Task Force 
Argentina (TFA) in Rome,701 in an effort to secure that they will obtain their interests and 
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capital. The idea was that interested bondholders could sign a ‘Mandate for the Protection 
of the Interests Connected with the Bonds involved in the “Argentinean Crisis”’702 at their 
bank and be represented by TFA. After the participation of 450,000 Italian bondholders, 
TFA entered into negotiations with the government of Argentina trying to achieve a 
settlement.  
In an effort to restructure its debt, the government offered an exchange of the defaulted 
bonds for new instruments with modified terms. In particular, on 14 January 2005, 
Argentina launched the Exchange Offer 2005, offering bondholders to exchange their 
bonds for new debt that Argentina would issue. Subsequently, Law 26,017, known as the 
‘Emergency Law’, was enacted.703 The Emergency Law provided that any bonds that 
would not be exchanged under the Exchange Offer could not be admitted to any new 
exchange offer later. In practice, the acceptance of that exchange offer meant that foreign 
bondholders would suffer a haircut of about 75% of the initially agreed payments in 
principal and interest. The 76% of bondholders accepted the offer. Meanwhile, national 
legislation was implemented that forbade the government from reaching any judicial, 
quasi-judicial, or private transaction with regard to those bonds.704  
Those creditors who refused to tender with the government of Argentina initiated 
litigation in New York,705 Germany, and Italy, aimied at obtaining the payment of capital 
and interest.706 Though most judgments were in their favour, claimants faced serious 
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difficulties to enforce them. The reason was that the Republic of Argentina refused to pay 
and it was hard to find attachable Argentine assets to be levied against; as it was 
commented, litigation had ‘yet to yield a penny’.707  
In 2006, and being dissatisfied with the Exchange Offer with the Argentinian government, 
TFA prepared a ‘Mandate Package’ that was accepted by over 180,000 Italian 
bondholders. On 14 September 2006, a Request for Arbitration with ICSID was filed 
based on the Argentine-Italy BIT, arguing that the 2001 default on the bond obligations 
of Argentina constituted an expropriation that remained without compensation and 
breached their obligation to fair and equitable treatment.708  
In 2010, a new offer was made by Argentina in order to accomplish its unresolved debt 
restructuring. That new offer intended to ‘restructure and cancel defaulted debt 
obligations of Argentina represented by Pre-2005 Eligible Securities, to release Argentina 
from any related claims, including any administrative, litigation or arbitral claims and to 
terminate legal proceedings against Argentina in respect of the tendered Eligible 
Securities in consideration for the issuance of New Securities and, in certain cases, a cash 
payment’.709 The 2005 Emergency Law was suspended for the time of the offer. 66% of 
the hold-out creditors agreed to the offer, and some bondholders who were part of TFA 
also decided to participate in the new Exchange Offer and withdrew from the ICSID 
proceedings. 
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2. Abaclat v. Argentina: Decision on jurisdiction 
The Argentina-Italy BIT that came into force in 1993, constituted the basis for the 
arbitration claim brought by the Italian bondholders against the Republic of Argentina in 
the famous case of Abaclat.710 The claimants sought a declaration by the Tribunal that 
Argentina was in breach of its obligations under the aforementioned BIT and the award 
of compensatory damages. Particularly, the claimants argued that their bonds qualified as 
investments, and that Argentina had defaulted on their payment and refused to negotiate 
with them, by making a unilateral exchange offer instead and dramatically diminishing 
the value of their investments through national legislation. The Tribunal gave a Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 4 August 2011;711 a Dissenting Opinion of Professor 
Georges Abi-Saab, on 28 October 2011,712 and numerous procedural orders. It underlined 
the lack of a precise legal regime governing a defaulting sovereign and the existence of a 
mere informal framework on this area that included some commonly used principles. 
Both Parties accepted that there was a legal dispute within the framework of Article 25 
of ICSID Convention.  
A dispute arising out of the BIT or a mere contractual dispute? 
One of the main disagreements between the Parties was whether their dispute could be 
considered as one arising out of the BIT or whether it was a mere contractual dispute 
arising out of the bond-related documents. Thus, the Tribunal was asked to identify 
whether the claims fell within the scope of protection of the BIT, so they were treaty 
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claims, or whether they constituted pure contract claims, that fell outside their 
jurisdiction.    
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction was dependent on this determination, since BITs could not 
correct contractual remedies and do not provide for dispute resolution, either for judicial 
or arbitral proceedings, of contract claims. The only case that an ICSID tribunal can have 
jurisdiction over a contractual dispute is when the host State was also in breach of its BIT 
obligations, in addition to the alleged breach of contract. Apart from this scenario, any 
other contract claim can only be resolved before the competent body, either judicial or 
arbitral, which is granted its jurisdiction from the contract itself. 
Unequivocally, Argentina failed to perform its obligations as the debtor of the bonds, thus 
it was in violation of its contractual obligations towards the Italian bondholders and all 
other owners of security entitlements. Argentina justified it breaches by recalling the 
exceptional circumstances and the severe economic conditions the country faced by the 
end of 2001. In particular, the adoption of the Emergency Law, which modified the State’s 
payment obligations, was presented as a drastic reaction to the dramatic public deficit. 
Argentina only based its actions on the risk of insolvency, and it did not argue that it 
invoke any contractual provision excusing its non-performance of its contractual 
obligations towards the bondholders.  
The Tribunal acknowledged that an insolvent debtor may employ some special regimes 
such as bankruptcy or other mechanisms of financial redress, which can affect the 
performance of their contracts and release them from all or some of their contractual 
obligations. Although these kinds of mechanisms are in principle subject to conditions, 
those are not applicable in the Abaclat case, since the debtor was a sovereign State and 
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any measure taken, including the Emergency Law, constituted an exercise of its sovereign 
power and did not derive from any contractual mechanism. 
To summarize the majority’s reasoning on this issue, it was found that Argentina, in order 
to face the country’s financial insolvency, took sovereign decisions, independent from 
any contractual framework, for the implementation of measures. Those measures 
reflected the power of the State and not the rights and obligations that arose out of a 
contract. In essence, the particular dispute did not ‘derive from the mere fact that 
Argentina failed to perform its payment obligations under the bonds but from the fact that 
it intervened as a sovereign by virtue of its State power to modify its payment obligations 
towards its creditors in general, encompassing but not limited to the claimants in the case 
in question’.713  
Can securities qualify as investments? 
The first major issue to be dealt with by the Tribunal was whether the securities held by 
the Italian bondholders qualified as investments, thus they could have jurisdiction to hear 
the case.  
Argentina brought three basic arguments. Firstly, they argued that those securities did not 
meet the Salini criteria714 thus they did not constitute investments under Article 25(1) of 
the ICSIC Convention. It could be reminded in this stage that the Salini criteria include a 
substantial commitment by the investor, certain duration, the assumption of risk and 
significance for the host state’s development. Secondly, the Respondent argued that the 
alleged investment was neither physically nor legally made in the territory of Argentina, 
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as required by Article 1 of the Argentina – Italy BIT. As it was submitted, the securities 
‘(i) […] did not cause any transfer of money into the territory of Argentina, [and] (ii) they 
[were] located outside of Argentina and [were] beyond the latter’s scope of territorial 
jurisdiction based on the foreign law and forum selection clauses contained in the relevant 
bond documents, and (iii) the indirect holding systems of these entitlements implicates a 
cut-off point beyond which claims are not permissible because they have only a remote 
connection with the investment’.715 The final argument focused again on Article 1 of the 
Argentina – Italy BIT, which provides that investments should be ‘in compliance with the 
laws and regulations of the host State’. In particular, the Respondent argued that securities 
should have complied with Argentine law, Italian and European law, the selling 
restrictions provided in the relevant bond documents, and general principles. In the case 
of the Italian bondholders, Argentina contested that numerous EU law regulations and the 
principle of good faith were violated by the conduct of the Italian banks, thus the 
Argentina-Italy BIT could not apply to those securities. 
The Tribunal started its analysis by demonstrating that bonds, as financial instruments, 
fall below the scope of Article 1(1) lit. (c) of the Argentina- Italy BIT, and, thus, securities 
can also qualify as investments ‘since they constitute an instrument representing a 
financial value held by the holder of the security entitlement in the bond issued by 
Argentina’.716 Also, by underlining that bonds and securities are closely related, as ‘they 
are part of one and the same economic operation and they make only sense together’,717 
the Tribunal established that the dispute was directly arising out of an investment.  
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and the Salini criteria 
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Starting with the first argument made by the Respondent, the Tribunal focused on whether 
the investment was ‘generated by a contribution that is in line with the spirit and aim’ of 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and disproved the Salini criteria.718 Its reasoning 
was that the application of the Salini test would keep investors outside the scope of the 
ICSID protection, and such a result would be contrary to the general aim of the ICSID 
Convention, which is to broaden the scope of protection it offers to private investors. 
Instead, the Tribunal only required a connection between the investors’ action and the 
value the parties to the BIT wished to protect.  As the Decision states ‘there is no doubt 
that Claimants made a contribution: They purchased security entitlements in the bonds 
and thus, paid a certain amount of money in exchange of the security entitlements. The 
value generated by this contribution is the right attached to the security entitlements to 
claim reimbursement from Argentina of the principal amount and the interests 
accrued’.719 Though this explanation was not actually based on Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention,720 it led to the conclusion that the securities held by the Italian bondholders 
met the criterion of the contribution. 
‘Made in the territory of the host State’ 
Regarding the second argument, namely whether the investment was ‘made in the 
territory of the host State’,721 the Tribunal followed a two-stage approach. Firstly, the 
place where the investment was considered to be made was examined, and, secondly, 
whether the existence of forum selection clauses in contractual documents concerning the 
investment could influence their decision. It was noticed that the place of the investment 
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depends on the nature of the investment and for financial instruments, the place of the 
investment depends on the legal person which benefited from it, in our case the State 
where the payment was made to. 
A quote from the decision of Fedax v Venezuela722 was employed by the Tribunal, that 
being that ‘‘[i]t is a standard feature of many international financial transactions that the 
funds involved are not physically transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but put at 
its disposal elsewhere’, in order to support their reasoning.723 
Furthermore, the Tribunal examined the ultimate usage of the funds in order to support 
that the investment was made in Argentina. The Government of Argentina alleged that 
the payment was made by the bondholders to the Italian banks, which had previously 
purchased the bonds, thus no money was transferred from the investors to the State. 
However, the Tribunal decided that the banks advanced the payment made by the 
investors and the money ‘was used by Argentina to manage its finances, and as such must 
be considered to have contributed to Argentina’s economic development and thus to have 
been made in Argentina’.724 
The Respondent brought the argument that forum selection clauses were included in the 
bond contracts in favour of the courts of New York and Switzerland which indicated that 
the bonds were located outside of Argentina. The Tribunal disagreed with this argument, 
supporting that, even if it was accepted that the forum selection clause reflects the place 
of contract performance, such a finding could not affect the place where the investment 
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was made, as the rights and obligations that arise out of the BIT and the ICSID 
Convention have an ‘independent basis’ from contractual rights and obligations.725  
Compliance with Argentinian, Italian and European law 
After concluding that the investments were made in Argentina, the third argument 
brought by the Respondent was considered. The allegation made was that the investments 
were not in conformity with Italian law, local regulations and the general principle of 
good faith and the Tribunal explained that their Decision should only be limited to the 
definition of ‘investment’, and all the remaining questions had to be answered in a later 
award on the merits of the dispute. It therefore held that the investments should have been 
made in compliance with the laws and regulations of Argentina, as required by Article 
1(1) of the Argentina – Italy BIT, and that was not challenged by the Respondent. Thus, 
the third objection was easily refuted.  
State’s consent to arbitration 
The second major subject to be dealt with by the Tribunal was the State consent to 
arbitration over sovereign debt restructuring. Argentina alleged that it never consented on 
an ICSID dispute that deal with its sovereign debt restructuring, which was also a mass 
claim.  
As regards the admission of a mass claim, the reasoning given by the Tribunal had policy 
and teleological character, centered on the scope of the BIT and ICSID Convention in 
general. At first, the decision focused on the raison d’être of collective claims, despite 
the lack of a consistent position of national legal orders over this matter. In particular, 
some national legal systems do not accept collective claims, either only in arbitration or 
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in litigation as well. According to the Tribunal, ‘[c]ollective proceedings emerged where 
they constituted the only way to ensure an effective remedy in protection of a substantive 
right provided by contract or law; in other words, collective proceedings were seen as 
necessary, where the absence of such mechanism would de facto have resulted in 
depriving the claimants of their substantive rights due to the lack of appropriate 
mechanism.’726 Turning to the scope of the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal supported 
that the particular claim was collective due to the type of the specific investment, namely 
the bonds issued by a State, and that the ICSID Convention’s scope was to promote and 
protect foreign investments, the notion of which is partially dependent on the discretion 
of States when drafting their BITs. Since the BIT’s protection encompasses bonds and, 
in that case, the protection of that investment cover a huge number of investors, it seemed 
unnecessary and contrary to the scope and nature of the ICSID Convention to require a 
supplementary consent to refer to arbitration a collective claim, additionally to the general 
consent to ICSID arbitration. If the lack of any specific provision on the admissibility of 
collective claims in ICSID arbitration under the Convention would be treated as a 
negation, the purpose of BITs and the ICSID Convention would be adversely affected. 
The decision suggested that the most appropriate interpretation of this fact was the one of 
a simple lacuna that should be filled by the Tribunal through its regulating power on all 
procedural aspects that are not explicitly governed by the Convention or Arbitration 
Rules.727  
As the Tribunal stated, ‘however, it is understood that adaptations made to the standard 
procedure must be done in consideration of the general principle of due process and must 
seek a balance between procedural rights and interests of each party.’728 In the majority’s 
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view, declaring the particular claims inadmissible would constitute a clear denial of 
justice, since the kind of their investment is covered by the relevant BIT and their claims 
are either identical or, at least, adequately homogeneous. 
As regards the absence of consent, the Respondent argued, firstly, that if sovereign debt 
restructuring disputes would have been decided by ICSID tribunals the whole efforts 
made by the country would be undermined, and, secondly, that the forum selection 
clauses included in the bond contracts demonstrated that the State had never consented to 
ICSID arbitration. At the beginning, the Tribunal clarified that, according to Article 25(4) 
of the ICSID Convention, States are allowed to apprise the Centre of categories of 
disputes which it would not accept to submit to its jurisdiction. It also underlined that the 
State of Argentina had not taken advantage of that option. The Decision then reiterated 
that the investment was protected under the Argentina-Italy BIT and found ‘no reason to 
exempt foreign debt restructuring situations from the scope of application of the BIT’.729 
Considering the inclusion of the forum selection clauses in the bond contracts, the 
Tribunal based its analysis on the distinction between contract claims and treaty claims. 
While for the former they constituted a vital element, they had no effect on the latter. 
Provided the Tribunal was dealing exclusively with treaty claims, and its jurisdiction 
relied only on them, the existence of forum selection clauses could not obstruct the 
undertaking of its jurisdiction. Therefore, they reached the conclusion that they were 
‘irrelevant for the assessment of the existence and/or validity of Argentina’s consent to 
ICSID arbitration’.730 Consequently, the majority affirmed that the ICSID Tribunal had 
the necessary jurisdiction over the claims brought by the Italian bondholders, members 
of TFA, under the Argentina-Italy BIT and the ICSID Convention. 
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3. Abaclat v. Argentina: Dissenting Opinion 
Arbitrator Georges Abi-Saab, appointed by the Respondent, disagreed with the majority 
and explained the reasons that made him depart from the majority in his Dissenting 
Opinion. His reasoning contained grounds such as the requirement of previous 
consultations, the need to litigate to national courts for eighteen months before resorting 
to arbitration, and the lack of consent from Argentina to ICSID Arbitration for collective 
mass claims. However, the most remarkable issue was the one of the Centre’s jurisdiction 
over a sovereign debt restructuring case. The arguments in the Dissenting Opinion were 
in sharp contrast with the reasoning deployed by the majority.  
Economic and political effects of the result 
At first, Professor Abi-Saab declared that it was the first time that an ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal was called to hear a dispute involving a sovereign debt, instead of concerning a 
project or an economic operation or enterprise in the host State, thus he expressed his 
worries about the economic and political effects of that case’s result. He also expanded 
on the distinction between the notion of investment in the financial and in the ICSID 
context. The financial meaning of ‘investment’ encompasses the ‘acquisition of any kind 
of assets such as deposit accounts, debt and equity securities, credit default swaps and 
derivatives’.731 On the other hand, the ICSID Convention covers a rather restricted area, 
pursuant to what the Contracting Parties contemplate, thus this ‘term has a hard-core that 
cannot be waived even by agreement of States parties to a BIT’.732 He also referred to the 
background of the ICSID Convention, and particular to the framework of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The type of investment Contracting Parties 
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envisaged to protect through international arbitration was the one which contributed to 
the economic development of the host State, ‘i.e., to the expansion of its productive 
capacity, a contribution that presupposes a commitment to this task not only of economic 
resources, but also in terms of duration in time and the taking of risk, with the expectation 
of reaping profits and/or revenue in return’.733 He also made a distinction between foreign 
direct investments, for which he also described the ‘ideal type’ to be protected by ICSID, 
and portfolio investments, which should be considered on a case-by-case basis.734  
Legal remoteness 
The Dissenting Opinion agreed with the majority in recognizing that security entitlements 
were included on the definition of financial instruments found in Article 1(1) of the 
Argentina – Italy BIT. However, Professor Abi-Saab insisted on the existence of legal 
remoteness between Argentina and the bonds it issued and securities and their Italian 
holders. He disagreed that securities and bonds ‘are part of one and the same economic 
operation’,735 and he focused on the distinction between primary and secondary markets. 
On primary markets, the State and the banks which pay for the bonds, on behalf of the 
purchasers, should be in direct contact. On secondary markets, banks sell securities to 
retail investors, and money is not transferred to the host government, which remains 
outside of the whole transaction. As a result, those securities could not constitute 
investments protected in Argentina, on the ground of legal remoteness.  Moreover, it was 
supported that both the Argentina-Italy BIT and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
required a legal and material connection between the investment and the host State. Such 
connection was absent in the case of the securities in question. From the legal point of 
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view, it was argued that all bond-related documents indicated that the place of the 
securities was outside of Argentina, including the forum selection clauses, the choice of 
a foreign applicable law, the place and the currency of payment and the residence of the 
intermediaries. He also replied to the distinction made between contract claims and treaty 
claims by the majority, by arguing that treaty claims are founded on a right which have 
arisen out of a contract. In those cases, it is the contract which ‘governs [the right’s] legal 
existence and the modalities of this existence, including [its] location’.736 
Material connection between the investment and the host State 
From the material point of view, Professor Abi-Saab developed a strong line of reasoning 
on which he rebutted the assertions made by the majority. Initially, ‘it stated that whilst 
the vehicles utilized by investors corresponded to those listed by Article 1(1) lit. (c) of 
the Argentina-Italy BIT, the ‘negotium’ registered by such an act still had to comply with 
the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which it failed to do’. 737 
Furthermore, the introductory text of Article 1(1) of the BIT established the condition that 
the investment be made by the subject ‘of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other [Party]’. Such a condition was claimed to be met only when the investment deals 
with a specific project, operation or enterprise in the territory of the host State, and it 
could not be overdrawn by the majority’s reasoning. Investments should be treated as a 
single unit for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, and no distinctions between them 
based on their financial or other nature, should be allowed. Professor Abi-Saab went 
further and distinguished Fedax from Abaclat and criticised Fedax on its own merits.738 
Finally, the availability of the funds to State of Argentina did not render the funds a 
                                                                
736 Abaclat Dissenting, paragraph 84 
737 G. Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration 
and the Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 4, 315, at 330 
738 Ibid., paragraph 105 
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contribution to the development of the country, neither imply that they have been located 
in Argentina.  
The Dissenting Opinion concluded that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction Tribunal, 
since both the ICSID Convention and the Argentina-Italy BIT entailed the investment to 
be made in the territory of the host State. As far as such a territorial connection was argued 
to be absent, the result was that no any protected investment existed on which jurisdiction 
could be grounded. Finally, Professor Abi-Saab made a powerful statement on the general 
matter of giving jurisdiction to ICSID tribunals to deal with disputes concerning 
sovereign debt restructurings: 
‘in view of the actual profound structural crisis of the international financial system; the 
absence of agreed international procedures regulating State bankruptcy; and the intense 
international discussions and efforts to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process, 
the present case raises, an international public policy issue about the workability of future 
sovereign debt restructuring, should ICSID tribunals intervene in sovereign debt disputes. 
It suffices to ponder the potential disrupting effect of different ad hoc tribunals following 
separate ways or deciding at cross purposes with the desperate international efforts to 
reconstruct a semblance of a coherent international financial architecture. Such decisions 
can also potentially unravel patiently negotiated settlements (through the effect of the 
most favoured creditor clause inserted in most settlements) […].’739 
Despite the Dissenting Opinion given by Professor Abi-Saab,740  the majority of the 
Tribunal asserted its jurisdiction over the mass claims brought by the Italian bondholder 
that were members of TFA.   
                                                                
739 Abaclat Dissenting, paragraph 271 
740 He resigned from the Tribunal shortly after, on 1 November 2011, to be substituted by Dr Santiago 
Torres Bernárdez 
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4. Implications of the Decision 
As an initial implication, the decision in Abaclat is considered landmark as it signals the 
availability of ICSID arbitration to holders of security entitlements that have been 
negatively affected by a sovereign debt restructuring. Such a possibility could be 
characterised both as salutary for foreign investors and as a menace to States in financial 
difficulties, such as the Eurozone countries.741 The immense significance of Abaclat does 
not depend on whether compensation was finally payable or not, but on the fact that it 
recognised that financial investment should enjoy the protection afforded by BITs. 
Indeed, since, probably, most BITs define ‘investment’ as ‘any kind of asset’, they give 
the opportunity to tribunals to encompass on the notion of financial investments. The 
jurisdiction of arbitral Tribunals over a claim against sovereign debt restructuring relies 
upon various matters, such as whether an investment is found to be made, whether consent 
is given by the relevant State to arbitration and whether an investment agreement provides 
for arbitration in such a dispute. Regarding jurisdiction, the consent of the State is 
governed by the investment agreement in the relevant BIT, whose provisions on 
‘definitions’ are crucial. Had the agreement expressly included bonds and other debt 
instruments as covered investments, then the sovereign party would have consented to 
jurisdiction for those claims. Similarly, any limitation within the BIT to those claims 
constitutes a limitation on consent. 
The introduction of international arbitration as a new forum for disputes arising out of 
sovereign debt restructurings demonstrates ‘a neglected field in the European Union 
countries’ reaction to the sovereign debt crisis’.742 The reason for this is that, within the 
                                                                
741 G. Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration 
and the Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 315, at 331 
742 Ibid. 
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Eurozone, various legal and political measures were taken in order to achieve and secure 
financial stability, but the matter of the resolution of disputes arising out of those 
measures was never touched upon.  If ‘the crisis showed that it was possible to have a 
sovereign debt crisis in a European Member State’,743 the Abaclat case revealed the 
availability of an international fora. It is noteworthy that shortly after the publication of 
the Abaclat Award, many law firms were already advising bondholders in Greece and 
other Eurozone countries on how to get advantage of the relevant BITs and ICSID.744 
As a matter of fact, those Eurozone countries that were heavily affected by the financial 
crisis, namely Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, have signed a significant number 
of BITs, both intra-EU and extra-EU. All these BITs can constitute the basis that grants 
jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals to hear disputes arising out of the financial crisis and the 
measures adopted as a response to it, as they all provide for arbitration as the resolution 
method for disputes between investors and the host State. It could be noticed here that 
none of the intra-EU BITs of the abovementioned Eurozone countries explicitly exclude 
sovereign debt restructuring disputes or financial investments from their coverage, as they 
just use the general definition of ‘every kind of asset invested by an investor’ and a non-
exhaustive list of examples.745 On the other hand, it has been argued that sovereign bonds 
and other financial instruments only constitute ordinary commercial transactions, thus 
they cannot enjoy the protection offered by investment arbitration.746 However, such an 
argument ignores the political and legal aspects of the particular situation.  
                                                                
743 D. Zandstra ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Evolving Resolution’ (2011), 6 Capital 
Markets ;aw Journal, 285, at 287 
744 G. Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration 
and the Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 315, at 332 
745 D. Strik, ‘Investment Protection of Sovereign Debt and Its Implications on the Future of Investment 
Law in the EU’ (2012) 29 Journal of International Arbitration, 183, at 185-187  
746 M. Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration’ (2007) 101 The 
American Journal of International Law, 711, at 722 
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The regime of international arbitration lacks the feature of precedent, which means that 
arbitrators are not bound to follow previous awards, even in cases with very similar facts, 
and this is the reason why court decisions and arbitral awards do not have the same legal 
value though they are both enforceable and binding on the parties involved. Thus, it is 
only expected that the ongoing arbitration cases on the financial cases will use the 
reasoning of Abaclat, but no one can ensure that this will happen. In any case, even if the 
approach of Abaclat Decision is not followed by other ICSID tribunals, and they find 
similar claims inadmissible due to the lack of an investment within the meaning of Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention, this does not exclude the availability of other international 
arbitral tribunals. For example, most BITs signed by the aforementioned EU countries 
provide for the option to resort to other forms of arbitration, for instance ad hoc tribunals 
governed by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.747 Such provisions that allow for other forms 
of arbitration avoid the obstacle of interpreting the notion of investment based on the 
ICSID Convention and would no longer constitute a threshold for holders of financial 
instruments ‘seeking redress under these BITs’.748 A serious negative further implication 
of Abaclat should also be stressed. The availability of international arbitration for foreign 
investors entails the risk of de facto discrimination between holders of financial 
instruments in a country. In simple terms, dissatisfied creditors in a State which has signed 
a BIT with a country in financial crisis are able to commence arbitral proceedings and 
potentially recover their money. However, those who are in similar conditions but who 
are nationals of a country which does not have a BIT in force with a country in crisis 
cannot take the advantage of this opportunity. As a consequence, the equality of treatment 
                                                                
747 G. Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration 
and the Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 315, at 333 
748 D. Strik, ‘Proposed Greek Collective Action Clauses Law May Trigger Its International Law 
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between investors cannot apply, because of the ground of nationality. Instead of treating 
all of them on the same footing and equitably dividing the capital available, a tribunal 
called upon to protect BIT rights would ‘allow any creditor to bring an action against the 
debtor state, regardless of other creditors and of the insolvency of the state, provided that 
creditor is able to locate goods to be realised’.749 The notion of discrimination is examined 
as a general concept of law here. At the EU level, as it will be analysed at a later stage, 
the European Commission has already asked for the denunciation of their intra-EU BITs, 
but they are still in force, at least officially, thus the principle of equality between EU 
citizens is still under threat. 
Furthermore, moving to the matter of the admissibility of collective claims, the Decision’s 
teleological approach has been criticised as deficient, on the ground that it suggests a 
simple reading of the agreements.750 While the Tribunal interpreted as the purpose of the 
ICSID Convention the protection and promotion of investments, the Preamble to the 
Convention contravenes this position. According to the Preamble, the ICSID Convention 
aims at setting up a neutral arbitral forum for investment disputes’ settlement between 
contracting States and private nationals of other contracting States, ‘considering the need 
for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment’.751 The scope of the BIT, as demonstrated in Article 1 of the 
Additional Protocol, cannot prevail over the scope of the ICSID Convention, through the 
teleological approach according to which the BIT’s objective is only the protection of 
foreign investments. Instead, the BIT should be interpreted employing the literal method, 
                                                                
749 M. Barra, ‘Remedies to Default on International Lending: Any Improvement From Bilateral 
Investment 
Treaties?’ (2005) 2 Transnational Dispute Management, 5  
750 A. De Luca, ‘Collective Actions in ICSID Arbitration: The Argentine Bonds case’ (2011) The Italian 
Yearbook of International Law XXI, 211, at 229 
751 Preamble, first line 
245 
 
in good faith and based on the ordinary meaning of the terms.752 In other words, it is 
beyond the powers of an arbitral tribunal to allow its own policy considerations to prevail 
over the nature of interests, based on the Contracting Parties’ agreement on the BIT, 
despite the need of ‘ensuring effective protection to a broad category of small and medium 
investors, who would otherwise be deprived of that protection’.753 Against the reasoning 
on the Abaclat Decision, the adjustments that were made so as to hear the collective 
claims within the framework of the Argentina – Italy BIT do not only affect the execution 
of the ICSID arbitral procedure, but they also restrict the Tribunal’s authority to verify 
groups regarding the eligibility of investors to treaty-based ICSID arbitration.754 Such a 
limitation on Tribunal’s control contravenes Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
regarding the examination of jurisdictional requirements. It also contravenes Article 1 of 
the Additional Protocol of the Argentina – Italy BIT, which again provides for the 
jurisdictional requirements. Thus, it is strongly argued that the admission of collective 
claims and the adjustments of the ICSID proceedings caused problems over the 
verification of the jurisdictional requirements and should have resulted to the opposite 
decision. In other words, the Tribunal should have declared the collective claims 
inadmissible on the ground that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and the BIT cannot 
be applied appropriately, therefore respecting the nature of interests agreed by the Parties 
when concluding the respective BIT.  
                                                                
752 Article 31(1), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
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The fact that a dissenting opinion was given in Abaclat, which included numerous strong 
arguments against the admissibility of the case, illustrates that there is significant 
uncertainty in the system of international investment arbitration regarding this area and a 
lack of a consistent line. Particularly, Professor’s Abi-Saab worries about the political 
and economic consequences of the result of the case, and his opinion that ICSID tribunals 
are not appropriate to intervene in sovereign debt disputes due to the high element of 
international public policy involved. The absence of a clear-cut position of arbitrators was 
perfectly expressed in the Dissenting Opinion and is to be repeated here: ‘the potential 
disrupting effect of different ad hoc tribunals following separate ways or deciding at cross 
purposes with the desperate international efforts to reconstruct a semblance of a coherent 
international financial architecture’.755  
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III. ARBITRATION CASES IN THE EUROZONE REGARDING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS756 
1. FBME v. Republic of Cyprus 
In the case of FBME v Republic of Cyprus, 757  an application was brought to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) on the basis of the BIT between Lebanon and 
Cyprus.758 
FBME Bank was established in Cyprus as a subsidiary of the Federal Bank of Lebanon 
in 1982. Thereafter, its parent company was reincorporated in Tanzania, and FBME 
Bank’s operations in Cyprus became a branch of the Tanzanian entity, a foreign credit 
institution, subject to a different special liquidation regime. An in-depth investigation by 
the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a division of the Department of Treasury, 
resulted in findings of money laundering, fraud, financing of Hezbollah, the Lebanese 
militant group linked to terrorism, and transnational organized crime against the FBME 
Bank. In response to those findings, the CBC acted under the powers conferred to it by 
the Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Laws 2013-2014 and placed the Cypriot 
branch under resolution, by taking over the management of its operations as the 
Resolution Authority and appointing a Special Administrator in July 2014. Consequently, 
all the commercial activities of the bank in Cyprus were suspended, most of its business 
units closed, and all payments were authorized by the appointed administrators. 
Inevitably, FBME’s income was drastically reduced and its withdrawals were drastically 
increased, with the bank remaining under resolution since then.  
                                                                
756 It should be underlined that most of the cases discussed in this section are ongoing, apart from the last 
two. 
757 FBME v Republic of Cyprus, ICC 
758 Treaty between the Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Cyprus on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (2003), available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/925 (accessed 12 September 2017) 
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The bank’s shareholders argue that such a decision to put the bank into resolution was in 
breach of the BIT and sought protection of their investment against expropriation. Their 
claim was found to fall within the scope of the BIT, since, according to Article 2, the 
notion of investment includes ‘every kind of asset and in particular, although not 
exclusively, the following: […] (b) a company or business enterprise or shares in and 
stocks and debentures of a company or any other form of participation in a company or 
business enterprise’. 759  Article 6 of the Cyprus - Lebanon BIT prohibits any 
nationalisation or expropriation of the assets of the citizens of either country.760   They 
claim that the measures taken by the Central Bank of Cyprus were designed for insolvent 
banks or banks which are facing serious liquidity problems. Healthy financial institutions 
such as FBME Bank cannot come under the realm of such measures. As a matter of fact, 
the shareholders’ demand reaches the €500 million compensation on the grounds that 
Cyprus failed to protect their investment and the proceedings are pending.  
2. Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A., Alexandros Bakatselos and others 
v. Republic of Cyprus 
After the decision of the CBC and the government regarding the resolution of Laiki Bank, 
Marfin Investment Group and 18 more Greek shareholders brought proceedings in 
international arbitration against the Republic of Cyprus, in Marfin v Republic of 
Cyprus,761 on the basis of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Greece and Cyprus,762 
                                                                
759 Article 2 of the Lebanon – Cyprus BIT 
760 Article 6(1): ‘Investments of investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
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against the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.’ 
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762 Treaty between the Greek Government and the Republic of Cyprus concerning the Reciprocal 
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http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3011 (accessed 12 September 2017) 
249 
 
with the prime claim being for expropriation of their investments as shareholders of Laiki 
Bank.  
Initially, the claimants attempted to approach the Republic of Cyprus in order to achieve 
an amicable settlement of the dispute, as the BIT provides for. On September 2013, after 
the deadline expired without any remarkable result, the arbitration proceedings were 
commenced and they are still pending. The damages they claim for the loss of their 
investments amount to approximately €1.1 billion, of which €824 million relates to the 
value of MIG’s investment. In particular, the applicants argue that the Republic of Cyprus 
violated three of the essential standards of investment protections, those being the 
standard of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 763  the standard of Most-Favoured Nation 
Treatment764 and the provision of compensation in case of expropriation.765  
The outcome of the particular case will be of high importance regarding the way 
arbitrators will approach the matter of the financial crisis, since it is assumed that the 
tribunal will easily accept that it has jurisdiction because the applicants are only 
shareholders and shares are included in the definition of ‘investment’ in the particular 
BIT. Therefore, it is expected that the Tribunal will easily proceed to the merits of the 
dispute and examine whether the standards of protection provided by the BIT between 
Greece and Cyprus have been violated or not.  
                                                                
763 Article 2 of the Greece-Cyprus BIT implies that MIG’s investment in Cyprus ‘shall always enjoy fair 
treatment and full protection and security’ and that ‘in no way shall be hindered by measures of an 
arbitrary or discretionary nature’ 
764 Article 3 of the Greece-Cyprus BIT implies that MIG’s investment in Cyprus shall not be treated ‘less 
favourably than that which Cyprus accords to the investment of its own investors’ 
765 Article 4 of the Greece-Cyprus BIT implies that MIG’s investment ‘is not subject to expropriation, 
nationalization or any other measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization’. 
250 
 
3. Theodoros Adamakopoulos and others v. Republic of Cyprus  
The case of Adamakopoulos v Republic of Cyprus766 deals with the bailout of the two 
biggest Cypriot banks which arose in 2013 in Cyprus and affects the claimants, who are 
Greek citizens. The claimants, who are either depositors or bondholders, suffered 
significant losses either in Laiki Bank or in the Bank of Cyprus. It must be noted that the 
number of the claimants are 954, thus the case raises, once again, the issue of the 
admissibility of collective claims. In addition, according to the law firms of the claimants, 
the compensation of the complainants is estimated to be over €120 million in order to 
recover their losses. The claim is based on the non-discrimination provision of the Cyprus 
– Greece BIT, since the claimants argued that they were discriminated when the bailout 
arose because many public institutions of Cyprus were excluded. The case is still pending.  
The interesting point of this case is the fact that some of the claimants are depositors in 
the two banks, thus once the award is given it will be seen whether bank deposits will be 
treated as investments.  
4. Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. v. Hellenic Republic  
Laiki Bank filed a claim against the Hellenic Republic,767 based on the Cyprus – Greece 
BIT. Laiki Bank’s claim focused on the standard of Fair and Equitable Treatment and the 
non-expropriation. It was argued that, while the Greek authorities rejected the two Laiki’s 
subsidiaries, namely Marfin Egnatia and Investment Bank of Greece, from the provision 
of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), the assistance was permitted to other local 
banks. It was further argued that they invested in Greek bonds, which were then haircut, 
thus the Bank suffered severe damages as a consequence of expropriation. The 
                                                                
766 Theodoros Adamakopoulos and others v. Republic of Cyprus (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/49) - pending 
767 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/16) - pending 
251 
 
Respondent made an objection for the jurisdiction of the tribunal but without success. The 
case is still pending. 
5. Bank of Cyprus Public Co. Ltd. v. Hellenic Republic  
Greece was hit with its fourth ever ICSID claim in February 2017 by the Bank of Cyprus 
following a dispute over debt instruments and banking services.768 The exact nature of 
the dispute in this case is unclear. The only information provided by ICSID is the fact that 
the claim has been brought under the Cyprus – Greece BIT. It is noteworthy that the Bank 
of Cyprus does not operate any branches in Greece, since it had closed up its banking 
operations in the country in 2013 and was in the effort to dispose of its remaining real 
estate assets there.  
6. Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic  
One Slovakian bank, Poštová banka, and one of its shareholders, Istrokapital SE, initiated 
ICSID arbitration proceedings against Greece for the Private Sector Involvement Program 
(PSI), claiming that Greek measures deprived the value of their investments in Greek 
bonds back in 2012.769 During the financial crisis that heavily hit the country, Greece was 
asked to issue five series of Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) and Poštová purchased a 
respectful amount of those GGBs, amounting to €504 million. As part of its sovereign 
debt restructuring, the IMF ordered the Greek government to replace its GGBs with new 
securities by implementing the Greek Bondholder Act. The facts of this dispute are 
similar to those of Abaclat, therefore the two cases will be examined comparatively. 
Accordingly, Poštová and Istrokapital sought compensation for Greece’s alleged 
violation of the Greece – Slovakia BITs’ provisions and Greece brought numerous 
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jurisdictional objections. The two key issues were, firstly, whether the shares of 
Istrokapital could constitute investments and, secondly, whether the purchase of bonds 
by Poštová fell within the scope of the Greece – Slovakia BIT.  
Istrokapital claimed it had made an indirect investment in Greece, through Poštová’s 
acquisition of the GGBs, and such investment was included in Article 1(c) of the Greece 
– Cyprus BIT by constituting ‘monetary claims or any other claim arising out of a contract 
and having economic value’. The Tribunal held that Istrokapital’s shares were not eligible 
to be considered as investment, based on previous case law on the matter770 and on the 
general principle of commercial law which provides that a company is an independent 
and separate legal entity, distinguished from its shareholders, having its own assets, rights 
and obligations. Istrokapital would only have had a right to bring a claim based on 
measures taken against Poštová’s assets, provided that those measures had diminished the 
Istrokapital’s shares’ value. However, Istrokapital did not rely on its shareholding to 
found its claim. In other words, Istrokapital lacked the necessary standing to pursue 
claims directly over Poštová’s assets, as Poštová bank was the single owner of the Greek 
bonds. Consequently, Istrocapital’s claim was rejected a priori for lack of jurisdiction. It 
is important to underline that the Tribunal was not absolute on its ruling, in the sense that 
it suggested that Istrokapital would satisfy the requirement of jurisdiction if it based its 
claim on its shareholding on Poštová bank. 
Poštová supported that its interests in the GGBs was included on the general definition of 
‘investment’ which was described in Article 1 of the BIT as ‘every kind of asset and in 
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particular, though not exclusively, includes…’771 The Tribunal preferred a more general 
approach which took into account the wording of the BIT’s provisions, the rules on 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, similar wordings in other 
BITs and previous case law. The Tribunal believed that ‘the list of examples provided by 
the Slovakia – Greece BIT must…be considered in the context of the treaty and be given 
some meaning together. Otherwise, if the interpretation stops by simply indicating that 
any asset is an investment, the examples will be unnecessary, redundant or useless…’772 
They further noticed that the GGBs constitute both securities and sovereign debt.773 
However, securities are subject to specific regulations and sovereign debt has some 
special features, and neither sovereign debt nor public securities or other public 
obligations are mentioned in Article 1(1) of the Slovakia – Greece BIT.774  
Then, the Tribunal examined whether the bank’s interests in GGBs could fall within either 
Article 1(b) or Article 1(c) of the BIT. The former refers to ‘shares in and stock and 
debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a company’, while the 
latter covers ‘loans, claims to money or to any performance under contract having a 
financial value’. The Arbitrators held that the wording of Article 1(b) clearly establishes 
that the bonds covered are only those bonds issued by a company and neither sovereign 
debt in general, nor bonds issued by either State party to the treaty, in particular.775 A 
comparison between loans and bonds followed, which underlined that bonds are held 
generally by anonymous groups of creditors, are subject to several alterations of their 
value and, in the particular case, are directly linked with sovereign debt.776 However, 
                                                                
771 Article 1 of the Slovakia – Greece BIT 
772 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8), 
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sovereign debt fell outside the scope of the BIT, an omission that led to the conclusion 
that bank’s BBGs could not enjoy the protection offered by the BIT.  
Finally, the Tribunal considered Article 25 of the ICSID Convention that grants 
jurisdiction to ICSID arbitral tribunals for ‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State…’ 
In the absence of a specific definition of investment in the Convention, arbitral tribunals 
established some key features that should be fulfilled in each case, including contribution 
of money, certain duration and the assumption of risk. Even when applying those criteria, 
it was found that Poštová’s possession of interests in GGBs could still not be held to 
constitute investments, thus the Tribunal could not assume jurisdiction.777 
There being no protected investment under the Slovakia-Greece BIT, the Tribunal 
declared that it lacks competence to decide the dispute. Remarkably, the Tribunal’s 
conclusion in this case comes in contrast with the Decision of Abaclat, probably because 
of the difference in the wording of the two BITs, namely the Slovakia – Greece BIT and 
the Argentina – Italy BIT. In particular, the Tribunal in Poštová and Istrokapital held that 
the language in Slovakia – Greece BIT was not as broad as the Tribunal in Abaclat 
considered as language that would comprise bonds, i.e., ‘any right of economic nature 
conferred under law or contract’. The comparison between the two cases strengthen the 
argument that there is significant uncertainty in the system of international investment 
arbitration regarding this area and a lack of a consistent line. 
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7. Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An 
Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium  
In the first ever ICSID claim brought by investors from mainland China,778 two Chinese 
insurance giants initiated arbitration proceedings against Belgium, based on the Belgium–
Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) and China BIT, which was firstly signed in 1986 
and replaced in 2009.  
In 2007, the two claimants held the majority of shares in an international banking and 
insurance group, the Fortis group, which was regulated by Belgian, Dutch and 
Luxembourg authorities. As a consequence of the global financial crisis, Fortis suffered 
serious problems with its liquidity and, as a response, the Belgian government adopted a 
series of measures that resulted in the nationalisation of the subsidiary of the group in 
Belgium. Those restructuring measures dramatically decreased the value of interest that 
the shareholders of Fortis had at that time. The failure of the measures to rescue Fortis 
group led to the sale of the Belgian subsidiary to BNP Paribas one year later. The sale of 
Fortis meant that the claimants suffered a significant loss of their investment.  
According to the original BIT between BLEU and China, signed in 1986, international 
arbitration could be an option for foreign investors only for the determination of the 
amount of compensation in case their investment has been expropriated. Other than that, 
‘all disputes’ fell into the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts. In contrast, the new 
version of the BIT, signed in 2009, includes much broader dispute settlement terms, 
which gives the investors the option to initiate ICSID arbitration proceedings against the 
host State for any type of dispute that may arise. Two months before the entry into force 
                                                                
778 Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, 
Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29) 
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of the updated BIT, the claimants sent a notice of dispute to the Belgian government based 
on the original BIT. In 2012, the claimants filed an application with ICSID citing the 2009 
BIT provision on dispute settlement and also communicated with the Belgian government 
to affirm that the notice of dispute they sent before was under the new BIT. However, the 
substance of the claim was fully based on the obligations under the 1986 BIT regarding 
expropriation and nationalisation and general principles of international law. 
Belgium raised five objections on the matter of jurisdiction, and the tribunal found in 
favour of Belgium based only on its first objection, namely ratione temporis, thus it never 
addressed the remaining four. Belgium argued that the dispute arose before the entry into 
force of the 2009 BIT, which did not have retrospective effect, and did not contain the 
obligations under the 1986 BIT and general principles of international law that the 
claimants revoke on their claims. 
After discussing previous awards of international tribunals dealing with  the principle of 
non-retroactivity in international law, the Decision underlined that the matter of non-
retroactivity was irrelevant in that case since ‘the temporal application of jurisdictional 
provisions is a question separate from the retroactivity of substantive provisions’;779 and 
‘the application of a new dispute settlement mechanism to acts which may have been 
unlawful when they were committed is not in itself the retroactive application of law’.780 
The Tribunal continued to interpret the arbitration clause of the 2009 BIT in order to 
examine whether it encompasses disputes previously notified but not submitted to a 
formal judicial or arbitral process before it entered into force. Their outcome that such 
disputes were not included to the 2009 BIT was reasoned by six arguments. The literal 
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interpretation of the arbitration clause showed that it only referred to future disputes and 
not those that had already arisen, because of the choice of words used. In particular, the 
clause states that ‘[w]hen a legal dispute arises […] either party to the disputes shall notify 
[…]’ rather than ‘has arisen’ or ‘shall have notified’.781 The Preamble of the BIT had 
nothing that could indicate the retro-activity of the arbitration provision and the Tribunal 
refused to fill this lacuna by the method of ‘creative interpretation’. Moreover, it was 
clarified that while prior investments were covered by the new BIT, the same did not 
apply for prior disputes. The claimants supported that since the 2009 BIT only stated that 
it does not apply to disputes already under judicial or arbitral process before it came into 
force impliedly meant that disputes already notified but not yet under judicial or arbitral 
process could be covered. Such an argument was rejected by the Tribunal and it was 
further explained that the new BIT could not be applicable to those ‘notified by not 
matured’ disputes just because it substituted the original BIT. Finally, the tribunal 
considered the potential consequences had the claim be allowed to proceed, and expressed 
its worries that claimants would be granted access to a significantly broader dispute 
settlement mechanism merely by the entering into force of the 2009 BIT, without having 
any express consent by the contracting parties. Despite the admission of the risk that some 
disputes, including the one before them, ‘might fall into some ‘black hole’ or ‘arbitration 
gap’ between the two BITs’,782 the Tribunal concluded that they could not justify the 
extension of the 2009 BIT scope to settle the particular dispute on any ground. 
Nevertheless, they did not exclude the possibility that the claimants could still use other 
remedies, such as commencing a new claim (either investor–state or state–state) under 
the 1986 BIT, or bringing a proceeding in the national courts of Belgium. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the position that international 
arbitration has adopted when arbitrators were asked to review the conformity of the post-
crisis measures adopted at the EU and national level with the standards afforded to the 
protection of foreign investors. The example of the Argentinian crisis and the way 
international arbitration handled it could constitute a benchmark and an indication of how 
other arbitral tribunals in the pending cases could approach the matters of financial 
instruments as investments and the financial crisis. 
It should be stressed here that any conclusion drawn at this stage783 is premature, since 
there are plenty of arbitral cases regarding the Eurozone that are still pending. A further 
limitation should be mentioned here. Most of the cases concerned in this chapter are under 
the ICSID regime, with the case of FBME v Cyprus784 being the only exception. However, 
the fact that it is not ICSID, but a different arbitral institution that manages this case does 
not seem to change the conclusions that have been drawn in this thesis, since arbitrators 
share similar philosophy and approach the issue similarly, irrespective of the institution 
they belong to. In other words, arbitrators take into account similar considerations when 
deciding cases on alleged expropriation and measures being defenced on the ground of 
necessity. For example, as seen in the Literature Review, when applying the principle of 
proportionality, most arbitrators take into account the effects of the measure on 
international commerce and the economic impact on the investment.   
Undeniably, from a procedural point of view, all arbitral tribunals have offered 
sufficiently effective protection, in the sense that the applicants’ rights of access to justice 
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and a fair trial have been respected. Thus, procedurally, both litigation and arbitration 
satisfy the principle of effective (judicial) protection. However, one of the differences 
between litigation and arbitration lies on the ground of jurisdiction. While courts refused 
jurisdiction to hear the cases that concern the financial crisis, by declaring that they fall 
outside the scope of EU law, arbitral tribunals are more likely to assume jurisdiction and 
proceed to the merits of the disputes, as happened in the case of Abaclat and as it is 
expected to happen in cases that were brought by shareholders that clearly fall under the 
scope of the relevant BIT. From this point of view, it can be argued that arbitration offers 
more effective protection than litigation, since parties are given the opportunity to present 
their arguments in the substance of their cases instead of rejecting them by denying that 
they have jurisdiction. While no legal organ within the EU legal order is available for 
them, individuals should limit their judicial protection to their national courts, and 
particularly to the district courts of their countries, which prefer to remain distant from 
any political consideration and whose rulings are given with notable delay. This is the 
reason why arbitration can operate as a worthy available forum where individuals785 can 
have their disputes being heard.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
In the two previous chapters, the approach of courts and arbitrators towards the protection 
of bank depositors has been measured based on the principle of effectiveness, not only in 
its procedural sense, but also in its substantial one. The method used was the comparative 
research, and particularly the microcomparison, since the means through which the 
different legal regimes, i.e. litigation and arbitration, resolve the same legal problem was 
compared. But, demonstrating that arbitral tribunals can offer more effective protection 
to bank depositors and other affected individuals is insufficient, if the awards rendered 
by such actions do not have a standing in the EU legal order. Now, in the last chapter 
before the Conclusion, the final research question of this thesis is answered and the 
traditional exclusion of arbitration is contrasted with the recent trends so as to develop 
arguments to support that arbitration constitutes an available avenue within the EU law 
regime. 
It should be underlined here that the discussion on this chapter does not concern 
exclusively the matter of bank depositors. Instead, the case of the financial crisis works 
as an example in order to prove that arbitration can have a general role to play in the EU 
legal order.  
Traditionally, there was a lack of interaction between EU law and international arbitration 
law. Furthermore the common commercial policy of the EU did not include investment 
law, thus EU law lacked any competence over Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 
which belonged to the exclusive external competences of Member States. However, the 
Lisbon Treaty incorporated foreign direct investment (FDI) into the exclusive 
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competences of the EU, by including it in the scope of the CCP,786 which means that the 
Union has now the authority to take external action regarding the admission and 
establishment of foreign investment and the conclusion of international investment 
agreements.    
Despite the traditional distance between EU law and arbitration, there are some recent 
trends that suggest that the EU legal order has some place available for investment 
arbitration. The two most remarkable examples are CETA787 and TTIP,788 which provide 
for an ICS that resonates with many of the features of arbitration. In particular, the dispute 
resolution mechanism negotiated in TTIP reflects the European Commission’s attempts 
to establish a ‘court’ but, at the same time, preserve the enforcement of the decisions as 
‘awards’ rendered by a ‘tribunal’.789 It should be underlined here that the discussion on 
TTIP only aims at examining the EU’s attitude towards arbitration and will not consider 
any recent development guided by the post-Trump US’ policy on the area.  
Furthermore, it is a well-established principle that any external judicial system with the 
authority to hear disputes by individuals within the Union is incompatible with EU law.790 
Compatibility with EU law was only found when those bodies’ jurisdiction does not 
                                                                
786 Article 206 TFEU 
787 EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, 29 February 2016, available at: 
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788 EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership EU’s proposal for Investment Protection and 
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http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
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involve individuals, or when the claims are brought by individuals but do not relate to the 
Union or any Member State. This conventional approach is criticised in this chapter, by 
referring to the landmark case of Eureko v Slovak Republic.791 Four arguments are then 
developed to support that arbitration can be used by bank depositors in disputes regarding 
the financial crisis without being in contrast with EU law, with the final one suggesting 
that investment tribunals could be allowed to make references to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.  
To this effect, the chapter firstly explains the traditional relationship between EU law and 
arbitration (i) and between EU law and International Investment law (ii). It then outlines 
the recent trends on arbitration in the EU (iii), namely the CETA and the TTIP, and 
proceeds with the development of some arguments supporting that arbitration does have 
a role in the EU law regime (iv). It concludes with a general overview of the matters 
discussed (v), so as to lead to the final conclusion of the thesis in which all considerations 
are to be synthesised.  
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I. EU LAW AND ARBITRATION 
‘EU law and the law of international arbitration have traditionally occupied largely 
separate worlds, as if arbitral tribunals would rarely be the fora for the resolution of EU 
law claims and as if EU law, in turn, had little concern with arbitration.’792 The absence 
of any interaction between EU law and international arbitration law is rather due to 
traditional assumptions made by EU law than vice versa.793 
In 1958 two treaties came into force, each of them pursuing its own separate policy aims. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community794 and the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards795 set the 
foundations of the EU legal regime and the international arbitration regime 
respectively.796  
‘In theory, arbitration merely offers another forum for giving effect to EU law in private 
legal relations, and to that extent serves EU law's purposes.’ 797  However, EU law 
maintains some distance from arbitration, which has been reflected in various ways. 
Firstly, for many years, EU law did not intersect with private international law, and thus 
with arbitration. 798  Secondly, arbitral tribunals have not been allowed to make 
preliminary references to the ECJ, when applying aspects of EU law.799 Finally, Brussels 
I Regulation, the leading legal instrument of EU law that governs the jurisdiction of courts 
                                                                
792 G. A. Bermann, ‘Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the Demands of International 
Arbitration’ (2011) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 1193 
793 G. A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU law and the law of International Arbitration’ (2012) 28 Arbitration 
International 397 
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795 New York Convention on The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 
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797 G. A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU law and the law of International Arbitration’ (2012) 28 Arbitration 
International 397 
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and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
excludes arbitration from its scope.800 Even its Recast Regulation of 2012 maintains the 
exclusion of arbitration.801 
Although EU law has historically regulated a wide range of areas, private international 
law did not belong to them. Constitutional and administrative law, as well as transport 
law, common commercial policy, competition law and the creation of the internal market, 
constitute the principal interests of the EU architects. Recently, environmental law802 and 
consumer protection803 have been added to the broad list of areas which are governed by 
EU law. Private international law did not belong to the sphere of EU regulation, probably 
because of the initial refusal of the Union to intervene in private legal relations. 804 
Indicatively, the EEC Treaty stated that any harmonization in the field of private 
international law would proceed outside the framework of EU law, through a wholly 
separate convention to be entered into by the Member States.805 The consequence of that 
statement was the entry of the Member States into the 1968 Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 806 
Private International law finally fell within the scope of EU law with the Treaty of 
Maastricht,807 which relegated the field to the Union’s ‘third pillar’ on justice and home 
                                                                
800 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters [2000] OJ 2 012/01, Article 2(1)(a) 
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804 For a discussion on the evolving role of Private International law in EU law see: A. Mills, ‘The 
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affairs. ‘Third pillar’ matters are conducted at the inter-governmental level, while ‘first 
pillar’ matters require qualified majority voting among the Member States in the Council, 
executive authority in the European Commission, and judicial review by the CJEU. It was 
only after the Treaty of Amsterdam,808 that private international law was recognised as a 
‘first pillar’ area for the Union, resulting in the adoption of Brussels Convention of 1968 
and the following Brussels I Regulation that is directly applicable to all Member States.  
A well-established mechanism of EU law which ensures its correct application is the 
preliminary reference. Under this mechanism, which is provided for in Article 267 TFEU, 
the highest court of each Member State can refer questions to the ECJ on the meaning 
and validity of EU law for the effective disposal of cases before them. According to 
Article 267, preliminary references are allowed to be made by any ‘court or tribunal of a 
Member State’. As the ECJ held in the Nordsee case, 809  arbitral tribunals did not 
constitute tribunals of a Member States, even when they have their seat in the territory of 
a Member State and the lex arbitri is the state’s law of arbitration. In other words, arbitral 
tribunals cannot request preliminary rulings on the interpretation or validity of EU law. 
Such a textual interpretation of the Treaty leaves arbitral tribunals unguided when they 
have to deal with a case governed by EU law. Arbitrators ‘cannot seek the kind of 
guidance on the meaning or validity of the relevant EU law norms that would ordinarily 
be available to a national court hearing the identical dispute’.810 It could be argued that 
this exclusion of arbitral tribunals from preliminary references affects the effectiveness 
of EU law, since the relevant provisions of EU law might be misunderstood and applied 
wrongfully by the arbitrators. Notwithstanding the constant revisions of European 
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legislation, arbitral tribunals remained excluded from bringing preliminary references to 
the CJEU. ‘Whether driven by an assumption that EU law issues will seldom arise in 
arbitration, by a desire not to overburden the Court, by a textual interpretation of the treaty 
language ‘courts or tribunals of member states,’ or by some other purpose,’ this exclusion 
keeps EU law distant from international arbitration.811 
The 1968 Brussels Convention constituted a legal instrument outside the EU legal regime 
and expressly excluded arbitration from its scope. According to it, national courts did not 
have jurisdiction to hear arbitration cases and give judgments on them.812 Moreover, 
matters of judicial jurisdiction and the judicial recognition and enforcement of prior 
judgments were excluded, when the claim or judgment in question related to arbitration, 
either because of the existence of an arbitration agreement or of an arbitral award on the 
same dispute. According to the Jenard Report, the Brussels Convention did not cover 
claims for the enforcement of arbitration agreements or the annulment of awards, 
applications for interim relief in support of arbitration, and claims to enforce foreign 
arbitral awards.813 The Schlosser Report gave some further specific examples of court 
proceedings which were not covered by the Convention, including the appointment or 
dismissal of arbitrators, the determination of the place of arbitration and the extension of 
the time limit for giving the award.814  The reason for that exclusion lies in the belief that 
since the New York Convention had already addressed all the arbitration proceedings, 
there was no need to intervene on that well-established regime.  
                                                                
811 G. A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU law and the law of International Arbitration’ (2012) 28 Arbitration 
International 397 
812 Brussels Convention, Article 1(4) 
813 The Jenard Report OJ 1979, C 59, 1  
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In 2000 the Convention became a secondary legal instrument of EU law in the form of 
the Brussels I Regulation and, from 2012, the Recast Brussels I applies. Both versions of 
the Regulation exclude arbitration. The statement ‘This Regulation shall not apply to 
arbitration’ leaves unclear what is exactly excluded by the Regulation. It is doubted 
whether only arbitral proceedings are excluded or whether court proceedings relating to 
arbitration are also covered by that exclusion.815  
In addition to the abovementioned Reports which tried to delineate the extent of the 
exclusion, the case law of the Brussels Convention could be examined.  
The first case in which the ECJ had to decide on a matter relating to the interface between 
arbitration and litigation was the case of Marc Rich & Co. AG v Societá Impianti PA,816 
which concerned a contract for the sale of crude oil, in which the buyer was a Swiss 
company (Marc Rich) and the seller an Italian company (Impianti). When the defendant 
denied the validity of the arbitration clause and commenced proceedings before an Italian 
court, the claimant made an application for the English High Court to appoint an arbitrator 
on Impianti’s behalf. The English Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ, which held that the proceedings before the English courts did not fall within the 
scope of the Brussels Convention, because they were ancillary to arbitration proceedings. 
The fact that the validity of the arbitration agreement was contested did not alter the 
Court’s decision.  The ECJ found that the contracting parties to the Brussels Convention 
‘intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before 
national courts’.817 As it was stated: ‘In order to determine whether a dispute falls within 
the scope of the Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the 
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dispute. If, by virtue of its subject-matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a 
dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue 
which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue 
may be, justify application of the Convention.’818 That ruling of the ECJ demonstrated 
the interpretations of the Jenard and Schlosser Reports and confirmed that the Brussels 
Convention excluded from its scope any court proceedings ancillary to arbitration 
proceedings.    
In the Van Uden case819 the ECJ was asked to rule on the question of applicability of the 
Brussels Convention to the provisional measures applied for by a party to arbitration. 
Asset-freezing orders, even if granted in support of arbitration proceedings, differ from 
the other court proceedings ancillary to arbitration, such as the appointment of arbitrators. 
While the latter are inherent part of the arbitration process, the former could be equally 
used to support court proceedings. Therefore, preliminary measures are independent from 
the law of arbitration. In this case the reference to the ECJ concerned an interim-payment 
order, granted as a provisional measure in aid of arbitration. At first, the ECJ 
demonstrated that no any courts of any Member State should have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the case, since a valid arbitration agreement exists. It then held that 
‘provisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitration proceedings as they are 
ordered in parallel as measures of support’.820 If the subject matter of the substantive 
claim, in that case performance of the contract as such, is covered by the Brussels 
Convention, then the Convention applies to provisional measures granted in aid of it, 
irrespective of whether the claim is subject to arbitration.       
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The prohibition of anti-suit injunctions under the Brussels Convention creates the 
question whether anti-suit injunctions are also prohibited regarding arbitration, as far as 
arbitration is also explicitly excluded from the scope of the Convention. Generally, a court 
of a Member State, even if it has jurisdiction, cannot forbid parties from bringing a claim 
based on the same facts to a court of another Member State.  The ECJ first considered the 
place, if any, of anti-suit injunctions on the EU legal order in the Turner v Grovit,821 a 
case which did not involve arbitration. The Court clearly prohibited parties from 
enforcing by anti-suit injunction a contractual clause which provided that parties would 
submit their disputes only to the courts of a particular Member State. According to the 
judgment, ‘a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from 
commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter 
court’s jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from 
bringing such an action must be seen as constituting interference with the jurisdiction of 
the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of the Convention.’822 
Anti-suit injunctions have been found incompatible with Brussels I Regulation, even if 
they relate to arbitration, which is excluded from the scope of the Regulation. The ECJ 
was faced with the relationship between arbitration and anti-suit injunctions in the Allianz 
SpA v West Tankers Inc.823 The case concerned a claim in Italy, despite the existence of 
an arbitration agreement in London, and a second claim in London seeking the 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the suspension of the court proceedings in 
Italy. The House of Lords, in a preliminary reference to the ECJ, raised the question 
whether anti-suit injunctions are prohibited even when they are granted because the 
foreign proceedings were in conflict with an arbitration agreement. In other words, the 
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House of Lords asked whether the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of Brussels I 
also meant the isolation of anti-suit injunctions from the rule laid down in Turner v Grovit, 
since such an injunction would be granted in proceedings which were not regulated by 
the Regulation.  Initially, the ECJ demonstrated that any court actions regarding the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards are excluded from Brussels I 
scope of application. However, it held that if the subject matter of the dispute, in that case 
a claim for contract damages, fall within the scope of the Regulation, then any matter 
relating to the arbitration agreement is also covered by it.  
In the Court’s words, ‘if, because of the subject-matter of the dispute, that is, the nature 
of the rights to be protected in proceedings, such as a claim for damages, those 
proceedings come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, a preliminary issue 
concerning the applicability of an arbitration agreement, including in particular its 
validity, also comes within its scope of application. .. It follows … that an anti-suit 
injunction, such as that in the main proceedings, is contrary to the general principle which 
emerges from the case-law of the Court on the Brussels Convention, that every court 
seized itself determines, under the rules applicable to it, whether it has jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute before it.’824  
The rule derived from that judgment is that the decisive factor for the prohibition of anti-
suit injunctions in every case is not whether the given proceedings fall within the scope 
of Brussels I, but whether the proceedings ‘against which the injunction is directed fall 
within its scope’.825 Therefore, the Marc Rich principle on the subject-matter of the 
proceedings is confirmed and applied in each case. The rationale behind this decision is 
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to ensure the application of Brussels I to all the aspect of court proceedings in civil and 
commercial matters. Court proceedings ancillary to arbitration are excluded from its 
scope since they are more closely connected with arbitration than with the subject-matter 
of the Regulation. On the other hand, an anti-suit injunction, even if it prevents 
interferences with arbitration, affects court proceedings significantly, as they can stop 
them, before reaching a final decision. Consequently, prohibiting anti-suit injunctions 
whenever court proceedings are governed by Brussels I, could be reasonable.826   
The Recast Brussels I Regulation, in force from January 2015, 827  operated as an 
opportunity for negotiations regarding the role of arbitration in the EU legal order. 
Various proposals were made, including the abolition of the arbitration exclusion and the 
total exclusion of arbitration. Abrogating the exclusion of arbitration would include 
arbitration within the sphere of governance of the Regulation and, as a consequence, 
within the competences of EU law.828 In contrast, completely excluding arbitration would 
exclude a great number of cases in which arbitration might have been incidentally 
involved, from the Regulation scope and it would send them back to national law of the 
Member States, as if no any Convention would have bound them. Both proposals were 
unacceptable by many Member States.829  
In an effort to find ‘the golden section’, the Commission supported the maintenance of 
the exclusion of arbitration, but also proposed that once proceedings had started in an 
arbitral tribunal or in a court in a Member State, which was the seat of the arbitration, ‘the 
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9-11 
829 Draft Report of MEP Zwifka of 28 June 2011, 2010/0383 (COD) 
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courts of another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement shall stay proceedings’. 830 
In other words, a court in a Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of 
an arbitration agreement should stay the proceedings before it, once the arbitral tribunal 
or the courts of the Member State where the seat of the arbitration is located have been 
seized and the challenge is based on the arbitration agreement. If the court/ tribunal first 
seised confirmed the validity of the arbitration agreement, the court whose jurisdiction 
was contested had to decline jurisdiction. In case the arbitration agreement was declared 
invalid by the court/ tribunal first seised, the court could continue with the case. 
It could be argued that such a proposal seems like the lis pendens rule and the anti-suit 
injunctions. As the Commission clarified, ‘this modification will enhance the 
effectiveness of arbitration agreements in Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration 
proceedings, and eliminate the incentive for abusive litigation tactics’.831  
That proposal received criticism based on the arguments that the Brussels I Regulation 
should not refer to the seat of arbitration in order to avoid further complexity, and that the 
New York Convention works autonomously and effectively for years.832 As a result, the 
Recast Brussels I maintains the exclusion of arbitration and includes Article 73(2) and 
Recital 12 which refer to arbitration.  
Article 73(2) states that the Regulation does not affect the application of the New York 
Convention. Although Article 71(1) of the Brussels I refer to ‘conventions to which the 
Member States are parties and which, in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction 
                                                                
830 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 14 Dec. 2010, 
COM (2010) 748 final/2, Article 29(4) 
831 Ibid., Article 9 
832 P. A. Nielsen, ‘The New Brussels I Regulation’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 503 
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or the recognition or enforcement of judgments’, it is the first time now that there is a 
specific reference to the New York Convention and this can be interpreted as a 
recognition of the particular importance of the subject of the relationship of EU law with 
arbitration.  
Recital 12 consists of four paragraphs which concern the exclusion of arbitration 
regarding court jurisdiction, arbitration proceedings and the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards.   
The first paragraph repeats that arbitration is outside the scope of the Recast Regulation. 
As it is further stated: ‘Nothing in this Regulation should prevent the courts of a Member 
State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered 
into an arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or 
dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in accordance with their national 
law.’833 In other words, each Member State can maintain its national law governing the 
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements.   
The following paragraph provides that decisions of a national court regarding the validity 
of the arbitration agreement are not governed by the rules of the Recast Brussels I on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. That means that a decision made in 
the court of one Member State which upholds or annuls an arbitration agreement, is not 
necessary to be recognised and enforced by the courts of any other Member State. It could 
                                                                
833 Recital 12(1) 
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also be argued that ‘although this provision does not expressly apply to rulings on the 
applicability of an arbitration agreement, there is little doubt that this too is covered’.834  
Paragraph three explains that in cases a national court, which has jurisdiction under the 
Regulation, has set aside an arbitration agreement, this does not preclude the recognition 
and enforcement of the judgment on the substance, as it is provided in the Regulation. 
Therefore, it is clear that judgments on the substance are covered by the Regulation rules 
on recognition and enforcement, even if the court has set aside an arbitration agreement 
in order to determine its jurisdiction. Such a provision does not affect the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award according to the rules of the New York Convention, and 
thus it does not affect the dilemma whether a court judgment or an arbitral award should 
take precedence. ‘This question is left to national law, so Member States are free to give 
priority to the award or the judgment, as they deem appropriate.’835 
Finally, Recital 12 clarifies that the Regulation does not apply ‘to any action or ancillary 
proceedings relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers 
of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure…. nor to any action or judgment 
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award’.836 This paragraph confirms the Jenard and Schlosser Reports, as well as the 
rulings of March Rich and Van Uden cases.  
In sum, both the case law of the CJEU and the Union legislation exclude arbitration from 
the scope of EU law and declare the lack of competence of national courts of the Member 
States and the EU courts to decide matters that concern arbitration proceedings.   
                                                                
834 T. C. Hartley, ‘The Brussels I Regulation and arbitration’ (2014) 63 International and Comparative 
Law Quaterly, 843, at 858 
835 P. A. Nielsen, ‘The New Brussels I Regulation’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 503, at 511 
836 Recital 12(3) 
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II. EU LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Traditionally, the common commercial policy of the EU did not include investment law, 
thus the Union could not legislate or enter into international agreements within this 
field.837 Consequently, EU law lacked any competence over Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), for which, each Member State had exclusive external competence. The initial 
little interest for the relationship between the two regimes can be attributed to the 
traditional absence of any substantial connection between BITs and EU law. Mostly, BITs 
were signed between Member States, exercising their external competence, and third 
countries, thus the internal law of the Union was not apparently affected.838  
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU law 
The initial provisions of the EU legislation did not expressly refer to investment matters 
when enumerating the express competences of the Commission, though it has always 
been doubted whether investment and trade are separate and not interrelated concepts. 
While Article 133 TEU provided for ‘uniformity in measures of liberalisation’ but only 
referred to ‘tariff and trade agreements’,839 the CJEU interpreted those terms broadly and 
held that the CCP competences are non-exhaustive, underlining that the ultimate purpose 
should be the effective protection of the EC commercial interests.840 That approach by 
the CJEU meant that some of the aspects of foreign investment could be covered by the 
                                                                
837 Article 51 TFEU that establish the common commercial policy as an exclusive competence of the 
Union; G. A. Berman et al., Cases and Materials on European Union Law (3rd edn, American Casebook 
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838 T. Eilmansberger, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law 
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839 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union [2001] OJ 1 80/1, Article 133(1) 
840 Opinion of 11 November 1975, pursuant to Article 228 (1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion 1/75, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:145 and Opinion of 4 October 1979, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 
Opinion 1/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:224 
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CCP, particularly those aspects in the trade of services which are analogous to trade in 
goods.841  
Some years later, Opinion 2/92 and the Treaty of Amsterdam reassured this position. The 
former demonstrated that the decision whether or not to assign foreign investors national 
treatment does not fall within the scope of the CCP,842 while the latter reinforced Opinion 
1/94, but at the same time did not rule out a future addition of intellectual property rights 
into the CCP.843 
On 1 December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty inserted the foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
the exclusive competences of the EU, by including it in the scope of the CCP. 844  
Remarkably, the Commission described FDI as ‘a new frontier for the common 
commercial policy’.845 
In that way, the Union has now the power to take external action in most aspects of foreign 
investment regulation; though, this power is not absolute. The admission and 
establishment of foreign investment forms part of the Union’s competence, since they are 
directly related with the principles of uniformity and liberalisation, which are promoted 
by the CCP. Moreover, the Union is empowered to substitute Member States in the 
conclusion of international investment agreements. The implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty was followed by a debate between the EU Commission and the Member States on 
                                                                
841 Opinion of 15 November 1994, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements 
concerning services and the protection of intellectual property, Opinion 1/94, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para 
41‐47 
842 Opinion of 24 March 1995, Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in 
the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, Opinion 2/92, ECLI:EU:C:1995:83 
843 P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU law: text, cases, and materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 
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844 Article 206 TFEU 
845 Commission Communication ‘Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy’ of 
July 7, 2010, COM (2010) 343 final, p. 7 
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the proper separation of their respective powers in the field of investment.846 Both sides 
made remarkable efforts to negotiate on their treaty-making powers regarding 
International Investment Agreements with third countries that may hinder them from 
focusing on the design of the new investment policy of the EU. 
The addition of FDI within the scope of the CCP illustrated the beginning of the collective 
effort, at a Union level, to reconsider the borderline of competences between the Union 
and Member States, ‘by simplifying the complex system of rules, solidifying Union 
competence with regard to certain aspects of foreign investment regulation and offering 
a framework for establishing a common foreign investment policy’.847  
Likewise most powers of the Union in this area, the ambit of the new Union competence 
on FDI is undefined. However, the exclusive nature of this competence is undisputable. 
In 2012, a new EU Regulation was adopted, known as ‘grandfathering regulation’, 
considering BITs between Member States and third countries. 848  The exclusive 
competence of the Union over investment matters resulted in the loss of some powers of 
Member States, thus existing BITs of Member States were rendered ‘unconstitutional’ 
under EU law. Though their validity under international law remained unaffected, under 
EU law, only the Union can enter into such treaties with third countries and be a 
contracting party. This Regulation allows Member States to enter into new BITs with 
third states only after the authorization of the European Commission. 849  However, 
informally, the Commission had already warned Member States that it would give its 
                                                                
846 A. Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other 
Investment Agreements’ (2014) 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 111, at 119 
847 A. Dimopoulos, ‘The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between 
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consent to their pending negotiation and implementation of BITs with third countries, 
even before the adoption of the ‘grandfathering regulation’.850 
The CJEU examined the compatibility of BITs between Member States and third 
countries with EU law and proved that Article 351(2) TFEU can be ‘a rather sharp tool’851 
by holding that Austria’s,852 Sweden’s853 and Finland’s854 BITs with third states were 
inconsistent with Council measures restricting the free movement of capital and payments 
as protected by the TFEU, by providing clauses that guarantee investors the free transfer 
of payments with an investment. Though the Commission could not demonstrate its 
argument on real facts, since the Council had never taken such measures, the mere 
potential risk of conflict between the BITs’ and EU law rules’ obligations was ruled to be 
capable of impeding the practical effectiveness of EU law.  ‘By basing itself on the mere 
existence of such provisions, the CJEU embraced a broad understanding of 
incompatibility.’855 The effects of these decisions did not only concern the three Member 
States involved, but all the Member States that were bound by such agreements with third 
countries. Austria, Sweden and Finland have to amend their BITs so as to comply with 
the EU law provisions, bearing the risk that their agreements should be terminated, had 
the third states refuse the amendments. The broader implications of these rulings are that 
all Member States should examine the compatibility of their BITs with EU law to avoid 
                                                                
850 A. Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other 
Investment Agreements’ (2014) 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 111, at 120 
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future infringement proceedings, since the incompatibilities identified by the CJEU are 
‘not limited to the Member State which is the defendant in the present case’.856  
2. Investment Treaty Arbitration and EU law 
Investment treaty arbitration is more and more affiliated with EU law, to such an extent 
that it was commented that ‘courts and arbitration tribunals throughout the EU interpret 
and apply EU law daily’.857 However, it remains unclarified whether and how EU law 
can be employed in investment treaty arbitration. Generally, the basis in investment treaty 
arbitration is the relevant BIT, supported by principles of public international law and the 
applicable domestic law, which is regulated by the applicable arbitration rules that ensure 
the respect of party autonomy.858 Moreover, in those proceedings involved are the law of 
the host State and the lex arbitri, i.e. the law of the seat of arbitration.  Thus, EU law 
could be involved either as part of public international law or the applicable domestic 
law; or, in some cases, simply as a matter of fact.  
The involvement of EU law on investment treaty arbitration raises the important question 
regarding its interpretation, since it falls below the exclusive powers of the CJEU. 
Notwithstanding the fact that arbitral tribunals’ mandate is to apply the provisions of 
BITs, in some cases it is unavoidable that they will also apply EU law. Vice versa, 
sometimes the CJEU applies provisions of BITs, such as in the case of European 
Commission v Slovak Republic, where the Court examined whether there was an 
‘investment’ and decided that indirect expropriation took place, based on the provisions 
of the relevant BIT.859 In principle, when a court or tribunal applies a certain legal regime, 
                                                                
856 Judgment of 3 March 2009, Commission v Austria, C-205/06, ECLI:EU:C:2009:118, paragraph 43; 
Judgment of 3 March 2009, Commission v Sweden, C-249/06, ECLI:EU:C:2009:119, paragraph 43 
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it has jurisdiction over the application of the context of that regime. This means that when 
an investment tribunal applies some EU law provisions, its jurisdiction covers EU law. 
At the same time, when the CJEU applies some BIT provisions, its jurisdiction extends 
to investment treaty law. This jurisdictional overlap affects the autonomy of both EU law 
(as established in traditional cases such as Van Gend en Loos860 and Costa v ENEL861) 
and international investment arbitration.  
The role of national courts in an investment arbitration can be either auxiliary or 
supervisory,862 and it is mostly governed by the lex arbitri. In the former, the courts of 
the seat of arbitration may rule on the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, at the 
beginning of the process, or on issuing any interim measures, during the proceedings. In 
the latter, the courts of the seat can hear any challenges of the award and examine whether 
to set it aside. The award can also be challenged in the courts of other countries, at the 
recognition and enforcement stage, and based on the principles of New York 
Convention. 863  The matter of jurisdiction cannot be characterised strictly either as 
auxiliary or supervisory. If a party doubts about the validity of the arbitration agreement 
he can either pursue litigation once the dispute arises, or he can proceed with the arbitral 
proceedings and challenge the award before the court of the seat or the court of 
enforcement at the end of the process.864  
Another option for a party who disagrees with the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is to 
challenge it before the tribunal itself, as the Respondent did in Eureko v Slovak 
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Republic,865 a landmark case regarding the aforementioned jurisdictional overlap between 
EU law and international investment arbitration. The dispute concerned an alleged 
violation of the Netherlands and Czech and Slovak Federal Republic BIT, as a result of a 
systematic reversal of the liberalization of the health care insurance market that affected 
Eureko’s investment in the country. The Respondent State, namely the Slovak Republic, 
denied liability and objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal due to its conflict 
with EU law.  
Its objection was based on two arguments. Firstly, it was argued that from an international 
law perspective, the EC Treaty had rendered the BIT inapplicable under Articles 59 
and/or 30 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. Secondly, it was argued that 
from an EU law perspective, the Member State submitting to an investment tribunal was 
in breach of EU law, and particularly the provisions of TFEU that establish the exclusive 
authority of the CJEU to interpret EU law. A partial award was given which dismissed 
the jurisdictional objection.866 The Slovak Republic challenged the partial award before 
the OLG Frankfurt, as the seat of arbitration, and the court upheld the decision of the 
tribunal.867  
The Tribunal in its partial award rejected both arguments. Regarding the argument on 
international law, the tribunal underlined that it is not a question to be answered on the 
stage of jurisdiction. Specifically, it stated that any conflict between the BIT and EU law 
‘would be a question of the effect of EU law as part of the applicable law and, as such, a 
matter for the merits and not jurisdiction’.868 It also recalled the CJEU’s decisions in Eco 
                                                                
865 Eureko B.V. v The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA Case 
No. 2008-13 (Oct.26, 2010) 
866 Ibid. 
867 OLG Frankfurt-am-Main, Decision of 10 May 2012 in Case 26 SchH 11/10, (BeckRS 2012, 10291) 
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Swiss869 and Mox Plant; 870 regarding the latter, they commented that it was only a dispute 
between Member States and not investor-State arbitration.871 Moving on to the argument 
regarding EU law, the tribunal supported again that it is rather a matter for the merits. 
Explicitly, EU law ‘may have a bearing upon the scope of rights and obligations under 
the BIT in the present case, by virtue of its role as part of the applicable law under BIT 
Article 8(6)43 and German law …. But this is a question for the merits stage, not a 
question that goes to jurisdiction’.872 The tribunal supported that the only obstacle in 
jurisdiction in relation to EU law, would be if the parties had not consented on the tribunal 
to apply EU law to the facts of the case. However, parties had not included any such 
provision in their investment treaty arbitration agreement. Thus, EU law was applicable 
‘to the extent that it is part of the applicable law(s), whether under BIT Article 8, German 
law or otherwise’.873 A final, and very significant, point made in the award was that the 
CJEU had no ‘interpretative monopoly’ over EU law, but only ‘a monopoly on the final 
and authoritative interpretation of EU law’.874 
As already mentioned, the OLG Frankfurt upheld the tribunal’s findings, and its decision 
was mostly focused on the EU law related arguments expressed in the Partial Award. The 
ruling gave extensive reasoning in order to demonstrate that Article 344 TFEU875 was not 
applicable in investor-State arbitration. 876  The position that Article 344 TFEU was 
relevant only to disputes between Member States themselves and not to investor-State 
                                                                
869 Judgment of 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss, C-126/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269:  the CJEU discussed the issue 
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disputes found support by the German legal literature. In order to defend its findings, the 
Court also employed the silence of the relevant submissions of the European 
Commission. Although the Commission was not in favour of investor-State arbitration 
within the Union, it never stated that Article 344 TFEU applied. Though the Commission 
stressed out that arbitral tribunals could not use the preliminary reference mechanism, the 
risk that arbitral awards may not be in conformity with EU law could be dealt with by the 
domestic courts, which examine their validity or recognition and enforcement, and which 
are allowed to make preliminary references to the CJEU.  
Furthermore, the statement made by the arbitral tribunal on the interpretative monopoly 
of the CJEU and all the reasoning given was fully supported by the national court. The 
decision reaffirmed that the CJEU had the exclusive authority to interpret EU law, but 
this exclusivity did not imply that domestic courts and arbitral tribunals were prevented 
from applying EU law. Even in preliminary references, the CJEU’s role is only to 
interpret the EU law provisions in question, while their application lies within the 
responsibilities of the Member State court.  
Finally, the OLG Frankfurt considered whether it was necessary to make a preliminary 
reference itself on that case. It was recognised that, generally, a Member State’s Supreme 
Court was bound by the general obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. 
The two exceptions to this obligation were the cases that settled case law on the relevant 
issue already existed, and the acte clair doctrine, namely when the correct interpretation 
of the EU law in question was adequately clear. The Decision concluded that the 
particular case fell below those exceptions, since Article 344 TFEU had already 
sufficiently clearly interpreted and no question was left for the CJEU.  
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The Partial Award in Eureko and the succeeding ruling of OLG Frankfurt can constitute 
a significant starting point for the development of arguments that support that arbitration 
does have a role in the EU law regime that follows in section v.  
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III. RECENT TRENDS ON ARBITRATION IN THE EU 
Despite the traditional distance between EU law and arbitration, there are some recent 
trends that suggest that the EU legal order has some place available for investment 
arbitration. Remarkable elements of an ICS, which reflects many of the features of 
arbitration, are evident in the two, probably largest, free trade agreements on which the 
EU had recently being involved, these being CETA877 and TTIP.878 The legal value of 
both agreements should be clarified here. CETA was approved by the European 
Parliament on 15 February 2017, 879  it was entered into force provisionally on 21 
September 2017, 880  and what is pending is its ratification by all Member States’ 
Parliaments.881 TTIP is still under negotiations between the EU and the US.882 Although 
the initial mandate to the European Commission, given by the Union’s Council of Trade 
Ministers, was to negotiate for CETA and other free trade agreements on the basis of the 
classic investment-State arbitration, 883  the increased public reaction, known as the 
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available under the Member States’ bilateral investment agreements (BITs).’ 
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‘backlash’ against investment arbitration, resulted in the proposal of establishing a 
permanent court rather than ad hoc arbitration.884 It was firstly suggested by the Socialists 
and Democrats in the EU Parliament, led by their German branch, and then the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution suggesting the set-up of a permanent investment court 
with an appellate system. 885  This proposal attracted political momentum and was 
considered as an opportunity to be relieved by the alleged weaknesses of international 
investment arbitration.  
In addition to the objections of the public against the inclusion of investment arbitration, 
since it is considered as a privilege given to foreign investors to challenge measures of 
public policy of States by circumventing national and EU courts, there are also concerns 
on behalf of the legal scholars on this matter.886 Their principal considerations relate to 
the discrepancy of the ICS with the autonomy of EU law,887 and with the exclusive 
competence of the CJEU both in the interpretation and application of EU law, and in the 
determination of claims on non-contractual liability of the EU and its institutions.888 
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Notably, Jean-Claude Junker commented that ‘Nor will I accept that the jurisdiction of 
courts in the EU Member States is limited by special regimes for investor disputes. The 
rule of law and the principle of equality before the law must also apply in this context.’889 
Though on the surface this statement seems like an opposition of the ISDS, a more careful 
reading of it indicates that he does not exclude the possibility or investors to proceed with 
litigation before national courts.  
A closer examination on the dispute resolution mechanisms negotiated in TTIP shows the 
significant efforts of the European Commission to find the golden section between 
establishing a ‘court’ and preserving the enforcement of the decisions as ‘awards’ 
rendered by a ‘tribunal’.890  
The position of the US could also be mentioned here. The US have objected to the creation 
of a permanent international dispute settlement institution and expressed their preference 
for ad hoc investment arbitration.891 This can be illustrated by comparing two free trade 
agreements, one concluded by the US and one concluded by the EU. On the one hand, 
TPP provides for the traditional mechanism of investor-state arbitration with parties being 
able to nominate the arbitrators.892 On the other hand, CETA provides for a permanent 
tribunal, consisted of 15 members, who have the competence to decide investor-state 
disputes.893 This comparison shows the huge gap between the two approaches and raises 
                                                                
889 J.–C. Juncker, ‘A new start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness and Democratic 
Change. Political guidelines for the next European Commission’, 15 July 2014, available at: 
https://groenlinks.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/newsarticle/PG_EN.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
890European Commission, ‘Report: Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)’, 
Commission Staff Working Document, 13 January 2015, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017); St. Schill, 
‘Editorial: The German Debate on International Investment Law’ (2015) 16 The Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, 1  
891 S. Schacherer, ‘TPP, CETA and TTIP between Innovation and Consolidation – Resolving Investor-
State Disputes under Mega-regionals’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 628 
892 Ibid., at 630 
893 Ibid. 
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the question of which of the two will finally prevail in the ongoing TTIP negotiations. As 
was commented, ‘these fundamentally contrasting visions about the future of ISDS are a 
'historic juncture' for the future of international investment governance’.894 
1. CETAC 
The EU and Canada initiated the negotiations between them for CETA in May 2009, with 
the original directives of the Council being silent on ISDS. Two years later, the Trade 
Sustainability Impact Assessment, sought by the European Commission, pointed out that 
‘the conflicting costs and benefits of [an ISDS] mechanism make it doubtful that its 
inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and environmental) 
sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada’.895 Based on this, the Council amended 
the negotiation directives that had the purpose of agreeing to an ‘effective and state-of-
the-art investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism’. 896  Despite the numerous 
objections, CETA was made public in 2014 including the traditional ISDS. The principal 
reason given for this inclusion was that ISDS could enhance legal certainty and, thus, 
could increase trade and investment flows, an aim ‘of significant economic value and 
importance’.897 Besides the economic considerations, the provision of ISDS procedure in 
CETA was also underlined, as investment protection without ISDS ‘would be of little 
value’ due to the need of ensuring effective implementation of the commitments from 
both sides. Moreover, CETA constituted the first EU agreement addressing investment 
                                                                
894 S. W. Schill, 'Editorial: US versus EU Leadership in Global Investment Governance' (2016) 17 The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 1 
895 Development Solutions, ‘A Trade SIA relating to the negotiation of a Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada’, Final Report (2011) 19, 20, available at: 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september/tradoc_148201.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
896 European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘EU-Canada trade negotiating mandate made 
public’, available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/15-eu-canada-trade-
negotiating-mandate-made-public/ (accessed 22 July 2017) 
897 Parliamentary Questions, Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission, 5 February 
2013, OJ C 321 E, 7 November 2013,  available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-011275&language=EN 
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protection and ISDS, thus it is ‘politically important for the Union to exercise this 
competence, and in the future to pursue this policy with other key partners … as …. the 
first agreements will be important in setting the path for this policy.’898 Finally, on 29 
February 2016, the final version of CETA was agreed, replacing the ISDS by an ICS.899  
CETA provides for the establishment of a Tribunal of first instance and an Appellate 
Tribunal. The former has 15 permanent members, nominated by the CETA Joint 
Committee.900 The latter has as many members as decided by the Joint Committee. Cases 
are decided in divisions of three members, chaired by a third country national. Disputes 
are assigned to divisions in a 'random and unpredictable' manner.901 The EU and Canada 
pay equally into an account managed by the ICSID Secretariat, who also acts as secretariat 
for the Tribunal, which means that no permanent secretariat is established. 902  The 
Tribunal can draw up its own working procedures. 903  The Appellate Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction cover only those awards issued by the Tribunal and its mandate is to uphold, 
modify or reverse these awards on the ground of error in the application or interpretation 
of applicable law, on manifest error in the appreciation of the facts, including the 
appreciation of relevant domestic law, and finally on grounds set out in Article 52 of the 
ICSID Convention.904 The Appellate Tribunal can also 'refer back issues to the tribunal 
for the adjustment of the award'.905 These key characteristics of CETA ICS are to be 
analysed now, in an effort to examine whether the previous criticism against such system, 
                                                                
898 W. Douma, ‘Investor-state arbitration in the light of EU policy and law after the Lisbon Treaty’, 
available at:  https://www.eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/401 (accessed 22 July 2017) 
899 EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, 29 February 2016, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
900 Five of these Members should be nationals of an EU Member State, five should be nationals of Canada 
and five should be nationals of third countries.  
901 Article 26.1 revised text of CETA, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
902 Ibid., Article 8.27(6)  
903 Ibid., Article  8.27(10)  
904 Ibid., Article  8.28(2)  
905 Ibid., Article  28.7(b)  
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regarding the alleged privilege given to foreign investors to challenge measures of public 
policy and the contradiction of the ICS with the autonomy of EU law and with the 
exclusive competence of the CJEU, has become unfounded. 
The first main concern was the matter of independence and impartiality of arbitrators. By 
establishing a permanent tribunal, where the members are pre-elected, CETA excluded 
investors from choosing the people that will hear their claim. Instead, members are elected 
by the Joint Committee, on the basis of mutual consent of the EU and Canada. The 
requirement of their consent gave rise to the argument that probably the Tribunal 
Members would be more sympathetic to the States’ position, that in most cases are the 
respondent, than to the investors’ positions, who are mainly the claimants in investor-
state disputes.906  
Furthermore, the assignment of cases to members on a rotation basis means that the 
division is random and unpredictable and ensures the objectiveness of the whole process. 
It also ensures that members are independent from the parties and the issues at stake, and 
thus, it is assumed that they are also impartial. In essence, this method limits the 
possibilities of bias to a greater extent than by applying a case-by-case appointment of 
adjudicators by the two conflicting parties. It is worthy to note that CETA insists on the 
traditional number of three adjudicators deciding as a panel, which constitutes the typical 
number in investment arbitration.  
Another characteristic of CETA ICS that comes in support of the concerns regarding 
impartiality and independence is the nationality of the three adjudicators in each division; 
                                                                
906 A. Koorosh et al., 'Task Force Paper Regarding the Proposed International Court System (ICS)' (2016) 
EFILA Paper, 15, available at: http://efila.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/EFILA_TASK_FORCE_on_ICS_proposal_1-2-2016.pdf (accessed 22 July 
2017)  
291 
 
namely, there is one EU national, one Canadian national and one from a third country. 
Such composition implies that the adjudicator that shares the same nationality with the 
respondent State or with the investor might not show the necessary impartiality. 
Therefore, the proceedings may be held by a ‘pro-state’ adjudicator and a ‘pro-investor’ 
adjudicator.907 It means that the only person that seems fully neutral in each case is the 
chairperson whose nationality is from a third country.   
Using, once again, the comparative method, it can be observed that the risk of lack of 
impartiality and independence in investment disputes under CETA is much higher than 
in other dispute resolution bodies. For example, the Dispute Settlement Understanding of 
the WTO prohibits a member of the panel from being a national of the respondent State.908 
Another example is the composition of the ICJ. Despite the allowance of nationals of the 
conflicting parties to be judges in the case, their influence is lessened due to the higher 
number of judges sitting on the Bench, those being 15-17, instead of only three.909  
Finally, CETA sets some qualifications and ethical requirements for the members of the 
Tribunal, one of them being that they are expert in public international law.910 This 
requirement illustrates that investment treaties are inter-state agreements and the disputes 
emanating from them are to be governed by some general principles of public 
international law. Tribunal Members should also prove their independence by 
demonstrating absence of affiliation with any government or organization. As a footnote 
in CETA agreement provides, receiving remuneration from a government is not a 
                                                                
907 S. Schacherer, ‘TPP, CETA and TTIP between Innovation and Consolidation – Resolving Investor-
State Disputes under Mega-regionals’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 628, 637 
908 Article 8(3), Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (accessed 22 July 2017) 
909 Article 31(2) and (3), Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/statute (accessed 22 July 2017) 
910 Article 8.27(4), revised text of CETA, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017) 
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sufficient element itself to render a person ineligible to be a member of the Tribunal.911 
Also, CETA shows a preference for the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines 
on conflict of interests in international arbitration and does not include a specific code of 
conduct of the Tribunal.912  
The second main concern was the matter of inconsistency of arbitral awards in investment 
arbitration, even in cases with identical or similar treaty language and similar facts.913 
Inconsistency of awards results in lack of legal certainty and predictability, the authority 
of national courts to examine the awards given is limited and the ICSID annulment 
process is only focused on procedural grounds.914 In order to strengthen predictability, 
coherence and legitimacy in investor-State disputes, the EU suggested the establishment 
of an appeal mechanism, in particular of an Appellate Tribunal that was mainly inspired 
by the operation of the WTO Appellate Body.915 In contrast with the WTO Appellate 
Body that allows only for appeals on questions of law, CETA provides only for reviewing 
questions of fact. The reference to 'manifest' errors on the appreciation of the facts, 
indicates that appeals should be made with some deference to the factual assessment of 
the Tribunal of first instance. Finally, CETA remains silent on the matter of binding 
precedent. In particular, there is no specific provision on whether the CETA Appellate 
Tribunal’s decisions should bind the Tribunal of first instance. Judges of other permanent 
international courts and tribunals respect more or less the doctrine of precedent for the 
                                                                
911 Article 8.30(1), revised text of CETA, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017)  
912 Ibid., Article 8.44(2), last paragraph CETA 
913 C. Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: Balancing Investment 
Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (CUP 2015) 2-3 
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State Disputes under Mega-regionals’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 628, 640 
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purpose of legal certainty. For example, neither the ICJ nor the WTO Appellate Body 
explicitly provide for stare decisis, but both repeatedly referred to their precedent in their 
respective case law.916 In contrast, the doctrine of precedent is a key concept for the 
operation of courts at the EU, both at national and the EU level.  
2. TTIP 
In June 2013, the European Commission was given the mandate to negotiate with the US 
and conclude a TTIP that would remove all tariffs, improve access to markets and enhance 
investment protection through ISDS, which is the arbitration clause of the Agreement.917 
As it was stated, the inclusion of investment protection and ISDS ‘will depend on whether 
a satisfactory solution, meeting the EU interests (…) is achieved’, notably regarding the 
right to adopt and enforce ‘measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives such as social, environmental, (…) public health and safety in a non-
discriminatory manner.’ 918   In 2015, a public consultation was given regarding the 
inclusion of the ISDS on the TTIP.919 Despite the numerous oppositions to the ISDS, the 
Commission repeated its command to discuss ISDS as part of TTIP, with the only 
condition that the agreement reflects and protects the Union’s interests.920 According to 
the recommendations of the European Parliament for the TTIP, the ISDS could be 
replaced by a new public legal structure, where cases are decided by publicly appointed, 
                                                                
916 Article 59, Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute 
(accessed 22 July 2017) and Article 3(2) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (accessed 22 
July 2017) 
917 Council of the EU, Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, 17 June 2013 available at:  
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918 Ibid., 8 
919 European Commission, ‘Report on the Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-
to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
(TTIP)’ (Staff Working Document] SWD (2015)3 final, available at:  
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professional judges, in public hearings, with the option of appeal, and with deference to 
the jurisdiction of national and EU courts. In September 2015, a draft TTIP Investment 
chapter was presented,921 providing for ICS composed of a first instance Tribunal and an 
Appeal Tribunal. The proposal was criticised as amounting ‘to little more than putting 
lipstick on a particularly unpopular pig’922 and that ICS does not prevent investors from 
circumventing national law systems. 
The structure of the TTIP ICS is identical with the CETA ICS: it provides for a First 
Instance Tribunal and an Appellate Tribunal. Each case is decided by a division of three 
adjudicators and the chairperson’s nationality should be from a third country. Similarly 
to CETA, the members of the Tribunal are to be allocated based on a ‘random and 
unpredictable’ rotation system. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency are also 
incorporated, according to which the repository is obliged to rapidly make ‘available to 
the public information regarding the name of the disputing parties, the economic sector 
involved and the treaty under which the claim is being made’ once the proceedings 
begin.923  
Furthermore, the proposals provide for third-party and amicus curiae participation, which 
means that a non-dispute party, most probably the host state of the investor, is allowed to 
participate and also ‘any natural or legal person which can establish a direct and present 
                                                                
921 Commission draft text TTIP – investment, available at;:  
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interest in the result of the dispute (the intervener) to intervene as a third party’, including 
non-governmental organisations.924   
Appeals are allowed on the grounds provided by Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, but 
also on the grounds of errors of law and manifest errors in the appreciation of facts. The 
Appellate Tribunal can either uphold, modify, or reverse the award rendered by the First 
Instance Tribunal.925 If the appeal is unsuccessful, the award becomes final, while if it is 
upheld, the Appeal Tribunal can fully or partly modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions in the initial award.  
Though most aspects of the proposed ICS have been drafted, three of the issues that 
remain unresolved, are discussed here. Firstly, the relationship between public 
international law rights and private rights; secondly, the determination of the respondent 
in case of dispute; and, thirdly, the relationship between the ICS and national courts.  
Due to the wide scope of the TTIP, both the EU and the US should ensure a consistent 
interpretation, implementation and application of the measures agreed regarding trade. A 
possible means to achieve this, is to treat TTIP exclusively as a public international law 
legal agreement.926 However, the strong negotiating position of the US vis-à-vis the EU 
would not result to the direct accessibility of ISDS or the enforceability of investment 
awards to be reconciled with an exclusion of private rights in toto.927  
Regarding the determination of the respondent, the question is whether the European 
Commission will take this role in any case an investor from the US wants to initiate 
                                                                
924 Article 23(5), section 3, EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership EU’s proposal for 
Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes of 12 November 2015 (TTIP), available at: 
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EU Legal Order’ (2015) Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2015:2, 78 
927 Ibid. 
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proceedings against the Union, since, generally, investment tribunals do not have the 
power to identify and allocate international responsibility.928 One way to deal with this 
internal EU legal matter, is to give the authority to the European Commission to decide 
the respondent in any such dispute, subject to judicial review by the CJEU. Alternatively, 
the provisions of CETA on this could be altered in the case of TTIP. CETA ICS provides 
that if the Commission does not determine the respondent within a period of 50 days, the 
investor’s position on the allocation of Union competences is adopted by the Tribunal. 
The CETA approach can be improved by recognizing the EU as the prima facie 
respondent unless the Commission determines otherwise during the 50-day period.929 
Another solution could be the acceptance by the CJEU that the requirement for 
cooperation that originates from the duty of sincere cooperation, preserves the 
maintenance of EU objectives in investment arbitration against individual Member States 
to an adequate extent.930 
Finally, the relationship between ICS and domestic courts should be clarified. It seems 
that foreign investors are privileged over national investors as they have extra options: 
firstly, the option to proceed in the ICS if they lost in domestic courts; secondly, the option 
to pursue parallel proceedings before the two legal mechanisms; and, thirdly, to wholly 
circumvent domestic courts, since exhausting local remedies is often not a prerequisite 
for access to ISDS.  Evidently, ISDS is contrary to the idea of democratic equality.931 At 
the same time, it should not be ignored that the weaknesses of domestic courts are the 
main reason why ISDS was conceived in the first place. Notably, the European 
                                                                
928 H. Lenk, ‘Investor-state Arbitration under TTIP: Resolving Investment Disputes in an (Autonomous) 
EU Legal Order’ (2015) Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2015:2, 79 
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931 S. W. Schill, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court System” for TTIP: 
Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?’ (2016) 20 ASIL 
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Commission sought to strike a balance between democratic equality and effective dispute 
resolution.932 Thus, in its Proposal on ICS, direct access to the Tribunal is permitted, 
without resorting to local remedies first.933 Further, in order to avoid parallel adjudication 
and prevent foreign investors from using the Tribunal as a second option if they fail in 
domestic courts and imposing pressure on States, the Tribunal is prohibited from hearing 
a dispute if proceedings in domestic courts are pending or if domestic remedies have been 
exhausted on the same case.934 However, the Proposal might be difficult to operate in 
practice, due to the restricted remedies that the TTIP Tribunal can offer. In particular, the 
Tribunal can only order the respondent to compensate the claimant by examining the host 
State’s actions based on principles of international law. Thus, in case the investor wants 
to examine the alleged conduct of the host Sate based on national law and ask for further 
remedies, for example restitution of the status quo ante, the only appropriate forum is the 
domestic courts. In other words, a dilemma burdens the investors as they are sought to 
choose between domestic law and international law protection. ‘The requirement to make 
such choices weakens the authority of domestic law and domestic courts, as well as that 
of international law and the TTIP Tribunal, and hinders the mutual integration of both 
legal orders and dispute settlement mechanisms.’935 In essence, the deficiencies of some 
States’ court system mean de facto prevalence of the TTIP Tribunal and, in the long run, 
it can result in the devaluation of domestic courts’ authority, and it does not give the 
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opportunity to States to correct any measures adopted that adversely affect foreign 
investors in order to avoid liability and the payment of compensation.  
3. Summary of findings 
The above analysis illustrates that ISDS creates numerous controversial effects on the 
autonomy of EU legal order, 936  which could only be dealt with through innovative 
negotiations and radical changes on the structure of both legal orders, namely EU law 
regime and International investment law. The CETA text shows some innovations on the 
area, but does not completely address the clash between the EU legal order and the ISDS, 
and it is expected to constitute a blueprint for the negotiations regarding TTIP.937 It 
remains to see how, if at all, the TTIP will find a means to extinguish the most serious 
risk that investor-state tribunals impose to the fundamental principle of EU law 
autonomy. CETA grants to investment tribunals the authority to determine the allotment 
of competences between the Union and its Member States. Clearly, this provision 
operates as a ‘procedural safeguard for the US’,938 since it ensures that issues that are only 
internal to EU law cannot postpone or block a dispute brought by US investors against 
the EU or a Member State. However, it constitutes a real risk to the autonomy of the EU 
legal regime, and it is assumed that if the CJEU were asked to give an opinion on the 
matter, the conclusions would be unfavourable to the ISDS, due to the potential threat for 
the autonomy of EU law.  
                                                                
936 In brief, these controversial effects include the threat of undermining the principle of democratic 
equality by allowing foreign investors to challenge measures of public policy by circumventing national 
and EU courts; the loss of the exclusive competence of the CJEU in the interpretation and application of 
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conflict with the concept of binding precedence which contradicts the EU law concept of consistency of 
decisions.  
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It is also questioned whether the ICS can qualify either as a court or as an arbitral tribunal. 
Strictly speaking, the ICS mechanism shares most of the basic characteristics with courts. 
Firstly, judges are appointed for a specific period of time and their mandate is to decide 
as many cases as they are asked to, during their employment. On the other hand, 
arbitrators are appointed by the two parties and they should only resolve the particular 
disputes. Secondly, the system of appeals is inherent in litigation, while, traditionally, 
arbitration lacks any appeal mechanism. Finally, courts have jurisdiction over all types of 
disputes, in contrast with arbitration where jurisdiction is only given through the consent 
of the parties, as a reflection of the principle of party autonomy. However, the latter 
feature might be limited to national courts, since some international courts also require a 
consent by the parties, such as the ICJ that requires a distinct acceptance of its jurisdiction 
by the disputing parties.  
In addition to the typical forms of litigation and arbitration, some hybrid mechanisms 
emerge which have qualified as arbitral tribunals, irrespective of the fact that the 
adjudicators are not appointed by the parties and for the particular dispute only. The best 
example for this could be the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, where adjudicators are appointed 
by the two states in order to decide an undefined number of cases, with mixed claims 
commissions responsible for numerous similar cases.939 
It should be mentioned that the New York Convention does not limit its scope regarding 
the notion of arbitration to ad hoc arbitration, but also covers permanent arbitration bodies 
that can render enforceable arbitral awards. According to Article I(2), ‘[t]he term ‘arbitral 
awards’ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but 
                                                                
939 Established by the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the USA and the Government of the Islamic 
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also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted. [...].’940 
Despite the lack of an explanation of ‘permanent arbitral bodies’ in the New York 
Convention, judicial practice indicates that an institution like the Iran–US Claims 
Tribunal can be included in the notion of such bodies. 941  Moreover, the travaux 
préparatoires of the Convention illustrate that the most important criterion to recognise 
an institution as arbitration was the ‘voluntary nature of arbitration, based on “will” or 
“agreement” of the parties, as opposed to any type of adjudication based on 
“compulsory”, or “mandatory” jurisdiction, imposed on the parties “regardless of their 
will”.’942 In essence, what is crucial is that the parties freely consent to the particular 
institution, even if they do not appoint their adjudicators themselves. This is the case for 
the suggested ICS, because investors can be considered as freely accepting the 
Contracting Parties’ offer of consent included in the agreements. 
From all the above, it can be concluded that even a semi-permanent dispute settlement 
institution with members that have been regularly appointed by States instead of the 
parties to a specific dispute themselves can qualify as arbitration, and this is the case of 
the ICS. The EU shows that it becomes more positive towards incorporating arbitration 
(even impliedly) in its legal order, since it incorporates such a system in their agreements 
with other countries. Beyond this, arguably, positive attitude of the EU, there are further 
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appeal mechanism? – Analysis and roadmap’ (2016) CIDS – Geneva Center for International Dispute 
Settlement, 56, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf 
(accessed 22 July 2017) 
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arguments within EU law in favour of the inclusion, or, at least, co-existence, of 
arbitration in the EU legal regime.  
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IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THAT ARBITRATION DOES HAVE A 
ROLE IN THE EU LAW REGIME 
Never before in the history of the EU, was the jurisdiction of an external judicial system 
to decide disputes by individuals within the Union recognised as compatible with EU law, 
since this belongs to the competences of the EU courts.943 Agreements that provide for 
such external judicial bodies were held compatible with EU law only when those bodies 
can hear cases concerning the EU and the respective third State, in other words when 
individuals are not involved, or when the claims are brought by individuals but do not 
relate with the Union or any Member State. For example, in Opinion 1/92, the EFTA 
Court created under the European Economic Area Agreement, was held compatible with 
EU law, since it was described as a judicial mechanism whose function takes place outside 
the EU legal regime and outside the Union.944 A similar ruling was given regarding the 
European Common Aviation Area Agreement.945 Evidently, what plays a crucial role is 
the broader effects that the external judicial body causes on the EU legal order if 
individuals seek judicial relief against the Union or its institutions beyond the reach of 
the EU courts. In cases the judicial body does leave individuals contingent on EU courts 
and institutions for the inclusion of international obligation on the EU legal regime, it is 
much less likely to find incompatibility with EU law. As an example, the Union’s 
participation to the WTO and its special dispute resolution mechanism was not found to 
infringe EU law, since the CJEU still has the exclusive competence to decide the way and 
the extent to which EU citizens can challenge EU law measures based on the WTO and 
                                                                
943 Opinion of 26 April 1977, re Inland Waterways, Opinion 1/76, EU:C:1977:63; Opinion of 14 
December 1991, on the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91, EU:C:1991:490; Opinion 
of 28 March 1996, Accession to the ECHR, Opinion 2/94 , EU:C:1996:140; Opinion of 8 March 2011, 
European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123; Opinion of 18 December 2014,  
Accession to the ECHR, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454  
944 Opinion of 10 April 1992, on the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/92, 
EU:C:1992:189  
945 Opinion of 18 April 2002, ECAA Agreement, Opinion 1/00, EU:C:2002:231  
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the decisions of the WTO dispute settlement system.946 Contrariwise, the autonomy of 
EU law and the EU courts seems to be threatened if a judicial body constitutes a directly 
available avenue for individuals.947 This position resonates regarding agreements that 
provide for ISDS. The main concern is that had the EU concluded trade agreements 
providing for an ISDS system with its most basic trading partners, an important portion 
of individuals would wholly evade the EU judicial system and prefer seeking judicial 
relief against the EU or its institutions via arbitration tribunals.  
1. Article 344 TFEU 
As was explained in a previous section, the Eureko case is a clear example between the 
jurisdictional conflict that exists between the two legal orders.948 On the one hand, there 
is EU law and, in particular, Article 344 TFEU, and on the other hand, there is public 
international law, and the provisions of the respective BIT.949  It could be reasonably 
expected that the tribunal would have fully addressed the question whether the 
jurisdictional conflict would deprive it from its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the arbitral 
tribunal in that case, merely prefer to leave such discussion for the merits stage, by 
rendering a partial award which confirmed its jurisdiction. In contrast, the OLG Frankfurt 
decided to address the jurisdictional conflict itself, without makin a preliminary reference 
to the CJEU for the interpretation of Article 344 TFEU.950  
Article 344 TFEU states that: ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement 
other than those provided for therein’. The wording of this Article leaves unclear whether 
                                                                
946 Judgment of 1 March 2005, Léon Van Parys, C-377/02, EU:C:2005:121  
947 Judgment of 5 February 1963, Van Gen en Loos, Case 26/62, EU:C:1963:1 
948 Eureko B.V. v The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA Case 
No. 2008-13 (Oct.26, 2010) 
949 Article 8 of the relevant BIT in the case of Eureko 
950 OLG Frankfurt-am-Main, Decision of 10 May 2012 in Case 26 SchH 11/10, (BeckRS 2012, 10291) 
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in principle it applies to investor-State arbitration, thus it sets a prohibition to the Member 
States from allowing this kind of cases to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal in the first 
place.  
Both Article 344 TFEU and the case law of the CJEU relied on by the OLG Frankfurt 
court remain silent on the case that the dispute arises between a Member State on one side 
and a private individual on the other, as happens in investor-State arbitration. In addition 
to the legal instruments of the EU, the literature has also considered whether Article’s 
344 TFEU application is limited to disputes between Member States or whether it also 
extends to disputes concerning individuals.951 In the majority, it is supported that Article 
344 TFEU applies only to disputes between Member States, with this argument implying 
the compatibility of investor-State arbitration with EU law. 952  In essence, what is 
supported is a narrow interpretation of Article 344 TFEU, since the only alternative way 
to interpret it broadly and at the same time promoting arbitration within the EU legal 
order, is to recognise that investment tribunals qualify as ‘courts or tribunals of a Member 
State’. 
In Mox Plant,953 Ireland had alleged that by establishing and operating the Mox Pant on 
the coast of the Irish Sea, the UK was in breach of numerous EU directives. The CJEU 
demonstrated that ‘[I]t thus appears that Ireland submitted instruments of Community law 
to the Arbitral Tribunal for purposes of their interpretation and application in the context 
of proceedings seeking a declaration that the United Kingdom had breached the 
                                                                
951 See A. Bermann, Navigating EU law and the law of international arbitration’ (2012) 28 
Arbitration International, 397, 432; S. Hindelang, ‘Circumventing primacy of EU law and the CJEU’s 
judicial monopoly by resorting to dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in inter-se Treaties?’ 
(2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 179, at 199  
952 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1052 
953 Judgment of 20 May 2006, Mox Plant, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345 
305 
 
provisions of those instruments’.954 It concluded: ‘[T]hat is at variance with the obligation 
imposed on Member States by [Article 344TFEU]… to respect the exclusive nature of 
the Court’s jurisdiction… in particular by having recourse to the procedures set out in 
[Article 259 TFEU]… for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that another Member 
State has breached those provisions’.955 Consequently, the Court found that Article 344 
TFEU was in breach, on the ground that Ireland submitted a dispute to an arbitral tribunal 
while its subject matter was relevant to as EU law provision that the UK was alleged to 
have violated.   
This case illustrates that Article 344 TFEU prohibits Member States from submitting to 
an arbitral tribunal disputes with each other that considers whether one of them was in 
breach of its EU law commitments. This position was confirmed later in the European 
Patent Court Opinion956 where the CJEU further explained: ‘[t]hat article [Article 344 
TFEU] merely prohibits Member States from submitting a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for in the Treaties’.957 In other words, any question regarding the interpretation 
and application of EU Treaties triggers the obligation of Member States to abstain from 
referring the dispute to any court or tribunal except from the CJEU. However, in the 
particular case, the general rule was found inapplicable, as ‘[by contrast,] the jurisdiction 
which the draft agreement intends to grant to the PC relates only to disputes between 
individuals in the field of patents’.958 
                                                                
954 Ibid., para 151 
955 Ibid., para 152 
956 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123 
957 Ibid., paragraph 63 
958 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, 
paragraph 63 
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Both the aforementioned cases establish that Article 344 TFEU prohibits a Member State 
from submitting to an arbitral tribunal ‘any dispute with another Member State involving 
questions relating to the interpretation or application of the Treaties’.959 However, the 
situation where a dispute relates to a Member State and a private individual, as in an 
investor-State arbitration, remains unclear. The only that was clarified in the European 
Patent Court Opinion is that Article 344 TFEU does not bind Member States regarding 
disputes between individuals.960 
The OLG Frankfurt referred to the judgments of Eco Swiss961 and Commission v Slovak 
Republic962 and found that the CJEU recognised its limits on its interpretative monopoly. 
At the beginning, the CJEU in Commission v Slovak Republic stated it was ‘not for the 
Court [the ECJ] to interpret the Investment Protection Agreement’. 963  However, it 
continued by underlining that ‘it is none the less appropriate to examine the factors which 
make it possible to determine whether that agreement imposes an obligation … [on the 
Respondent] which cannot be affected by the provisions of the EC Treaty, within the 
terms of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC’.964 The Court did not restrict itself on 
deciding whether an investment existed based on the definition given on the Investment 
Protection Agreement, but continued its analysis based on the lack of a denunciation 
clause and concluded that ‘in so far as a termination of the contract at issue would have 
the consequence of depriving ATEL of the remuneration provided for by that contract in 
return for its financial contribution … such a measure would impact adversely on ATEL’s 
rights and would thus have the same effect as expropriation within the meaning of Article 
                                                                
959 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1054 
960 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123 
961 Judgment of 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss, C-126/97, EU:C:1999:269  
962 Judgment of 15 September 2011, Commission v Slovak Republic, C-264/09, EU:C:2011:580 
963 Ibid., paragraph 40 
964 Ibid. 
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6 of the Investment Protection Agreement’.965 Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that ‘[t]he 
only way for the Slovak Republic to comply with its obligations in the present case would 
be tantamount to an indirect expropriation’.966 The two main findings, namely that there 
was an investment protected by the scope of the Investment Protection Agreement and 
that the measures at stake resulted in indirect expropriation of the investment, were 
actually based on the interpretation and application of main principles of international 
investment law. In essence, while the Court argued that it did not interpret the Investment 
Protection Agreement, in practice this is what it was doing. 
To sum up, the first argument says that while Article 344 TFEU imposes an obligation 
that disputes between Member States should be resolved only by the EU courts, investor-
State arbitration does not deal with disputes between two Member States thus it is not in 
conflict with it.  
2. Article 19(1) TEU 
Another argument in support of the view that investor-state arbitration does not 
automatically lead to an infringement of the autonomy of EU law relates to the subject 
matter of the disputes concerned. It can be questioned whether, besides Article 344 TFEU, 
the EU judicial system provided for in Article 19(1) TEU is in conflict with investor-State 
arbitration within the EU. According to what the case law of the CJEU underlines, 
exclusive jurisdiction was conferred on the Court by Article 220(1) EC, the predecessor 
of Article 19(1) TEU. Article 19(1) TEU renders the CJEU the exclusive judicial body 
that should interpret and apply EU law, thus it ensures the autonomy of Union law.967 In 
                                                                
965 Commission v Slovak Republic, paragraph 48 
966 Ibid., paragraph 50 
967 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, 
paragraph 35; Opinion of 18 April 2002, ECAA Agreement, Opinion 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, paragraphs 11 
and 12 
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other words, any interpretation of EU law legislation made by a court outside the scope 
of Article 19(1) TEU and without the possibility of review by the CJEU violates its 
exclusive jurisdiction.  
In order to examine whether arbitral tribunals deal with matters that fall within the sphere 
of EU law, the scope of application of EU law should be defined. Generally, the scope of 
EU law may be found to encompass any international agreement that provides for any 
area that is covered ‘in large measure’ by EU legislation.968 The existence of specific 
Union legislation on the specific subject matter covered by the international, either 
bilateral or multilateral, agreement is not required, as EU law should only cover in general 
the area that is regulated by the agreement. To that extent, Member States are in breach 
of their obligation to safeguard the primacy and autonomy of EU law as far as they apply 
in their relations inter se the provisions of BITs that are covered ‘in large measure’ by 
EU law, in the form of either private or secondary legislation.969  
A remarkable example is the European Patent Court Opinion.970 Initially, the Court held 
that Article 344 TFEU could not operate as an obstacle for the compatibility of the 
European Patent Court with EU law, since it found that disputes between individuals do 
not fall within the scope of the Article. However, incompatibility was found based on 
Article 19(1) TEU, since the European Patent Court would essentially have hindered the 
national courts from their jurisdiction to apply relevant rules of EU law, those being the 
rules on internal market, patents and competition law. Moreover, it would also have 
impliedly prevented the same courts from using the preliminary reference mechanism.971 
                                                                
968 Judgment of 7 October 2004, Commission v France, C-239/03, EU:C:2004:598, paragraphs 29 and30 
969 A. Dimopolous, ‘The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements between EU 
Member States under EU and International law’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 63, at 88 
970 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123 
971 European and Community Patents Court, paragraphs 71 et seq. and 78 and 79 
309 
 
According to the words of the CJEU, the European Patent Court would have: ‘deprived 
those [Member State] courts of their task, as ordinary courts within the European Union 
legal order, to implement European Union law, and, thereby, of the power… or… 
obligation to refer questions for a preliminary ruling.’ 972  The reason leading to this 
conclusion was that the proposed Patent Court would have the authority to examine the 
validity of acts of the Union. Thus, it can be understood that Article 344 TFEU is not the 
only obstacle for arbitration to find a place within the EU legal order. Even if it is satisfied 
that Article 344 TFEU is inapplicable due to the fact that the dispute is between a Member 
State and an individual, Article 19(1) TEU might constitute a barrier. 
Clearly, most of the provisions of BITs are included in the scope of EU law. In particular, 
the substantive provisions of these agreements that aim at promoting and establishing 
investment and ensure the fair treatment of foreign investors can be found in EU law and 
the four free movements. However, as was already analysed in Chapter 2, Member States 
are entitled to regulate their property law independently and EU law does not contain a 
general principle of compensation. What is provided, is only some ‘procedural’ 
safeguards of the right to property that do not offer any substantial protection. There is a 
lack of EU law rules regarding the protection of the right to property of investors against 
infringements on property rights resulting from ‘pure’ national measures. Consequently, 
the commencement of investor-state arbitration seeking protection against expropriation 
or compensation for losses resulting from national measures does not affect the primacy 
and autonomy of EU Law, because the EU principles on this area do not cover it ‘in large 
measure.’ In other words, it can be argued that the provisions on the protection of the 
property rights of foreign investors in the host state against political risk and expropriation 
                                                                
972 Ibid., paragraph 78 
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do not fall within the scope of EU law, thus they are not in conflict with Article 19(1) 
TEU.  
3. Different mandates  
The suggestion that arbitration does have an active role in the EU legal order can also be 
supported by an argument that is not based on an EU law provision but on the mandate 
the relevant courts and tribunals have. Arbitral tribunals have only the authority to protect 
the rights of the particular applicant in each case without affecting the relevant legal 
framework in general. In particular, the main remedy given by arbitral tribunals is the 
payment of monetary damages. According to the principles of international law on State 
responsibility, remedies for a wrongful act can be in the form of restitution, compensation, 
or satisfaction.973 In investment arbitration, the most commonly used remedy is the one 
of monetary compensation. Satisfaction plays a subordinate role,974 and restitution in kind 
or specific performance is not ordered very frequently.975 Any award rendered binds only 
the parties involved in the particular dispute and does not have the power to affect third 
parties.  
On the contrary, the CJEU’s role have numerous aspects. Firstly, through the preliminary 
reference mechanism, the CJEU is responsible for the consistent interpretation of EU law, 
since national courts of different Member States may interpret the same provisions 
differently. Secondly, the CJEU has the responsibility to enforce the law in the case of 
infringement proceedings, if a national government fails to comply with EU law and the 
European Commission initiates proceedings against it. Thirdly, if a Union act is regarded 
                                                                
973 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the ILC in 2001 
Article 34.  R. Dolzer and C. SChreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd end, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 293 
974 Biwater Gauff v Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22) Award, 24 July 2008, paragraphs 465-467; 
Europe Cement v Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2), Award, 13 August 2009, paragraphs 146-
148, 176 and 181 
975 C. Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) 20 Arbitration International 325 
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as in breach of the EU Treaties or the fundamental rights, it will be annulled by the CJEU. 
Fourthly, the Court should ensure that the Union and its institutions, those being the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the EU Commission, act according to 
their mandates and they do not fail to act. Finally, under Article 340 TFEU, the CJEU 
decides on non-contractual liability of the Union and its institutions and can rule for the 
payment of damages to any natural or legal person harmed by the conduct of them.  
By comparing the mandate of arbitral tribunals with the mandate of the CJEU, it can be 
argued that the only conflicting point between the two would be the monetary 
compensation by arbitral tribunals with the damages for non-contractual liability of Union 
institutions by the CJEU. Other than that, the CJEU’s exclusive competence on the 
consistent interpretation and application of EU law throughout the Union cannot be 
affected by the operation of arbitral tribunals. In any case, an award can never affect the 
measures adopted at the EU level or the validity and legality of actions of the Union 
institutions. Its effects only reach the particular parties on the dispute and can result in 
remedying an affected individual or company that their rights have been infringed by an 
action of the host State. Thus, the inclusion of arbitration in the EU legal order does not 
contradict the primary role of the CJEU.  
4. Preliminary references from investment tribunals to the CJEU 
A far-reaching argument, or, more preferably, suggestion, relates to the opportunity for 
arbitral tribunals to use the preliminary reference mechanism according to Article 267 
TFEU. If such an option was given, two benefits would be gained. Firstly, arbitration 
would have a place in the EU legal order; and, secondly, the correct and consistent 
application of EU law would be ensured.  Article 267 TFEU only allows a ‘court or 
tribunal of a Member State’ to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU and, at a first 
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glance, it clearly excludes arbitration. Indeed, arbitral tribunals lack the right to ask the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling, and that was well-established in the Nordsee case.976 The 
rule that arbitral tribunals are excluded from the scope of application of Article 267 TFEU 
was confirmed in the case of the Arbitration Panel of the Belgian Travel Dispute 
Committee.977 In contrast, the CJEU in the Danfoss case found that the Danish Industrial 
Arbitration Board belonged to the notion of ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’, since 
its jurisdiction was provided by the national legislation and it was mandatory, and the 
awards were final and only subject to appeal by another arbitration board.978  
Due to its differences in nature with commercial arbitration, as it was the case in 
Nordsee,979 it can be argued that investment arbitration is rather closer to the case of 
Danfoss,980 and, therefore, it should be given the right to make preliminary references to 
the CJEU.981 According to the case law of the CJEU, a body qualifies as a ‘court or 
tribunal of a Member State’ once some criteria are met. While some of these criteria are 
undeniably met, such as that it is independent and it uses adjudicatory procedures, there 
are others that need a close examination, those being that it is established by law, it is 
permanent, it has compulsory jurisdiction, and it is ‘of a Member State’.982 The list of 
these requirements is not absolute and should not be absolutely and equally satisfied.  
 
                                                                
976 Judgment of 23 March 1982, Nordsee Deutsche, Case-102/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 
977 Judgment of 27 January 2005, Denuit and Cordenier, C-125/04, EU:C:2005:69, paragraphs 13 et seq 
978 Judgment of 17 October 1989, Danfoss, Case 109/88, EU:C:1989:383 
979 Judgment of 23 March 1982, Nordsee Deutsche, Case-102/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 
980 Judgment of 17 October 1989, Danfoss, Case 109/88, EU:C:1989:383 
981 Commentators are divided on this issue – See K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can 
EU Member State courts bridge the jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A 
plea for direct referral from Investment tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 
1039 
982 T. Tridimas, ‘Knocking on heaven’s door: Fragmentation, efficiency and defiance in the preliminary 
reference procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review (2003), 9, at 27, K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of 
“Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the jurisdictional divide between 
Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 
50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1067 
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It is established by law 
The first criterion, that the judicial body should be ‘established by law’, implies the 
existence of a statutory legal basis for the body to act and give decisions on disputes.983 
While, clearly, commercial arbitration that has its foundation on the arbitration agreement 
between the two parties cannot meet this criterion, investment arbitration does not have 
the same standing, as far as it is established by bilateral or multilateral treaties that are 
under the scope of public international law. In any case, investment arbitration has a 
particular regulatory framework providing for ‘a power to review decisions of review 
bodies even if this power is technically idle’.984 The Court in the Danfoss case examined 
whether the Industrial Arbitration Board was independent from the agreement between 
the parties and the nomination of Board members was not dependent on the discretion of 
the disputing parties. In other words, the judicial body should have mandatory jurisdiction 
over the parties and this applies in the case of investment arbitration, as the 
commencement of proceedings does not depend on specific agreement between the host 
State and the particular investor, but depends on the relevant investment treaty. 985 
Regarding the discretion of the parties over the formation of the tribunal means that the 
two private parties can nominate their arbitrators without the involvement, or at least the 
influence, of the State. For example, in the case of Broeckmeulen,986 the fact that the State 
had to choose three out of the nine judges of the Medical Appeals Committee was 
adequate to demonstrate that the government had a ‘significant degree of involvement’ in 
the composition of the tribunal, thus the requirement was met. The intricate part in the 
                                                                
983 Judgment of 21 March 2000, Gabalfrisa et al, C-110/98 to C-147/98, EU:C:2000:145, paragraph 34 
984 Judgment of 17 September 1997, Dorsch Consult, C-54/96, EU:C:1997:413, paragraph 24 
985 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1068 
986 Judgment of 6 October 1981, Broekmeulen, Case 246/80, EU:C:1981:218 
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case of investment arbitration is that the State is also a party to the proceedings. This 
means that the composition of the tribunal is decided by the parties, but at the same time 
the State is involved. In any case, the State is involved on the stage of drafting and 
concluding the respective investment treaty that provides for arbitration and this can be 
considered as much essential as in its absence, no arbitration agreement would exist at 
all.987  
It is permanent 
Generally, investment tribunals are established ad hoc and, notwithstanding that there is 
no any legal authority on the CJEU case law establishing that an ad hoc judicial body 
cannot qualify as a ‘court or tribunal’ under the auspices of Article 267 TFEU, this 
obviously conflicts with the criterion of permanence. Interestingly, in the case of Danfoss, 
the Court approached the requirement of permanence as being satisfied once the judicial 
body has general jurisdiction to decide a particular type of legal dispute.988 Legal scholars 
support that where there are both general jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and specific 
procedural provisions regulating the composition of the tribunal, it can be recognised that 
these factors establish permanence in a broad sense, notwithstanding the fact that the 
particular tribunal seized is of an ad hoc character.989 The same approach can apply for 
investment arbitration, and particularly for ICSID arbitration, which is absolutely 
institutionalised. Moreover, the need for a direct relationship between investment 
tribunals and the CJEU is most evident in the case of ICSID arbitration where the 
                                                                
987 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1069 
988 See Opinion of Attorney General Lenz of 31 May 1989, Danfoss, Case 109/88, EU:C:1989:383, 
paragraph 21 
989 S. Hindelang, ‘Circumventing primacy of EU law and the CJEU’s judicial monopoly by resorting to 
dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in inter-se Treaties?’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic 
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possibility for involvement of domestic courts that could bridge the EU law gap is 
limited. 990  Since ICSID has a complete system of appeal and institutional control, 
domestic courts are not involved, by exercising either auxiliary or supervisory role, in 
ICSID arbitration at all. Thus, the only way for questions of EU law to be resolved by the 
EU judges is by allowing ICSID arbitral tribunals to use the preliminary reference 
procedure.  
It has compulsory jurisdiction 
The case law of the CJEU lacks consistency regarding this requirement. The criterion of 
compulsory jurisdiction has been interpreted as encompassing the requirements that the 
parties are obliged to resolve their dispute before the judicial body in question and that 
the decision given is binding on them.991 Though sometimes the latter is treated as a 
distinct element, in any case it is easy to be proved for the case of investment arbitration 
since the awards are always final and binding unless one of the exhaustive grounds for 
annulment or non-enforcement applies. 
The difficulty arises on proving the former requirement. In Nordsee case and the rest of 
the cases that followed the same line of reasoning, it was established that the judicial body 
should not give to the parties the freedom of choice of their jurisdictional forum.992 What 
it means is that the jurisdiction of the judicial body should be mandatory in the sense that 
the parties do not have other choice but to submit their dispute to that judicial body as 
opposed to any other. At a first glance, this requirement is contrary to investment 
arbitration, to the extent that investors are given the option to bring a claim to the national 
                                                                
990 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
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991 M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (1st edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 65 
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courts of the host State. Nevertheless, a more in-depth examination of this requirement 
might shed some light on this matter. What is essential is that parties are under the 
mandatory jurisdiction of the judicial body once they opt for it, irrespective of whether 
another judicial body, including the national courts, are also available. For example, in 
the Broeckmeulen case, the Appeals Committee for General Medicine sought to make a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU which was accepted, despite the fact that its 
jurisdiction might not have been compulsory. 993  In fact, the individuals under the 
particular scheme had the option to bring proceedings either before the Appeals 
Committee or before the national courts of Netherlands. The Court held that where a 
professional body is authorised by the relevant Member State to implement some aspects 
of EU law and also provides for an appeal mechanism that relates to rights of individuals 
arising from EU law, it should be allowed to directly refer questions of EU law to the 
CJEU based on Article 267 TFEU.994  
The same approach could be adopted to the case of investment arbitration to the extent 
that EU law becomes relevant and applicable. In particular, in spite of the fact that 
investors are able to bring proceedings in the national courts of the host State, it is 
important and sufficient that BITs signed by Member States provide for investment 
arbitration, the finality of awards and the grounds for challenges before national courts. 
In other words, though investors can sue the host State on the Member States courts, this 
does not render the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal not compulsory. 
                                                                
993 Judgment of 6 October 1981, Broekmeulen, Case 246/80, EU:C:1981:218 
994 See also Judgment of 30 March 2006, Emanuel, C-259/04, EU:C:2006:215. In this case, the fact that 
the applicant had a choice between the Person Appointed by the Lord Chancellor under the UK Trade 
Marks Act 1994 and either the High Court in England or the Court of Session in Scotland, did not render 
its jurisdiction non-mandatory. 
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Even from a more ‘practical’ or realistic point of view, the jurisdiction of investment 
arbitration can be proved de facto compulsory. In essence, if an investor wants a neutral 
forum with the appropriate expertise for challenging the legality of acts by the host State, 
his sole option is to use the investment arbitration avenue, as opposed to the domestic 
courts of the host State. To sum up, according to the rulings of Nordsee 995  and 
Broeckmeulen,996 the jurisdiction of investment tribunal can be considered compulsory, 
both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.  
It is ‘of a Member State’ 
Finally, Article 267 TFEU can cover investment tribunals only if they are ‘of a Member 
State’, and this requirement is in conflict with the international nature of investment law 
disputes. Though from a strict point of view, an investment tribunal does not belong to a 
specific Member State, the requirement set out in Article 267 TFEU has been interpreted 
by the CJEU broadly.  A remarkable example is the case of Dior which established that 
the Benelux Court of Justice, which is a court not of ‘a Member State’ but of several 
Member States, was found compatible with the wording of Article 267 TFEU, based on 
the argument that this Court’s mandate was to ensure the uniformity of application of 
those laws that were shared by the three Benelux States. 997  On the other hand, the 
Complaints Board was not held to qualify as ‘of a Member State’ in the European Schools 
case, due to the absence of any relation with the judicial system of any Member State.998 
In the wording of the CJEU, the Complaints Board constituted ‘a body of an international 
organization which… remains formally distinct from it and from the Member States’.999  
                                                                
995 Judgment of 23 March 1982, Nordsee Deutsche, Case-102/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 
996 Judgment of 6 October 1981, Broekmeulen, Case 246/80, EU:C:1981:218 
997 Judgment of 4 November 1997, Dior, C-337/95, EU:C:1997:517, paragraphs 21 et seq 
998 Judgment of 14 June 2011, European Schools, C-196/09, EU:C:2011:388, paragraph 41 
999 Ibid., paragraph 42 
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Thus, some analogies should be drawn between investment tribunals and the Benelux 
Court in Dior case, as opposed to the Complaints Board in the European Schools case, 
based on any potential links between investment tribunals and the judicial systems of 
Member States. Firstly and most importantly, national courts serve an auxiliary and a 
supervisory role in arbitration proceedings, as it was explained in a previous section, by 
providing assistance and support to arbitral tribunals and also be responsible for the 
annulment, recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards and are bound by them. 
Furthermore, in contradiction with the European Schools case, investment tribunals are 
not accountable to any international organization that is independent from Member States. 
Even in the case of ICSID investment arbitration, where one cannot deny the involvement 
of an international organization, the awards are binding on the relevant Member States, 
which should ensure their enforcement, and not on any organization.  
5. Summary of findings 
If investment tribunals were allowed to trigger Article 267 TFEU and use the preliminary 
reference mechanism, this would bring numerous advantages not only for the parties 
themselves, but also for EU law, public international law and arbitration in general.  
Firstly, parties would be more confident regarding the finality of the award. An award 
can be challenged on the ground of public policy of the seat of arbitration and of the 
country of enforcement, and, after the Eco Swiss case,1000 it can also be challenged on the 
ground of EU public policy too. In practice, this means that the parties to an investment 
treaty arbitration which relates to rules of EU law cannot be sure for the actual 
enforcement of their award until a Member State court rules on the compatibility of the 
award with EU public policy.  In other words, the fact that investment treaty arbitration 
                                                                
1000 Judgment of 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss, C-126/97, EU:C:1999:269 
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is sometimes called to consider question of EU law creates a notable legal uncertainty 
regarding the enforceability of the award given.1001 One way to deal with this issue, is to 
stay the proceedings in arbitration until the relevant questions of EU law are clarified. 
Instead of resolving the problem, this option actually creates a new problem, namely how 
the relevant questions of EU law can be clarified. Giving this role to the European 
Commission and asking it to commence infringement proceedings against the Member 
State involved in any case an arbitral tribunal is sought to decide matters regarding EU 
law, does not solve the problem. It might aim at ensuring the uniform application of EU 
law throughout the Union and by all judicial and extra-judicial bodies, but it adversely 
affects the independence of international investment arbitration, since it would somehow 
be accountable to the European Commission.1002 In contrast, proceeding with the option 
of enabling investment tribunals to make preliminary references to the CJEU themselves, 
allows arbitral tribunals to preserve their independence and also ensures the uniform and 
correct interpretation and application of EU law. Even if some extra delays might be 
caused by using the preliminary reference proceedings, this delay is clearly outweighed 
by the risk of having similar delay at a much later stage of the proceedings,1003 namely in 
case the national court asks for a preliminary ruling at the stage of enforcement of the 
award.  
Secondly, EU law could also benefit from this suggestion, mainly because the 
interpretation and application of EU law will be exclusively dependent on the CJEU. In 
                                                                
1001 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1074 
1002 See S. Hindelang, ‘Circumventing primacy of EU law and the CJEU’s judicial monopoly by resorting 
to dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in inter-se Treaties?’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 179, at 198 and T. Eilmansberger, ‘Bilateral investment treaties and EU law’ (2009) 46 
Common Market Law Review, 383, at 405 et seq. 
1003 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1075 
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other words, any relevant question of EU law, and not only matters of EU public policy, 
will be reviewed by the CJEU.  
Thirdly, from the public international law perspective, direct referrals to the CJEU by 
investment arbitral tribunals would augment their position in the international legal order 
and would strengthen their role in the development of law in general, as investment 
tribunals would be appropriate to construe any relevant matters of EU law.  Furthermore, 
‘it would remove the “Damocles sword” hanging over the “finality” of arbitral awards 
that may face non-enforceability within the EU due to non-compliance with EU public 
policy’.1004 Due to the absence of specific definition of EU public policy, the risk of 
having the losing party, mainly the respondent State, to seek for an exceedingly broad 
application of the concept of EU public policy is very high. It thus constitutes a real threat 
for the whole system of international investment arbitration and its effective operation, 
which is mainly based on the finality of the arbitral awards and the limited grounds for 
their annulment and non-enforcement.  
Irrespective of the important advantages analysed above, one should not ignored a worth-
mentioning conflict between EU law and International investment arbitration that can 
operate as a disadvantage for investment arbitration regime. As discussed in Chapter 5, a 
pivotal characteristic of international arbitration is the fact that it constitutes a confidential 
dispute resolution mechanism, while the majority of national litigation lack 
confidentiality. In essence, litigation hearings and court dockets are open to the public, 
competitors, press and regulators, and disclosure of evidence and submissions are made 
publicly.1005 In contrast, arbitral hearings are almost always closed to public and the press, 
                                                                
1004 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1076 
1005 G. B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, 2012) 14 
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and the submissions of the parties and tribunals' awards remain confidential. Regarding 
courts at the EU level, Article 15 TFEU establishes the public right of access to 
documents of all the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Specifically for the 
CJEU, the ordinary access to documents provisions apply only when it exercises its 
administrative tasks.1006 Therefore, by allowing arbitral tribunals to use the preliminary 
reference mechanism under Article 267 TFEU and ask the CJEU to give rulings on the 
interpretation of EU law provisions, the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings would de 
facto be abolished. This thesis does not aim to proceed into an in-depth discussion of this 
matter, but it only mentions it as a possible limitation on the inclusion of arbitral tribunals 
on the scope of application of Article 267 TFEU.  
  
                                                                
1006Article 15 TFEU 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
After studying the traditional approach of EU law towards arbitration and its relationship 
with International Investment law, the above analysis illustrates, inter alia, that ISDS 
creates various controversial effects on the autonomy of EU legal order, whose response 
could only be innovative negotiations and radical changes on the structure of both legal 
orders, that is EU law regime and International investment law. Notwithstanding that 
CETA became somehow innovative on the matter, the conflict between EU legal order 
and ISDS still exists, and it remains to see whether the negotiations on TTIP could offer 
a radical solution on the threat that investor-state tribunals poses over the autonomy of 
EU law. In any case, it is argued that if the CJEU were asked to give an opinion on the 
issue, the conclusions would be unfavourable to the ISDS.  
It has also be examined whether the ICS can be recognised either as a court or as an 
arbitral tribunal. Section iii of this chapter indicates that even a semi-permanent dispute 
settlement institution with members that have been regularly appointed by States instead 
of the disputing parties can qualify as arbitration. Consequently, the EU makes some 
affirmative steps towards incorporating arbitration (even impliedly) in its legal order. 
Finally, four legal arguments have been discussed in support of a future role of arbitration 
on the EU legal regime, focusing on Article 344 TFEU, Article 19(1) TEU, the mandate 
of courts and arbitral tribunals and Article 267 TFEU. Admittedly, if investment tribunals 
could use the preliminary reference mechanism, this would bring numerous advantages 
not only for the parties themselves, but also for EU law, public international law and 
arbitration in general. Notwithstanding that both Article 344 TFEU and Article 19(1) 
TEU can constitute a basis for proving that arbitration does have a place in the EU judicial 
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system, direct references to the CJEU would constitute the most effective and drastic 
solution to ensure that investment arbitral tribunals are embraced in the EU law regime. 
As a point of last minute, Advocate General Wathelet gave an Opinion which comes in 
full support to most arguments developed in this section.1007  In particular, in a case 
concerning the compatibility of the arbitration clause in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT 
with EU law the Advocate General expressed the view that arbitral tribunals should be 
allowed to use the preliminary reference mechanism, since they are created in the basis 
of binding legal provisions, those being the relevant BITs, belong to a permanent 
arbitration system established by the two Member States concerned, their jurisdiction is 
compulsory, and they operate in complete independence and impartiality, according to 
the rule of law. Thus, it is supported that arbitration is compatible with Article 267 TFEU. 
Moreover, the Advocate General discussed the relationship of arbitration with Article 344 
TFEU and argued that the Article concerns only disputes between Member States or 
between Member States and the EU, and not investor-State disputes. Finally, the 
argument brought by the European Commission that EU law sufficiently protects 
investors, particularly through the Charter, was rejected, since BITs offer broader 
protection than the EU Treaties, but remain compatible with EU law. 
  
                                                                
1007 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 19 September 2017, Achmea, C-284/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:699 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to identify whether courts within the EU effectively protect 
bank depositors and whether arbitration would offer additional protection, especially in 
the light of the current global financial crisis. This was achieved by examining selective 
case law of national, EU and supranational courts and awards given by international 
tribunals in this area. In order to consider and compare the approach of courts and arbitral 
tribunals towards the protection of bank depositors during the financial crisis, this thesis’s 
measure of assessment is based on the right of effective judicial protection, as it is 
preserved in the Charter, the ECHR and the EU Treaties and the relevant case law. 
Accordingly this thesis posed the following research questions:  
1) What is the nature of bank deposits and what are the rights of depositors? Which 
of those rights have been affected by the financial measures adopted by the EU 
and/or the Member States and how? 
2) Which approach have the courts, which are dealing with the case of bank 
depositors, taken? Which has been the corresponding approach of arbitration? 
Have they offered effective protection to bank depositors?  
3) What role, if any, could arbitration play in order to protect depositors effectively? 
What is the relationship between arbitration and litigation in the EU legal order 
and, generally, in the context of the global financial crisis?  
Initiating with the Literature Review, various assumptions were made. Firstly, concerning 
access to justice, the legal regime of EU law and the ECHR may cause significant delays 
that can operate as an obstacle to effective judicial protection. In essence, when the 
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applicants’ cases reached EU courts, they were reverted to their national courts. They are 
thus asked to go through the same procedure twice, by submitting new applications before 
their national courts and wait until they reach the highest courts, and only then they are 
allowed to file an application to the ECtHR, due to the exhaustion rule provided in Article 
35 ECHR. Moreover, an impediment of effective, though not judicial, protection for 
foreign investors could be the principle of State immunity, which may be invoked by the 
Respondent States, in order to avoid arbitration proceedings on the measures adopted. 
Secondly, regarding the right to property and its alleged violations during the financial 
crisis, effective protection of bank depositors within the EU may be affected by the variety 
of provisions on ownership and possession, since its regulation belongs to the discretion 
of Member States. Thirdly, in relation to the principle of proportionality, it is challenged 
whether it is applicable in the context of the crisis. Due to the fact that most mechanisms 
employed by the Eurozone Member States in order to counter the financial crisis were 
determined to fall outside the scope of the EU legal order, it can be argued that probably 
Member States have been given the absolute freedom to act the way they wish, beyond 
any control of the proportionality of their actions at the EU level. However, in any case, 
the principle of proportionality constitutes a constitutional right, which means that all 
national courts are obliged to consider when deciding all their cases. Moreover, by 
comparing the principle of proportionality under EU law and under the ECHR, it was 
concluded that the obligation imposed by the Union on Member States to ensure 
proportionality is ‘softer’ than the one imposed by ECHR. Based on this comparative 
result, this thesis assumes that the ECtHR is more likely to declare the measures adopted 
to deal with the Eurozone financial crisis disproportionate and thus in violation of human 
rights in future litigation rather than the EU courts. Finally, while the principle of 
proportionality does not officially exist in International Investment law, it is expected to 
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be applied by arbitrators in the context of this thesis, because the defence of necessity can 
constitute a basic argument for the protection of the State’s interests. In particular, the 
public interest element is crucial, thus the application of the principle of proportionality 
by arbitrators may be unavoidable.  
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, this thesis firstly comparatively examined the 
nature of bank deposits under some national legal orders, under EU law, under Public 
International law, and, finally, under International Investment law. The case law of the 
ECHR clearly establishes that bank deposits fall within the scope of protection of Article 
1 of Protocol 1 ECHR. After analysing the key features of ‘investment’ under economic 
and financial sciences and under International and EU law, this thesis argues that though 
some of the principal characteristics of investments are present in bank deposits, most 
importantly the assumption of risk, there are other characteristics whose presence is 
controversial, such as the long-term duration. Moreover, the fact that some BITs 
expressly cover bank deposits also strengthens the argument that bank deposits are 
investments for the purposes of investment arbitration. In summary, Chapter 3 supported 
and explained that although bank deposits cannot be regarded as investments up to the 
amount protected by the deposit guarantee schemes, they can be regarded as investments 
for the unsecured amount, i.e. the amount that is not secured under the relevant DGS. The 
importance of deciding whether bank deposits qualify as investments lies in the further 
allowance or prevention of the protection of depositors by the provisions of investment 
law and the availability of international investment arbitration for the resolution of their 
disputes and their effective protection during the financial crisis. 
This thesis then proceeded to examine some landmark cases on the austerity measures 
adopted by Eurozone Member States in receipt of financial assistance or on the new legal 
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concepts and procedures in the context of the EMU. It was found that the differences 
between the macroeconomic adjustment programmes provided for each Member State, 
the traditions of each court in exercising judicial control, and the on-going litigation at 
national level and before the CJEU and the ECtHR justify some differences among the 
rulings given at different levels.  
This examination showed that at the national level, courts remained highly deferential 
when dealing with reforms of the EMU and slightly less deferential when dealing with 
national measures in the same area. This extent of deference can be explained based in 
the concerns of domestic judges of possible adverse consequences of a negative decision 
and of intervening in areas of political process and sensitive emergency circumstances. 
Similarly, the CJEU preferred to detach itself from scrutinising the legality of the ESM 
Treaty and declared inadmissible all applications made to review the compliance of 
national measures and the MoUs with the general principle of law and the Charter. 
Furthermore, it declared that the EU institutions were not involved in the conclusion of 
the MoUs and the financial assistance programmes, since they were not acting as organs 
of EU law at that time. Importantly, the EFTA Court refused to impose any responsibility 
on the State to compensate affected depositors, and prefer to shift all the burden on the 
DGS itself. Finally, the ECtHR’s case law on the Eurozone crisis is mainly based on the 
argument that the economic crisis at stake constituted a major threat for the Eurozone, but 
also for the Union as a whole, so most measures adopted were declared proportionate and 
States were given a wide margin of appreciation. 
The first conclusion reached is that the nature of the subject matter of the disputes, which 
requires particular expertise and democratic legitimacy, and the emergent character of the 
measures at stake, constitute the basic obstacle to judicial review, though such review 
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seems more necessary for individuals than ever before. Besides, by refusing any link of 
EU law and the EU institutions with the MoUs means that, de facto, no legal organ within 
the EU legal order remains eligible to examine the protection of citizens’ fundamental, 
economic and social rights considering this field. 
This thesis then concluded that from a procedural scope of view all courts have offered 
sufficiently effective judicial protection, since applicants enjoyed access to justice and a 
fair trial. However, most of the rulings given only gave priority on economic and political 
considerations and the survival of the Eurozone, thus they have not focused on the 
protection of individuals’ rights. The tendency identified that holds some of the most 
important actions taken in response to the crisis, with the European Commission and the 
ECB playing a crucial role in their adoption, to fall outside the scope of EU law and the 
jurisdiction of the European courts, limits the judicial protection of individuals on their 
national courts. National courts, from their side, seem reluctant to shift their focus towards 
the effects of the measures under challenges on the citizens. At this point it should be 
clarified that in no case the author supports that public interest should not be taken into 
consideration. In essence, what the author supports is that the courts, in their effort to 
apply the principle of proportionality in the context of the financial crisis, have not 
weighed the interests of individuals correctly, since they primarily focused on the public 
interest dimension to such an extent that balance was not achieved between the two. 
Having in mind that courts’ responsibility is to protect both States and citizens, it can be 
concluded that the aforementioned misapplication of the proportionality principle has 
resulted in an insufficient effectiveness of substantial judicial protection.   
After examining the approach of national, supranational and international courts towards 
the protection of bank depositors during the financial crisis, this thesis proceeded to the 
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position that international arbitration has adopted when arbitrators were asked to review 
the conformity of the post-crisis measures adopted at the EU and national level with the 
standards afforded to the protection of foreign investors. For this purpose, the Abaclat v 
Argentina case1008 has operated as a benchmark and an indication of how other arbitral 
tribunals in the pending cases could approach the matters of financial instruments as 
investments, and the financial crisis. The fact that most arbitral cases regarding the 
Eurozone are still pending renders any conclusion drawn, at least for the time being, 
somehow premature. As a matter of procedure, at this point the thesis reiterates the 
conclusion made in the previous chapter, namely that all arbitral tribunals have offered 
sufficiently effective protection, in the sense that the applicants’ rights of access to justice 
and a fair trial have been respected. Consequently, comparatively, both litigation and 
arbitration satisfy the principle of effective (judicial) protection.  
By comparing the approach of courts and arbitral tribunals towards the protection of bank 
depositors, this thesis reaches the conclusion that one basic difference between them lies 
on the ground of jurisdiction. In particular, while courts denied jurisdiction to hear the 
cases that concern the financial crisis, by declaring that they are not involved in the scope 
of EU law, arbitral tribunals are more likely to assume jurisdiction and proceed to the 
merits of the disputes, as happened in the case of Abaclat and as it is expected to happen 
in cases that were brought by shareholders that clearly fall under the scope of the relevant 
BIT. Based on this, it is suggested that arbitration offer more effective protection than 
litigation, in the sense that applicants are given the possibility to present their arguments 
on the merits of their cases instead of being rejected at the initial stage of jurisdiction. It 
should be repeated here that the limited information on the arbitration cases, due to the 
confidentiality principle and the fact that most cases are still pending, constitutes a 
                                                                
1008 Abaclat and others v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/07/5) 
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reservation of the thesis. While, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, no legal organ within the EU 
legal order remained available for them, the only available forum for individuals; judicial 
protection is their national courts, and particularly on their national district courts, which 
prefer to remain detached from any political consideration and whose rulings are given 
with considerable delay. This is the reason why arbitration can operate as the only 
available forum where individuals can have their disputes being heard, at least those 
individuals who fall within the scope of a BIT or any other agreement that provides for 
arbitration. 
Finally, this thesis discussed the role of arbitration in the EU legal order. The traditional 
approach of EU law towards arbitration in general and, in particular, investment 
arbitration, proves that ISDS creates various controversial effects on the autonomy of EU 
legal order, whose response could only be innovative negotiations and radical changes on 
the structure of both the EU law regime and International investment law.  
It was submitted that never before in the history of the Union was the jurisdiction of an 
external judicial system to decide disputes by individuals recognised as compatible with 
EU law, due to the fact that this task constitutes a competence of the EU courts. 
Accordingly, any agreement that provide for this kind of external judicial body were held 
compatible with EU law only when the competence of such body does not cover disputes 
that involve individuals or when the disputes involve individuals but do not relate with 
the Union or any Member State. 
This thesis identified that although the CETA became somehow innovative on the matter, 
the conflict between EU legal order and ISDS has not been abolished, and it remains to 
see whether the negotiations on TTIP could offer a thorough solution on the threat that 
investor-state tribunals poses over the autonomy of EU law. Moreover, after discussing 
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whether the ICS can be recognised either as a court or as an arbitral tribunal, this thesis 
supports that even a semi-permanent dispute settlement institution with members that 
have been regularly appointed by States instead of the disputing parties can qualify as 
arbitration. This thesis submits four legal arguments in support of a future role of 
arbitration on the EU legal regime, focusing on Article 344 TFEU, Article 19(1) TEU, 
the different mandates of the two systems and Article 267 TFEU.  
The wording of Article 344 TFEU implies that its scope of application concerns only 
disputes between Member States, this argument being supported by case law and legal 
scholars. Since Article 344 TFEU prohibits a Member State from submitting to an arbitral 
tribunal ‘any dispute with another Member State involving questions relating to the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties’,1009 this thesis supports that disputes between 
a Member State and a private individual, as in the case of investor-State arbitration, can 
be resolved through arbitration and remain compatible with EU law.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure the autonomy of EU law, 1010 Article 19(1) TEU renders 
the CJEU the exclusive judicial body that should interpret and apply EU law. In other 
words, any interpretation of provisions of EU law made by a court or other body that is 
not encompassed in the scope of Article 19(1) TEU and without the possibility of review 
by the CJEU is in contrast with its exclusive jurisdiction. While most of the substantive 
provisions of BITs are included in the scope of EU law, the Literature Review 
demonstrated that Member States are entitled to regulate their property law independently 
and EU law does not contain a general principle of compensation. As it was noticed, there 
                                                                
1009 K. V. Papp, ‘Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State courts bridge the 
jurisdictional divide between Investment tribunals and the ECJ? A plea for direct referral from Investment 
tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1039, at 1054 
1010 Opinion of 8 March 2011, European and Community Patents Court, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, 
paragraph 35; Opinion of 18 April 2002, ECAA Agreement, Opinion 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, paragraphs 11 
and 12 
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is a lack of EU law rules regarding the protection of the right to property of investors 
against infringements on property rights resulting from ‘pure’ national measures. 
Therefore, investor-State arbitration that asks for protection against expropriation or 
compensation for losses resulting from national measures does not affect the primacy and 
autonomy of EU law, since the EU principles on this area do not cover it ‘in large 
measure.’ Thus, the thesis argues that the provisions on the protection of the property 
rights of foreign investors in the host State against political risk and expropriation does 
not fall within the scope of EU law, so it does not violate Article 19(1) TEU.  
Moreover, a comparison between the mandates of arbitral tribunals with the mandates of 
the CJEU showed that the only conflicting point between the two is the monetary 
compensation by arbitral tribunals with the damages for non-contractual liability of Union 
institutions by the CJEU. Apart from this, the CJEU’s exclusive competence on the 
consistent interpretation and application of EU law throughout the Union cannot be 
affected by the function of arbitral tribunals. In essence, arbitral awards cannot affect the 
validity measures adopted at the EU level or at the national level. An award’s effects 
concern only the particular parties on the dispute and can result in remedying an affected 
individual or company that their rights have been infringed by an action of the host State. 
Thus, the inclusion of arbitration in the EU legal order does not contradict the primary 
role of the CJEU.  
Finally, the thesis developed the argument that investment tribunals could use the 
preliminary reference mechanism under Article 267 TFEU. The author argues that once 
this approach is taken, this would bring numerous advantages not only for the parties 
themselves, but also for EU law, public international law and arbitration in general. 
Despite the fact that both Article 344 TFEU and Article 19(1) TEU are argued to  
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constitute a sufficient legal basis supporting that arbitration does have an active role in 
the EU judicial system, direct references to the CJEU can be the most effective and drastic 
solution to ensure that investment arbitral tribunals are embraced in the EU law regime.  
It is anticipated that the proposals asserted and argued in Chapter 7 will enhance 
discussion on the contribution and value of methods of protection for bank depositors 
against the measures imposed countering the financial crisis that heavily affected them. 
If it is accepted that arbitration does have a place in the EU legal order, and based on the 
argument that bank deposits qualify as investment, then bank depositors can enjoy the 
protection offered by international investment arbitration. The case law discussed at 
Chapter 4 illustrated that courts’ protection, at least at the national and EU level, has 
lacked sufficient effectiveness, in the sense that the political and financial considerations 
have, in a sense, undervalued the rights of bank depositors. In contrast, the very nature of 
international arbitration, which focuses only on protecting the rights of the particular 
applicant in each case without affecting the relevant legal framework in general, can offer 
more effective protection to bank depositors.  
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